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And over there my Paladins
Are talking of effect and cause,
With “learn to live by nature’s laws!”
And “strive for social happiness
And contact with your fellow-men
In Reason: nothing to excess!”
As one leaves off the next begins.
—T. S. Eliot, “Convictions (Curtain Raiser)” (1910)
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Historicisms
Old, New, and Discontented
The history of the Victorian Age will never be written: we know too
much about it. For ignorance is the first requisite of the historian—
ignorance, which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits,
with a placid perfection unattainable by the highest art.
—Lytton Strachey, Eminent Victorians (1918)
Like most aphorisms worth remembering, Lytton Strachey’s famous open-
ing to Eminent Victorians is funny, economical, and, from the point of view
of his target, achingly unfair. Its manifest content might be perfectly
acceptable: Many Victorians shared Strachey’s disdain for the standard life-
and-letters biographical treatment, and for the tendency to flood the mar-
ketplace with bulky volumes of journals, letters, and reminiscences of even
minor figures. What would have been truly painful, from a nineteenth-
century perspective, is Strachey’s apparently cavalier, though actually stud-
ied and, arguably, feigned, disdain for historical facts. In the nineteenth
century’s self-image, historical consciousness was a salient insight under-
pinning various forms of thought, including geology, biology, biblical crit-
icism, philosophy, political economy, sociology, and the arts.1 And a cru-
cial part of historical consciousness involves recognizing the gaps in the
historical record, coming to grips, in other words, with the difficult real-
ization of how irretrievable the past really is. While this realization could
tinge some Victorian historiography with melancholy, Strachey cheerfully
implies that whatever we do not know, we are better off not knowing. The
brilliance of this aphorism stems from his conflating of a minor joke about
Victorian logorrhea with a repudiation of nineteenth-century historicism.
By contrasting his own approach with “the direct method of a scrupulous
narration” (1), Strachey wittily yokes two central historiographical con-
cerns: What can historical narration hope to achieve, and is there concep-
tual value to elements that elude narration?
At the risk of overreading a minor joke, we can also see here how nar-
1
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rowly Strachey confines his sense of “history”: History is an epistemology,
a mode of knowing the past.2 He strikes a faux-Arnoldian note in these
lines, as he laments modernists’ inability to gain the distance necessary for
a correct perspective on the past.3 The notoriously prolix Victorians thus
frustrate our desire to understand them—though, of course, Strachey
believes he knows them all too well. Many modern readers of Victorian
fiction align themselves with Strachey: those novels that take on specific
moments in history are, as my title suggests, “lost causes”—either lost
because they fail adequately to replicate the events of the past they prom-
ise to construct, or lost because they fail to capture our imaginations about
history or historical consciousness.
There is, however, another dimension to Victorian engagements with
history: For many Victorians, and here I would include Thomas Carlyle,
Charles Dickens, Charlotte Brontë, and George Eliot among others, his-
tory has an ontological, as well as an epistemological, dimension. For these
writers, there is an element of history that always exceeds our understand-
ing. We can know many elements about the past, but there is always an
irreconcilable dimension to it. This is not to be lamented; rather, it is the
condition of our knowledge, our action, and our identity in the present.
Because the past is partially lost, there can be a present; because we can-
not know everything about it, we are driven to learn as much as we can
about it. Not because our knowledge of the past would one day become
complete, but rather because the past’s inaccessibility gives us room to
speak. Perversely, then, the fact that the past is lost is not only why we have
to write history, but it is also why we have a history at all.4 And that is pre-
cisely the “lost cause” that interests me here.
When we grasp the Victorians’ interest in history’s ontological dimen-
sions, we recognize that they strive neither to represent the real transpar-
ently nor to argue for simple fables of progress. By contrast, the texts I
interpret in the following chapters—including Carlyle’s The French
Revolution (1837); Dickens’s Barnaby Rudge (1839–41) and A Tale of Two
Cities (1859); Brontë’s Shirley (1849); and Eliot’s Felix Holt (1866) and
Middlemarch (1871–72)—indicate that such stories of progress cannot
account fully for either Victorian England’s turbulent debates over politi-
cal representation and industrialization, or the apparently widespread
experience of alienation from history.
Rather than considering these texts as ahistorical or as uninterested in
history, then, Lost Causes claims that they articulate, at the limits of histor-
ical narrative, surprising models of causation that, by emphasizing contin-
gency and aesthetic or linguistic factors that resist meaning, arguably per-
mit historical change. Written during a period that saw the ubiquitous,
even virulent, spread of historical argumentation, the texts I examine try
Introduction2
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to show how social and subjective realms connect, thus undermining two
fantasies: that we are the authors of our own identities, and that we are the
effect of historical forces. These apparently contradictory fantasies are actu-
ally complementary: They are two extreme responses to history, the first
denying agency to historical forces, the second pretending that we have no
responsibility for our actions.5 Rather than accept this false choice, the
writers I examine suggest that history and subjective experience are incom-
mensurate, and are only partially legible to each other.6 This does not
imply that the Victorian novel focuses on private experience as a retreat
from the social world; on the contrary, the texts I address show how his-
torical explanations cannot fully account for even the coherence of a plot,
much less such vexed problems as identity or the progress of society. And
as we shall see, the claim that history and the subjective are only partially
legible to each other has wider-ranging implications than one might
expect.
To put this slightly differently, Victorian writers emphasize how neither
individual will nor ideology can fully explain either the social world or pri-
vate experience. If Victorian writers claimed only that historical forces can-
not account for the richness of subjective experience, then we would be
justified in calling them ahistorical.7 Instead, in these novels characters find
themselves stymied by both the world and their own surprisingly “obsti-
nate” desires.
I borrow “obstinate” from an Edwardian novel, Arnold Bennett’s The
Old Wives’ Tale (1908), which recounts how Sophia Baines is often thwart-
ed by what the narrator calls an “obstinate instinct” (439). Relatively
unconstrained by social expectations, Sophia nevertheless frequently finds
herself internally blocked from acting on her desires. At moments when its
readers expected to find characters acting freely, The Old Wives’ Tale thus
dramatizes an obstinate resistance to symbolization, to history, and to con-
sciousness.8 Lost Causes argues that Victorian writers frequently appeal to
this obstinacy when representing periods of tumultuous change; it mani-
fests itself in their novels as an undermining of narrative cohesion.
Two implications of this position should already be clear: First,
Victorian writers have much more interesting and nuanced approaches to
historical knowledge than has usually been understood. And second,
Victorian meditations on history are frequently more nuanced than the
critical vocabularies currently deployed to interpret them.9 My claim that
the incoherence and intractability of Victorian narratives about the past
has conceptual value, and is not merely a political or aesthetic failure, qual-
ifies recent discussions of the historical and social-problem novel genres,
and indeed requires a brief assessment of claims made about Victorian real-
ism. Debates about the nineteenth-century novel, whether in the period or
Historicisms: Old, New, and Discontented 3
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now, frequently turn out to hang on assumptions about causes and effects,
and about our desire to arrange these in coherent, meaningful narratives.
The writers I examine share in common a mistrust of “the direct
method of scrupulous narration,” if such a method purports to copy real-
ity transparently. We should thus characterize differently their narratives,
even the novelists’ interest in realism: These and other Victorian writers
are keenly interested in the limits of historiographic models of narrative,
especially when those models attempt to represent the identities of per-
sons, institutions, or communities as potentially unified. Understood in
this way, I propose, the inability of historical plots to cohere represents not
an aesthetic failure, but an interest in the contradictory ways that the
social and subjective realms intersect.10 Indeed, I argue that Victorian nov-
elists sometimes engage historical plots not to show how society holds
together, but rather to capture intractable dimensions about society. From
this perspective, their often baffling representation of social conflict is
strategic rather than ideological.
Attending to Victorian novelists’ skepticism about historical narrative,
especially narratives of origin, means rethinking the conventional charge
that the Victorian novel becomes increasingly ahistorical and politically
quietist over the course of the century.11 Victorian intellectuals were
famously self-conscious, even anxious, about the rapid political, techno-
logical, and economic transformation of their society, and historians’
attempts to explain those transformations could offer perspectival solace
for doubts about the pace of change. In the pages that follow, I want not
to recapitulate the development of Victorian historicism,12 but rather to
unpack a specific mistrust of that historicism: Friedrich Nietzsche’s com-
plaints about “The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.”
Nietzsche’s formulation, I’ll soon show, helps us reframe both Victorian
novels’ understanding of historical change and temporality as well as more
contemporary debates between historicism and psychoanalysis; indeed,
following this strand arguably permits us to see the deep fascination his-
tory has for psychoanalysis, and, in turn, the way a historically minded
approach to psychoanalytic interpretation can help us read Victorian fic-
tion more vividly.
Concerned on many levels about wedding science and history and its
stakes for advancing the nineteenth century, Nietzsche suggested in 1874
that a scientific approach to history encourages us to view the world with
false tolerance, and to disavow any responsibility for the present or
future.13 For Nietzsche: “And what we see is certainly a star, a gleaming /
and glorious star interposing itself, the constellation / has really been
altered—by science, by the demand / that history should be a science” (77,
emp. in original). Had almost any other nineteenth-century figure
Introduction4
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invoked it, Nietzsche’s star would celebrate the extensive relationship,
newly theorized in that century, between life and history: Reason’s light
finally illuminates our identity as clearly as it does the surrounding world.
A newly scientific approach to history discloses more and more truths
about who we are and where we have come from—indeed, some
nineteenth-century historians even claim to predict the future.
Here, Nietzsche advances two invaluable arguments about the relation-
ship of history to life: First, a falsely scientific historicism masks our own
egoism; second, authentic history is an after-the-fact response to an enig-
matic, oracular past. This belated rewriting of a vatic past is, Nietzsche
argues, a mode of fantasmatic hygiene: From time to time we need to
destroy our fantasies about history in order to be able to act in the present.
The primary thrust of Nietzsche’s argument is that historical conscious-
ness is not always healthy. In his view, we are accustomed to believing that
the study of history encourages a kind of modesty and justice. We recog-
nize that great deeds have been done before, and they were accompanied
by injustices. We also see that different cultures have varying solutions to
similar problems, which encourages relativism. Nietzsche counters this by
arguing that an untrammeled historical consciousness confuses the distinc-
tion between external circumstances and internal desires: “the individual
grows fainthearted and unsure and dares no longer believe in himself: he
sinks into his own interior depths, which here means into the accumulat-
ed lumber of what he has learned but which has no outward effect, of
instruction which does not become life” (84). Rather than focus on the
standard Nietzschean argument in favor of action, I want to foreground
the second half of this sentence, which claims that too much historical
consciousness leads us to retreat into the solitude of our thoughts, rather
than engaging the world. “Our thoughts,” however, are just the detritus of
historical awareness.14 Rather than extending our awareness, historical con-
sciousness risks leaving us impotent and confused.
Two consequences arise from this confusion of inside and outside, both
equally deplorable to Nietzsche. The first is that if we believe world-
historical forces drive historical progress, then it does not matter if we act
at all. Nietzsche claims that historical consciousness thus produces deca-
dence. A converse consequence is disingenuous action. Even if we do man-
age to act, we can always disavow responsibility by claiming that we are
simply carrying out history’s mandate. Not only does history thus provide
an alibi for our own egoism, but, as I have just shown, we cannot even
know our egoism properly. Whether we act or not, then, our decision will
always be undercut by our failure to see that even our private experience of
subjectivity reflects an accretion of historical determinants.
Rejecting scientific history, Nietzsche instead endorses a critical history.
Historicisms: Old, New, and Discontented 5
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He claims that the task of historiography is to free us from attitudes that
are no longer useful, thus opening up an opportunity to effect change.
Critical history does not develop new knowledge, but rather rewrites our
historical fantasies: “It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori,
a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which
one did originate:—always a dangerous attempt because it is so hard to
know the limit to denial of the past and because second natures are usual-
ly weaker than first” (76). This crucial sentence resists the argument that
historical narrative can fully account for causal relations; instead, it ren-
ders causation superfluous. After all, our own past is capable of producing
us, and so we do not need a “better” one. Nietzsche offers the paradox of
an effect trying to write its own cause, a paradox made possible by the dis-
tance between thought and its context.15 He also is careful to qualify the
risk of turning critical history into a mode of voluntarism: it is difficult to
know if we are rewriting enough, or too much, of the past, and it is hard
to know whether or how the new history will work.
Because Nietzsche’s account focuses wholly on critical history’s ability
to transform ideologies, he cannot eliminate the threat of voluntarism. He
tries to mitigate this threat by emphasizing the vatic element of history. He
argues that “[w]hen the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if
you are an architect of the future and know the present will you under-
stand it” (94). The meaning of the past is never settled or finite. Although
we inevitably interpret the past in light of our present concerns, that inter-
pretation is no truer than previous interpretations, and will someday be
superseded by the needs of another time. Critical history therefore can
profitably destroy the fantasies that blind us, but it cannot replace them
with more than newer fantasies.
Nietzsche’s argument usefully contests the view that history is a mode
of knowledge, and suggests that historical fantasy is at least as important
as fact. In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971), Michel Foucault
extends this insight, arguing that the point of history is to dissolve our
complacent sense of self-identity. Explaining that we tend to believe that
the origin of an institution or person contains the truth of it, Foucault
claims instead that stories of origins mask two kinds of multiplicity: they
hide our own lack of cohesion in the present, and equally hide the origin’s
lack of unity. Like Nietzsche, Foucault sees history as promoting a false
continuity, and urges an alternative, genealogy:
Genealogy does not pretend to go back in time to restore an unbro-
ken continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten
things; its duty is not to demonstrate that the past actively exists in
the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, hav-
Introduction6
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ing imposed a predetermined form to all its vicissitudes. Genealogy
does not resemble the evolution of a species and does not map the
destiny of a people. On the contrary, to follow the complex course
of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion;
it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or, converse-
ly, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the
faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to
exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do
not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exte-
riority of accidents. (146)
Foucault sees historical narratives as partaking in the genetic fallacy—the
argument that a thing remains identical with its origin. In this respect he
follows Nietzsche closely, since both see conventional historical narratives
as disabling. Meaningful action is not separate in such narratives from
what was already anticipated at some point in the past.  Foucault instead
argues that the contingency of events thwarts our narrative ambitions.16
Although we long to explain social transformations in causal terms, he
contends that these are a species of accident.17
Because in Foucault’s terms history moves by accident rather than caus-
es, historical narratives are interpretations, not discoveries. As with
Nietzsche, the task for genealogy is to free us from conceptual blinders:
If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in
an origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of
humanity. But if interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appro-
priation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential mean-
ing, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force
its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary
rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpreta-
tions. (152)
Genealogy and critical history share the task of rewriting history in order
to produce a new future; both therefore make history slightly redundant,
since the future that will come into being has to exist in order for history
to be rewritten. However, Foucault’s account veers toward voluntarism
insofar as genealogy’s project is to “impose a direction, to bend it to a new
will.” He does not pretend that this imposition will be “final,” or that indi-
viduals can achieve it, but does imply that history can be adapted to our
demands. His own skepticism about teleology, inherited from Nietzsche,
should remind us that interpretation rarely achieves what is wanted. All
that it can reliably do, as Nietzsche explained, is derail previous interpreta-
Historicisms: Old, New, and Discontented 7
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tions. What is required, perversely, is a concept of interpretation without
a specific aim, an interpretation that, contra to Foucault, does not seek to
bend discourse to a new will. One of psychoanalysis’s contributions will be
this sense of purposiveless interpretation.
Nietzsche and Foucault share a conviction that narrative explanation
misses crucial dimensions of historical change. By focusing instead on his-
torical fantasy, they remind us of a peculiar belatedness about historical
argument: It is a field of effects trying to invent its own causes, in the form
of accounts that would then restore causal order.18 These accounts never
work for long, Nietzsche affirms, since the real work of causation is a
“dice-game of chance and the future,” rather than a coherent story (70).19
In response to the contingency of time and events, we invent for ourselves
histories that we take as our own. Nietzsche and Foucault’s emphasis on
belatedness and contingency is invaluable, yet they still conceive of causa-
tion as internal to discourse. In other words, although they minimize the
determining force of history, they also tend to represent the causes of
social transformation as emerging from discourse itself.20
We see this tendency most dramatically in Foucault’s two works that
have most influenced Victorian studies: Discipline and Punish (1975) and
The History of Sexuality, volume I (1976). In these works we see Foucault’s
vision of a society linked by “an uninterrupted work of writing”
(Discipline 197), a society in which the smallest details of everyday life
attest eloquently to the machinations of power that have called them into
being. There is a breathtaking smoothness about the workings of power in
these texts, a remorseless effortlessness with which cause calls forth each
effect. Institutions, persons, and events are all relentless textualized and, at
the end of the day, tend to be legible to our interpretive eye. The appeal
of such a perspective to literary critics is formidable. The novels, poems,
and other texts with which we ply our trade are, at a stroke, converted into
the bearers of disciplinary power. Rather than standing as sources of liber-
ation (or even just escape), under critics’ attentive gaze literary texts have
been revealed to bear within them our own slavish subjectification. This
revelation is more or less the explicit thesis of D. A. Miller’s The Novel and
the Police (1988), one of the most sophisticated engagements between
Foucault and Victorian fiction. Miller argues that “From [a Foucauldian]
perspective, the enterprise of the traditional novel would no longer (or not
just) be the doomed attempt to produce a stable subject in a stable world,
but would instead (or in addition) be the more successful task of
forming—by means of that very ‘failure’—a subject habituated to psychic
displacements, evacuations, reinvestments” (xiii). The work of literature is
to make the work of power easier. Literature is not the aesthetic sweeten-
er that makes the bitter pill of power easier to tolerate; it is instead the sac-
Introduction8
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charine pill itself, luring us into submission. And what Miller argues on
behalf of Discipline and Punish, Nancy Armstrong’s equally influential and
valuable Desire and Domestic Fiction (1987) argues on behalf of The History
of Sexuality: Foucault “makes sex a function of sexuality and considers sex-
uality as a purely semiotic process. . . . Sexuality is, in other words, the cul-
tural dimension of sex, which, to my way of thinking, includes as its most
essential and powerful component the form of representation we take to be
nature itself ” (11). Armstrong, like Miller, argues powerfully for the idea
that literature expresses the disciplinary aims of social power. Central to
this idea is the premise that literature and disciplinary institutions are
mutually readable, even fully transparent to each other and exchangeable
for one another (sexuality is purely semiotic).
As we shall see momentarily, the idea that literature and its cultural and
political contexts are mutually interpretable is also a key premise of new
historicism, one that it admittedly inherits from Foucault. For example,
Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt dismiss as “perfervid” cele-
brants (the religious imagery is theirs) any who would assert a special place
for literary art (11). However, it is worth asking whether this vision of
Foucault is the whole Foucauldian story. After all, near the end of The
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1966), Foucault
had already insisted that literature is “enclosed within a radical intransitiv-
ity” (300), and that literature and the concept of literary language emerge
in the nineteenth century as a “compensation for the demotion of lan-
guage, the most important and also the most unexpected” (299). This
should immediately cast a wrench into the smooth operations of power: If
literature is intransitive, then it cannot be the unequivocal bearer of power’s
imprint. And the unexpectedness of the literary confirms this doubt: There
is, within the literary, something irreducible to the historical conditions
that produce it. This irreducibility is extradiscursive, not non- or prediscur-
sive. It is not a dimension prior to or untainted by discourse to which we
could gain straightforward access; it is, rather, a property internal to lan-
guage and representation that obstinately refuses meaning.21
When Foucault describes literary language as intransitive, he is making
an argument about history, social change, and causation, not just art. One
of the most trenchant critics of Foucault, Joan Copjec, argues that the
problem with his mid-1970s formulations is “his reduction of society to
. . . relations” of power and knowledge, with the concomitant “conception
of a cause that is immanent within the field of its effects” (5, 6).22 It is this
notion of immanent causality that American literary critics import from
Foucault when they assert that, within a given culture, all texts, artifacts,
events, and persons are, at least in principle, legible to each other. As an
alternative, Copjec offers psychoanalysis’s emphasis on language’s failure,
Historicisms: Old, New, and Discontented 9
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which—as I shall argue more fully in a moment—recognizes that society’s
“generative principle . . . cannot appear” among the effects and institu-
tions we see within it. Psychoanalysis “install[s] society’s generative princi-
ple, provide[s] for it a place beyond the realm of positive appearances” (9).
I agree strongly with Copjec that this is the crucial sociopolitical meaning
of psychoanalysis’s account of causation, but it is worth acknowledging
that it links up quite clearly with a dynamic internal to Foucault’s own
thought.23
As I have been suggesting, psychoanalysis contains a set of arguments
about historical consciousness, temporality, and causation that are vital to
understanding the vicissitudes of these concepts in the nineteenth centu-
ry. And while the individual chapters of Lost Causes largely avoid the ritu-
alistic invocation of Freud and Lacan, I want briefly to underline what I
find to be most useful about their theory of subjectivity, and its unsettled
relationship to narrative and historical consciousness.  By way of transition
to this theory, I want to risk a quick, and I hope not unfair, joke that tel-
escopes the difference between a psychoanalytic and a new historicist ver-
sion of interpretation.
In the process of offering a lively account of the founding of
Representations, Greenblatt and Gallagher reflect on the theoretical debates
that inspired it: “At this distance we remember best the heated discussions
of Althusser and Lacan, but, for all of our passionate interest, terms like
‘Institutional State Apparatus’ or the ‘objet a’ have not found their way
comfortably into our own teaching or vocabulary” (2). This has the ring
of truth, because in the Lacanian parlance, the objet a names, and quite
specifically, something absolutely disallowed within new historicist
approaches: the objet a is, as I’ll soon show, the lost cause of desire; its exis-
tence disrupts the mutual intelligibility of text and context, and its baf-
fling temporal logic contributes significantly to the intransitivity of liter-
ary language. By contrast, Gallagher and Greenblatt suggest that a suffi-
ciently adroit interpretation could correct the “slippages” and “absences”
of traditional historicism, thus unifying the historical field.24
Psychoanalysis’s focus on the object of desire as necessarily lost preserves
a gap between the real and its symbolic elaboration. The key to this discov-
ery, I’ll be claiming, is the privileged, yet ambiguous, role of historical nar-
ratives within psychoanalytic clinical practice. In his seminar of 1966–67 on
the logic of fantasy, Jacques Lacan reported to his audience that he had
recently been asked what need, what exigency drove him to theorize the
objet a as object/cause of desire. According to the transcripts of this unpub-
lished seminar, Lacan also passed along his answer: It was about time. The
objet a is the figure through which Lacan interprets the idea, which he dis-
covered in Freud, of deferred action or belatedness (Nachträglichkeit).25
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And if “everyone knows” that Lacan emphasizes deferred action,
nonetheless it is the case that the peculiar mode of causality it implies is
still far from understood. Joël Dor has argued that the problem with so-
called “wild” analysis—and, implicitly, the sociocultural or literary appli-
cation of psychoanalysis—is its application of a positivistic causal model to
psychoanalytic theory (Clinical 5–6). Dor denounces the mode of analysis
that proceeds by linking a textual thematic to an image in
psychoanalysis—hunting, as it were, for phallic symbols, or evidence of
anality, or explicit models of oedipal crisis. Instead, Dor insists, we have to
pay particular attention to the temporality of the clinic. When we recall
how Lacanian concepts are deployed clinically, their obsessive interest in
the narratives about the past leaps into focus.
For the seductiveness of the past constitutes the engine and the risk of
analysis—a Janus-faced reality that emerges immediately whenever Freud
writes on technique. Consider, for instance, this remarkable description of
psychoanalytic progress from “The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic
Therapy” (1910):
At its beginning psycho-analytic treatment was inexorable and
exhausting. The patient had to say everything himself, and the
physician’s activity consisted of urging him on incessantly. To-day
things have a more friendly air. The treatment is made up of two
parts—what the physician infers and tells the patient, and the
patient’s working-over of what he has heard. (142)
Even granting the Rotary Club atmosphere of this particular essay, in
which Freud tries to recruit more adherents to the psychoanalytic move-
ment, there is something a little disquieting about a description in which
the only person who speaks is the analyst! A more typical view—and one
that is often quoted—is his claim from “Constructions in Analysis”
(1937), where he claims that “What we are in search of is a picture of the
patient’s forgotten years that shall be alike trustworthy and in all essential
respects complete” (258).  This view of analysis is a sort of trick. Certainly,
there is an attempt to attain a complete version of the past, but not because
it is valuable in itself. Narratives about the past turn out to be a sort of
royal road to the unconscious, better even than dreams, because the con-
stant disruptions of the “picture . . . in all essential respects complete” force
the analysand into a dawning recognition that language speaks us.
This emphasis on the self-estrangement of historical narrative emerges
early in Freud’s descriptions of technique. In a short, eponymous encyclo-
pedia article, called “Freud’s Psycho-Analytic Procedure” (1904), he
declares that, after explaining the analytic rule to his analysands, he imme-
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diately asks for a “detailed account of their case history” (251). At first
glance, this seems trivial and self-evident: Of course the doctor will want
to know his patient’s history.  But surely if the idea of repression means any-
thing it means this: That analysands are constitutively incapable of deliv-
ering the goods when it comes to their own illness. It is not only that they
will have forgotten or confused key details, but that the story that they
want to tell is almost certainly not the story that they should be telling, at
least not if they want to improve. (And, for that matter, there is no reason
to trust that the analysand will want to improve—after all, the subject has
a passion for ignorance,26 and if improvement were simply a matter of
wanting to, psychoanalysis would just be an especially trite form of self-
help.) In other words, a founding axiom of Freudian technique is that any-
thing the analysand says during this “detailed account” will be misleading.
Misleading, at least, at the level of content. Freud declares in this ency-
clopedia article that asking for a history of the case has a pragmatic bene-
fit: The analysand’s historical narrative will produce a useful number of
“associations,” which Freud defines as “the involuntary thoughts (most
frequently regarded as disturbing elements and therefore ordinarily
pushed aside) which so often break across the continuity of a consecutive
narrative” (251). In other words, Freud asks for a narrative because he
knows he will not get one. If analysands follow the analytic rule, then their
narratives will always be interrupted. The claim here is not that the asso-
ciations are the “true” history, or that they inadvertently provide relevant
facts that the analysand has forgotten. Instead, Freud calls our attention to
their meaningless disruptiveness. Put another way, it is the disruption that
is the meaning, insofar as it signifies the existence of an Other speaker.
The first two seminars, and many of the early écrits, devote themselves
to Lacan’s critique of aiming at improved memory or a clearer narrative of
the past as analytic ends in themselves. He claims, in Seminar II, that
“reminiscence properly speaking . . . is the passage into the imaginary”
(320/Le séminaire II 369). The argument here is obviously not that the
memories are false, though that may be the case. Instead, Lacan wants us
to see that reminiscences buttress, or, at the bare minimum, refuse to chal-
lenge, our self-image. The specificity of psychoanalysis’s approach to
memory emerges when we recall that even traumatic memories are imag-
inary in this way. For Lacan, the explicit content of analysands’ narratives
just isn’t very interesting, because the narrative is almost by definition con-
sistent with the ego’s self-presentation.
Psychoanalysis is therefore not a hermeneutics. It is not a question of
uncovering hidden or secret meanings, but, rather, a question of making pos-
sible the discovery of truth. This discovery begins when the subject accepts
that imaginary unity is not the whole, or even the most interesting, story:
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In the course of analysis, as I have pointed out to you, it is when the
traumatic elements—grounded in an image which has never been
integrated—draw near that holes, points of fracture appear in the
unification, the synthesis, of the subject’s history. I have pointed out
how it is in starting from these holes that the subject can realign
himself within the different symbolic determinations which make
him a subject with a history. Well, in the same way, for every human
being, everything personal which can happen to him is located in
the relation to the law to which he is bound. His history is unified
by the law, by his symbolic universe, which is not the same for
everyone. (Seminar I 197/Le séminaire I 222)
This passage’s otherwise exemplary clarity is blurred by the use of “subject”
to refer both to the person in analysis and the virtual subject on whose
behalf an analysis typically is directed. Lacan here foregrounds the distinc-
tion between the “unification, the synthesis of the subject’s history”—that
is, the imaginary narrative that the analysand wants to tell—and the “sym-
bolic determinations” that give the subject a history. The trauma is “impos-
sible” or unintegrated at the level of the imaginary (at the level of the ego),
all the while registering itself in the subject’s symbolic history.
Psychoanalysis emerges as a theory and a therapeutics that aims to
account for the asymmetrical relationship between historical change and
individuals’ or families’ ability to incorporate those changes. In this sense,
psychoanalysis is a species of Victorian novel, which addresses itself repeat-
edly to the tenuousness of causality—not, as is frequently suggested, to
shore up the fit between individuals and their sociopolitical interpellations,
but precisely the reverse: To attune readers to the ideological nature of any
such “fit.” If what an analysand learns from an analysis is that the narrative
of one’s identity is never the whole story, nor even the story one would
want to tell, then a Victorian novel helps show its readers that fictions of
social progress are scarcely credible on their own terms, much less when
compared against their own experience.
In this way, the novelists I take up here appear to offer a rejoinder to
historians—as varied as Thomas Babington Macaulay, the most famous
adherent of Whiggish historiography, and Henry Buckle, whose History of
Civilization (1857–61) attempted to discover historical laws as invariant as
those of the physical world—could agree that English history is the unwa-
vering story of progress. And Herbert Spencer’s sociological theory of his-
torical evolution, especially in relatively early works like Social Statics
(1851) and The Developmental Hypothesis (1852), proposed that even
human misery should be tolerated as a sign of our future perfection.
This misery was often showcased in a genre I will refer to as “Victorian
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novels of the recent past.” Addressing such a concept in Novels of the
Eighteen-Forties (1956), Kathleen Tillotson argues that the 1840s saw the
widespread use of a largely new technique: “the use of the past in novels
of private life” (94). She claims that the novel of the recent past has two
primary conceptual advantages over its antecedents, though these advan-
tages tend to work at cross purposes. First, “the past, being past, can be
possessed, hovered and brooded over, with the story-teller’s supposed
omniscience” and, second, “the past, being not the present, is stable,
untouchable by the winds and waves which rock the present” (94).
Tillotson’s language initially suggests that these new novels imagine that
the past is knowable: the past is “stable, untouchable,” it can be “pos-
sessed” and related by an omniscient narrator. However, phrases such as
“hovered and brooded over,” or the “story-teller’s supposed omniscience,”
suggest a more complex perspective is at work. As Tillotson acknowledges
that the difference between “novels of the recent past” and “historical fic-
tion” is fairly arbitrary, I will adapt it slightly. Throughout Lost Causes, I
will use “novels of the recent past” to refer to novels set within a lifetime
of the date of publication, which additionally deal with turbulent politi-
cal events. These novels, I argue, dramatize how conventional historical
explanations blind us to causal factors that do not mesh well with society.
In other words, the novel emerges as a forum for critiquing our fantasies
about historical meaning and their implication for social order.
Realism itself, as defined by practitioners such as George Eliot and
Walter Scott, and theorists such as Harry Shaw, constitutes an attempt to
represent historical processes. For instance, Eliot often asserts that only
realism can show what is actually happening to the English countryside.27
And in Narrating Reality: Austen, Scott, Eliot (1999), Harry Shaw explains
that, contrary to widespread critical assumption, realism does not aim to
represent reality transparently.28 According to these thinkers, realism does
not pretend to master history; instead, its narrative movement elicits reac-
tions from readers that are analogous to their experience of historical
change. What I want to underscore here is that nonmimetic elements are
a crucial part of this process, even if no cognitive process is adequate to
give them meaning.
As Nietzsche argued in the 1870s, realism replicates history in part
through the formal incoherence of representation and plotting. But much
earlier in the century, Walter Scott, too, draws attention to this point. In
his famous 1815 review of Jane Austen’s Emma, Scott wittily acknowl-
edges that historical fidelity and plotting often seem at cross purposes. The
early novelist was “expected to tread pretty much in the limits between the
concentric circles of probability and possibility; and as he was not permit-
ted to transgress the latter, his narrative, to make amends, almost always
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went beyond the bounds of the former” (228). The improbability of this
mode of novel—which Scott elsewhere calls the “Big Bow wow strain” of
narration (Journal 114)—arises from the demand that all elements in the
narration formally cohere. No matter how wild the protagonist’s adven-
tures, they are expected to coalesce. Were the exact same events to happen
in real life, Scott insists, they would “usually be found only connected with
each other because they have happened to the same individual” (229). The
formal demands of fiction impose a unity on history completely lacking in
the real world.29
Scott acknowledges that there is a new style of fiction that does not
attempt to link up improbably diverse adventures; Austen exemplifies this
style. Scott claims that, in this mode, precise description gives alternative
satisfactions: the pleasure of “copying from nature as she really exists in the
common walks of life, and presenting to the reader, instead of the splen-
did scenes of an imaginary world, a correct and striking representation of
that which is daily taking place around him” (230).30 Although we might
think that Austen’s mode of realism is closer to mimesis, since it does not
depend on tenuous chains of causation, Scott argues elsewhere that the
realism of minute particulars replaces temporal unity with a structural
emphasis. He reminds us that “there is a distance as well as a foreground
in narrative, as in natural perspective” (“Jonathan Swift” 155). The novel-
ist is still not yet, at least in Scott’s mind, able to eschew formal unity in
order to represent history accurately. Because, outside of literature, history
has no such unity, a tension exists between the flow of history and the
demands of narrative. According to the logic of Scott’s argument, accurate-
ly representing history deforms the narratives that purportedly explain it,
because such a representation means disbanding aesthetic unity.
Realism paradoxically provides a framework with which to understand
the tension between history and narrative. But if, as Scott claims, there is
always a tension between history and narration, how can we interpret the
popularity of the historical novel? As John Sutherland has wryly comment-
ed, the historical novel is the “most numerous and least honoured of
Victorian fictional genres. . . . On no matter relating to the Victorian novel
has posterity more diverged from contemporary nineteenth-century
thought” (297–98). Virtually every major Victorian novelist experimented
with the genre, and writers specializing in the genre, such as W. Harrison
Ainsworth and especially Edward Bulwer Lytton, rivaled even Dickens in
sales. The genre is difficult to define, thanks in part to its ambition:
scrupulous attempts at historical reconstruction as well as formulaic plots
of derring-do in period dress have an equal claim to the label. Nineteenth-
century novels of the recent past, it appears, share with realism and histor-
ical novels an explicit concern with incorporating history into narrative.
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Lukács’s The Historical Novel (1937, trans. 1962) addresses directly the
impasse of realism, whereby history necessarily deforms narrative. The his-
torical novel, he argues, deduces “the individuality of characters from the
historical peculiarity of the age” (19). By foregrounding the relationship
between characters and their environment, the historical novel emphasizes
the instability of the social world. Lukács claims that the point of litera-
ture is to awaken readers to the contingency of social institutions that oth-
erwise seem permanent. The converse is true, too: Historical novels can
insert apparently cataclysmic events, such as the French Revolution, into
plots of progress and redemption.
Lukács’s crucial claim is that the historical novel awakens its readers to
movements of history. However, he is convinced of history’s already estab-
lished meaning, and so properly historical narratives always must mean
the same thing or appear reactionary.31 Jim Reilly’s Shadowtime: History
and Representation in Hardy, Conrad, and George Eliot (1993) offers an
important supplement to Lukács. Reilly argues that nineteenth-century
intellectual discourse, replete with history, compensates for modernity’s
failure to provide a satisfactory experience of history. In other words, peo-
ple write obsessively about what they cannot find in the world. The struc-
tural transformations of the Victorian period were impersonal, not hero-
ic, and consequently provoked alienation, not historical or radical con-
sciousness. As Reilly cogently observes, “the nineteenth century’s prolifer-
ation of historical genres compensates for the inexplicable absence of ‘epic’
history with an interminably voluble historical discourse” (4–5). Reilly
argues that, as the pace and scale of social change accelerated, and individ-
uals no longer experience history as continuous, the question of “histori-
cal meaning” became a lasting concern. Reilly reverses longstanding criti-
cal assumptions about modernism’s so-called break with history, literary
and otherwise. What is most useful for my purposes here, however, is sim-
ply his insistence that the notion of historical consciousness as primally
driven by loss—by the “inexplicable absence of ‘epic’ history”—is inti-
mately bound up with the form of Victorian historical narrative.
These histories also focus on turbulent events, and so are sometimes
incorporated into the social-problem genre. The social-problem novel,
also known as the Condition-of-England novel or roman à these, most
famously focuses on industrial unrest: Examples include Dickens’s Hard
Times (1854), Gaskell’s Mary Barton (1848) and North and South (1855),
and Disraeli’s Sybil (1845). Thanks to its focus on contemporary ques-
tions, the social-problem novel is often asserted to aim for transparency.32
However, like realist novels and historical novels, it too arguably focuses
on social fantasy, rather than reality, since it struggles to represent politi-
cal turbulence within a formally coherent narrative.33
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Lost Causes contends that, as with the historical novel, the social-
problem novel sets for itself tasks that it cannot handle, not in order to
consolidate class interests, but to suspend, question, or even abolish
them.34 The social-problem novel usefully indexes middle-class self-doubt
and self-criticism, especially when it appears to endorse middle-class hege-
mony. It is as though the novels understand that self-help and moral sua-
sion cannot ameliorate the social concerns represented within them. By
visibly straining to render coherent social progress and narrative unity,
social-problem novels often play up, rather than minimize, aspects of soci-
ety that resist assimilation.
By drawing on the strategies of realism, historical fiction, and the social-
problem novel, novels of the recent past underscore how difficult it is to
rely on linear historical narrative. This book adds to the criticism on these
novels by emphasizing extradiscursive factors that impede social or formal
coherence; I argue, that is, that such novels pursue contradictory represen-
tations of society, not to shore it up, but to delimit the plausibility of
reforming projects. Intensifying the fraught nature of historical representa-
tion, such novels turn out to be poetry’s equal as a vehicle for exploring the
gaps between our fantasies about historical causation and the experience of
change over time.
I argue throughout Lost Causes that meaning fails in historical narra-
tives, not because of ideology, but because of factors that elude discursive
elaboration. For example, if history and realism cannot comfortably coex-
ist,35 then how are we to interpret an incoherent novel with an historical
theme? Must we read such a novel as a “history,” aspiring to unity, and
respond to it by “countering” those aspirations? Instead, I demonstrate in
each chapter that there are conceptual advantages to the incoherence of
some Victorian historical fictions. Specifically, when we recognize that
narratives—whether normal or “counter”—cannot make society coherent,
then we grasp that the demand for coherence is fraudulent. This view, the
various chapters demonstrate, is paradoxically alive to history and histori-
cal change—indeed, with apologies to Rushdie, this is one of the ways
newness enters the world.
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C H A P T E R O N E
Chaos and Carlyle
I. Acorns and Facts
How often must we say, and yet not rightly lay to heart: The seed
that is sown, it will spring! . . . The Beginning holds in it the End,
and all that leads thereto; as the acorn does the oak and its fortunes.
—Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution (1837)
It is an idle question to ask whether [Carlyle’s] books will be read a
century hence: if they were all burnt as the grandest of Suttees on
his funeral pile, it would only be like cutting down an oak after its
acorns have sown a forest.
—George Eliot, “Thomas Carlyle” (1855)
These epigraphs, in their strikingly divergent uses of the identical simile,
encapsulate a tension that animates Thomas Carlyle’s best work: That between
his conviction, on the one hand, that there is a clear lesson to be drawn from
history; and his recognition, on the other hand, that our profound inability to
accurately read history enables action and change. And so in The French
Revolution, Carlyle wants to show how a set of sociopolitical conditions will
promote revolution, and how revolutions always destroy more than the con-
ditions producing them. Inevitably, for Carlyle, the acorn of the ancién regime
produces the oak of the revolution; likewise the acorn of the revolution pro-
duces the oak of the reign of terror. By contrast, George Eliot wants to empha-
size the fecundity of Carlyle’s thought, even for readers who disagree with him.
She stresses throughout the essay that Carlyle’s writing is uniquely edifying,
serving as a necessary precursor to new thought, even if that thought differs
from his own. There is still a powerful inevitability about engaging with
Carlyle’s work, because, she declares, everyone who reads him is permanently
altered, though not in a predictable way. It is as if the acorns of Carlyle’s
thought produce lots of different kinds of trees, not oaks alone.
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Eliot’s emphasis on the multitudinous fecundity of Carlyle’s thought
exposes a dynamic inherent in Carlyle’s vision of history itself. In his essays,
and in such longer works as The French Revolution and Past and Present
(1843), Carlyle urges us to understand history as bearing an incomplete,
even enigmatic, meaning, one that the historian must interpret rather than
simply recover. He does not lament the incompleteness of history, but
argues that our thinking of history as partially lost enables historical aware-
ness and even agency; the role of historical interpretation is thus to incite
action, rather than only reflect it. We can recognize this emphasis most
readily in Carlyle’s understanding of the tenuous relationship between facts
and meaning, and in his insistence—to the contrary of the historicist
approaches now dominant in Victorian studies—that the past is not fully
legible. Initially, this claim may seem surprising, since Carlyle famously
preferred biography to historical fiction, on the principle that a single fact
is worth more than reams of brilliant prose.1 He renders this epistemolog-
ical principle enigmatic, however, by consistently regarding metaphysical
concepts such as Destiny or Fate as facts, too.2 Carlyle’s rhetorical elision
of data and concepts—his equating facts with Facts—ensures that his writ-
ing oscillates between historical specificity, prophetic jeremiad, and philo-
sophical speculation, sometimes within the same sentence. And if this
rhetorical habit lends the credibility of common facts to metaphysical
speculations, the converse is also true: Carlyle’s writing tends to imbue
everyday phenomena with a philosophical and rhetorical density that
makes anything like transparency seem fantastical.
The density of Carlylean historiography renders the historical field ver-
tiginous. In a first gesture, Carlyle’s greatest histories always evoke the sense
of possibility that defines a historical moment. For example, what makes
The French Revolution an epic tragedy is how vividly the opening chapters
capture the effete, claustral atmosphere of the ancien régime. By showing
us why a revolution was necessary to relieve misery, Carlyle’s history of
France is always simultaneously a history of what might have been. Thanks
to this emphasis on possibility, Carlyle is able to critique his own age as
well: He does not simply show how Victorian England came into being,
but also implicitly—and explicitly in Past and Present (1843)—asks how
well his readers have honored that sense of possibility. In a second gesture,
Carlyle reminds his readers of their own historical agency. By emphasizing
the contingency and unrealized possibility informing the past, he under-
scores the possibility of changing the present. Rather than showing histo-
ry as a process of determinate laws, Carlyle urges, even goads, his reader-
ship to take action. He, as it were, folds historiography into history: Just as
in the past historical agents moved in a field of possibility, so too in the
present do we have the opportunity to change the world we inhabit. There
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is, in other words, for Carlyle a Janus-faced incompleteness to history: The
present is the unfinished product of the past, and we continue to dream
about making a new future.
The virtue of a “fact” for Carlyle is that it awakens us from our com-
placency about the world. Applied properly, a fact serves as a wrecking ball
for received wisdom and cant. What is startling about this mode of histo-
riography is its abstemiousness: Carlyle does not tell us what to do—
indeed, given his skepticism about securing happiness, progress, and jus-
tice through politics, it is hard to see how he could. He simply frees us to
act differently than we have been accustomed. I concede that Carlyle like-
ly imagined that, when confronted with the Fact of destiny, everyone
would act in the same way; nevertheless, he does not spell out a program
for his readers.  Indeed, this is a reason Eliot claims that he influenced
every serious Victorian writer: “When he is saying the very opposite of
what we think, he says it so finely, with so hearty conviction—he makes
the object about which we differ stand out in such grand relief under the
clear light of his strong and honest intellect” (214).3 Reading Carlyle can
liberate us from our fantasies about the past; he clears the intellectual
underbrush that chokes our ability to respond vitally to the demands of
the day. As we saw with Nietzsche in the introduction, history’s ability to
destroy received opinion is one of its most important contributions.
The predominant claim of this chapter, then, is that Carlyean histori-
ography provokes, rather than simply reflects, historical action.4 He artic-
ulates this position against rival historians such as Thomas Babington
Macaulay, whose Whiggish historiography Carlyle found disabling. If
such a formulation did not seem tainted by postmodern controversies, one
could say that for Carlyle historiography creates history. By this I mean
something more than the modern commonplace that there is no history
prior to the text: this position, attributed—fairly or not—to such diverse
sources as deconstruction and new historicism, amounts to the claim that
discourse constructs history. In modern usage, this seems to mean several
different things—for example, there is no context prior to its discursive
elaboration, or that agency, to whatever extent it exists, inheres in dis-
course rather than the subject. By contrast, Carlyle argues that readers’
encounter with historiography awakens them to a reality to which they
would otherwise be blind. Consequently, historiography is necessarily
“prophetic,” because history is still to come, prompted in part—although
not in any sort of predictable, deterministic way—by the text, which itself
is shaped by enigmatic shards that resist understanding. I shall dramatize
these claims through three readings: first, of Carlyle’s essays from the
1830s, then of The French Revolution, and then, briefly, of Past and Present.
Each reading pursues a distinctive attempt on Carlyle’s part to clarify the
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stakes of a contingent historiography: in the early essays, it takes the form
of a palimpsest; in The French Revolution, of metaphors of compression
and explosion; and in Past and Present, of Carlyle’s attempt to grapple with
the revolutionary implications of his rhetoric. Such a rhetoric is dangerous
in his argument, because justice and beneficence readily converts into
injustice and mere chaos. To combat this tendency, he develops a highly
metaphorical, prophetic style that underscores the need for action while
emphasizing an irreducible gap between cause and effect.
II. Torn Letters
A fiction may give a more impressive effect to what is already
known; but it can teach us nothing new. . . . Fiction . . . is essential-
ly imitative. Its merit consists in its resemblance to a model with
which we are already familiar, or to which at least we can instantly
refer. Hence it is that the anecdotes which interest us most strongly
in authentic narrative are offensive when introduced into novels;
that what is called the romantic part of history is in fact the least
romantic. It is delightful as history, because it contradicts our previ-
ous notions of human nature, and of the connections of causes and
effects.
—Thomas Babington Macaulay, “History” (1828)
Macaulay’s vindication of properly historical narrative against the inroads
of historical fiction seems both paradoxical and slightly defensive. After all,
what is most striking about his argument is that it implies a kind of read-
erly mistake: “what is called the romantic part of history is in fact the least
romantic.” He must hastily assure us that our pleasure in such anecdotes is
of a different order than mere romance, because it teaches us something
new about causal relations and human nature. But since we have mistaken
“authentic narrative” for a mere “romantic part,” how can we learn any-
thing new (fiction being, as he has just told us, most profoundly imita-
tive)? In effect, Macaulay inadvertently blurs the very distinction he is try-
ing to establish.5 This blurring represents the crux of his conflict with
Carlyle in the early 1830s: Whereas Macaulay sees narrative as an indis-
pensable modality of history, Carlyle insists that narrative is necessarily
inadequate to the task of representation. As an alternative to storytelling,
Carlyle proposes that we consider historiography a mode of reading:
History is variously a letter, a manuscript, and a palimpsest. Conceived
thus, the fragmentary nature of the historical record is actually the good
news: First, it turns the historian into a kind of hero, quasimiraculously
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recreating historical meaning from the flux of events. Second, and more
interesting, the incompleteness of history means that history is not simply
deterministic.6
Two essays in particular, “On History” (1830) and “On History Again”
(1832), advance Carlyle’s criticism of narrative historiography. The earlier
essay features one of his most famous dismissals of historical narrative:
“Narrative is linear, Action is solid” (89, emp. in original). Whereas for
Macaulay, history is able to discover unexpected causal relations between
events, and to arrange a narrative that represents those relations adequate-
ly, Carlyle understands history as a “Chaos of Being,” in which every event
is an “atom . . . ‘chained’ and complected with all” (89). The metaphor of
“complected” atoms uncannily anticipates the epistemological field of
modern physics, especially of quantum mechanics, insofar as Carlyle’s
image suggests that even the smallest discrete unit of matter, the atom, in
fact bears traces of all other units of matter. It is as if in a molecule of water
the hydrogen and oxygen atoms not only bond, but actually seep into one
another. The enclosure of “chained” within quotation marks suggests the
inadequacy of chains of causation for explaining the historical field. From
Carlyle’s perspective, Macaulayan history is doomed as epistemology,
because it focuses only on the chains, so ignoring the dynamic relations
between events. Although “complected,” from “complexioned,” is obvi-
ously in the first instance a visual metaphor, it is also implicitly a readerly
one, since Carlyle uses it to suggest that every discrete event carries the
traces of all others. The task of the historian, in this view, is to reconstruct
meaning from historical events, proceeding thus by interpreting the traces
left by the Chaos of Being on each event. The proper mode of history can
therefore at best be a kind of annotation, wherein the historian glosses
each event’s connection to every other. Such glosses would of course
always risk sliding into interpretive conjecture.
Were this the limit of Carlyle’s meaning, then he would be a new his-
toricist, arguing that the traces of historical meaning are mutually intelli-
gible. However, he soon makes clear that this is not the case; history is pri-
mally unintelligible, and unreadable. Our attempts at interpretation are,
in the first instance, only partial, and, in Carlyle’s fullest formulations, are
less interpretation than divination of “prophetic,” even vatic, writing.
Both “On History” and “On History Again” play up the idea of history’s
text as a palimpsestic shard, though a shard without an original whole.
“On History” emphasizes the palimpsest:
For though the whole meaning [of History] lies far beyond our ken;
yet in that complex Manuscript, covered over with formless
inextricably-entangled unknown characters,—nay, which is a
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Palimpsest, and had once prophetic writing, still dimly legible
there,—some letters, some words, may be deciphered; and if no
complete Philosophy, here and there an intelligible precept, avail-
able in practice, be gathered: well understanding, in the mean while,
that it is only a little portion we have deciphered; that much still
remains to be interpreted; that History is a real Prophetic
Manuscript, and can be fully interpreted by no man. (89–90, emp.
in original)
At first, this remarkable sentence appears to undermine my focus on the
potentially liberating capacity of Carlyle’s imagining history as a mode of
reading. By shifting the image from an unintelligible manuscript to a
palimpsest, he seems to affirm that the aim of historiography is to recover
the original message of history. Indeed, Hayden White’s claim that Carlyle
conceives of history as “palingenesis, the pious reconstruction of the past
in its integrity” seems warranted (Metahistory 146). However, Carlyle actu-
ally makes palingenesis more obscure, rather than a desirable goal: By shift-
ing the historian’s aim away from translating the past, “On History” over-
all makes history a field for interpretation, not reconstruction. Because his-
tory must be interpreted, Carlyle suggests, it cannot fully determine soci-
ety or identity.
If we think of history as a manuscript with “formless inextricably-
entangled unknown characters,” then the task for historians clearly is akin
to translating the script of a long-dead language that few can still read.
While such a task would be formidable, it is not impossible (as Jean-
François Champollion’s 1822 deciphering of the Rosetta stone suggests).
And translation implies reconstruction: A translation aims to preserve as
faithfully as possible the meaning of an original. Were this Carlyle’s model,
then he would indeed affirm palingenesis as the aim of historical work.
However, the shift in his metaphor to history as palimpsest indicates that
interpretation for him becomes more difficult, rather than less: Although
“some letters, some words, may be deciphered,” nonetheless it “can be fully
interpreted by no man.” The inability to fully interpret history is surpris-
ingly enabling, because it allows for partial agency. Indeed, history only
becomes a “real Prophetic Manuscript” with the recognition that it is
palimpsestic, and the corollary that it can never be fully interpreted.
The interplay between palingenetic and interpretive models of history
recurs to similar effect in “On History Again.” In that essay, Carlyle asserts
that history is “the Letter of Instructions, which the old generations write
and posthumously transmit to the new; nay, it may be called, more gener-
ally still, the Message, verbal or written, which all mankind delivers to
every man; it is the only articulate communication . . . which the Past can
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have with the Present, the Distant with what is here” (167). As in “On
History,” Carlyle at first appears to define historical work as reconstruct-
ing the past’s message. But it is easy to reconcile the idea of history as a let-
ter from the past with the idea of history as a palimpsest: Each generation
metaphorically overwrites the “letter” of previous generations. Simply
reconstructing the “original” message of history could not be the goal of
history, then, because each generation would have its own message.
Viewed in this way, history would seem fragmentary and broken—much
as Dorothea Casaubon experiences Rome in Middlemarch (1871–72).
Although plausible, this reading of Carlyle is fundamentally mistaken: he
does not conceive of history’s message as changing over time—at most, he
would agree that each generation transmits the same message in different
“clothes,” to borrow the language of Sartor Resartus.
As in “On History,” Carlyle overall stresses the virtue of oblivion. The
letter from the past has been “falsified, blotted out, torn, lost and but a
shred of it in existence; this too so difficult to read or spell” (168). Almost
immediately he shifts from lamentation to critique, insisting that if
“History is such a miserable defective ‘shred’ . . . the fault lies not in our
historic organs, but wholly in our misuse of these” (171). Carlyle claims
here that our idea that history is incomplete is wrong. A greater, fuller his-
tory does not exist; the fragments we inherit are the full legacy of the past.
Understood this way, the aim of historiography is not to reconstruct the
past—history is not palingenesis—but to unfold an interpretation of its
meaning from the shards of available knowledge. Historical work would
therefore have the status of a retroactive interpretation, rather than of
reconstruction. The blotting and tearing of history’s letter releases us from
the past, granting us the perspective we need to live, and binds us to it,
ensuring that our perspective is not simply voluntaristic.
To put this another way, the cause of history—whether understood as
the event which historiography tries to represent or as the meaning that
would redeem and complete history’s progress—is lost. It will not be found
in historical evidence, whether archival or archeological, and it will not be
found in historical reasoning, no matter how rigorous and precise. Indeed
it never existed at any moment in the past—how could it?—but is rather
an illusion of the fragmentary historical record. The psychoanalytic refer-
ence that sheds most light here, then, is neither “A Note Upon the ‘Mystic
Writing-Pad’” (1925), nor the famous letter to Fliess of 6 December 1896,
in which Freud speculates that repression is a kind of mistranslation of the
past (207–8). The reference instead has to be to the paradoxical status of
objects of desire, wherein the plethora of objects given to be desired leads
us to posit a primally lost, original object for which the current object is
only a more or less adequate substitute. There is no original object; rather,
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the notion or fantasy of an original object falls out of the structure of desire
itself.7 Carlyle makes a similar argument here about history. It is because
the “letter” of history is torn that it can be read at all, but at the same time
its tattered condition limits us to—as T. S. Eliot puts it—“hints followed
by guesses.”
Carlyle’s emphasis on obliteration highlights his interest in non-narrative
modes of historiography, and differentiates him sharply from contempo-
raries such as Macaulay, the historian with whom he debated most vigor-
ously in the 1830s.8 As the epigraph to this section suggests, Macaulay is
best known for his interest in, and brilliance at constructing, historical nar-
rative; his History of England (1849–61) is the most famous instance of the
“Whiggish” tendency to represent history as the story of progress.9 When he
is not defending historical narrative, Macaulay frequently uses painterly
metaphors for historiography—landscape and portraiture figure promi-
nently in “History.” And in these synchronic metaphors, his confidence
that historiography represents the real shines through:
[W]e could mention portraits which are resemblances,—but not
mere resemblances; faithful,—but much more than faithful; por-
traits which condense into one point of time, and exhibit, at a sin-
gle glance, the whole history of turbid and eventful lives—in which
the eye seems to scrutinize us, and the mouth to command us—in
which the brow menaces, and the lip almost quivers with scorn—in
which every wrinkle is a comment on some important transaction.
(277)
In historical portraiture, the part adequately stands in for the whole—or,
in Macaulay’s own phrase, “produce[s] the effect of the whole” (278).
Through the rhetorical force of synecdoche, historiography conjures the
real. Although experience is “condense[d],” the historical portrait is
nonetheless asymptotically able to express “the whole history.” The differ-
ence between Macaulay and Carlyle is thus important: For the former, our
impression of the whole emerges from the intense power of the portrait;
for Carlyle, by contrast, the effect derives solely from the viewer’s interpre-
tive ingenuity.10 Macaulay would argue that the field of historical meaning
coalesces in Carlyle’s “shred,” for in the language of synecdoche, a “shred”
is merely a synonym for “part.” We would be closer to understanding their
conflict if we identified Macaulay’s goal as palingenesis, since he is the one
who aims to relate the fragments of history to a potentially complete field.
By contrast, Carlyle focuses on the importance of historical amnesia—
he argues, indeed, that history is impossible without it. We can only rec-
ognize our difference from the past through forgetting: “Memory and
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Oblivion, like Day and Night, and indeed like all other Contradictions in
this strange dualistic Life of ours, are necessary for each other’s existence:
Oblivion is the dark page, whereon Memory writes her light-beam char-
acters, and makes them legible; were it all light, nothing could be read
there, any more than if it were all darkness” (173).  This highly metaphor-
ic writing recalls Carlyle’s invocation of the palimpsest in “On History,”
but we can interpret this metaphoric tendency by arguing that history
overwhelms us in the present, thwarting our ability to act. In other words,
we have to forget to remember anything at all. The shred of the past alerts
us to the fact that the best historiography provokes us to action, rather
than exposing our impotence in the face of social transformation.
Thus by conceiving of history as partially lost, Carlyle transforms the
commonplace lament that one cannot ever fully know the past, without
implying thereby that the past and present are coextensive. Instead, for
him a “shred” of the past remains lodged in the present, in unrecognized
form. The task of the historian, he suggests, is to disclose the past’s con-
tinuing relevance for the present, and when this is accomplished, we
understand our present situation in a fresh light. Revealing the laws of his-
tory, in Carlyle’s argument, frees us from orthodoxy, received wisdom, and
cant; it does not, as is so commonly supposed, promote determinism or
deference to tradition.
III. Compression
When Carlyle began to write historical narratives, he did not repudiate the
antinarrative emphasis I have been interpreting. Instead, such works as
The French Revolution stage a conflict between two different perspectives,
one following conventional causal explanations, and another emphasizing
chaotic, extrasymbolic factors that thwart such accounts. Carlyle associates
the first perspective with metaphors of compression, and the second with
those of explosion. Grasping his account of the interplay of these motifs
highlights the contingency of history, and emphasizes that ideological or
material accounts alone cannot fully explain the past. In this section, I
focus on Carlyle’s interest in compression; in the next, I interpret his fas-
cination with effervescence.
Carlyle uses metaphors of compression in two related ways: first, to
show how the present becomes the past; and second, to explain how rev-
olutions happen. Because force holds society together, he argues, histori-
ans can explain social transformations by tracing the vicissitudes of power.
And as the present becomes the past, its force must either dissipate or
somehow be preserved. When Carlyle uses images of compression, then,
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he invokes a version of the repressive hypothesis, which conceives of power
as obeying the laws of a zero-sum game.11 As I shall argue in the next sec-
tion, the power of Carlylean history comes from his ability to represent
events that resist assimilation to this hypothesis.
Carlyle’s explanation of how the present becomes the past is a mode of
conservation: Everything is preserved, albeit in strange, unrecognizable
forms. For example, in Historical Sketches (1898), his alter-ego, Smelfungus
uses the image of a peat bog to embody the compression of the past:12
All speech . . . is of vaporous character, and has to condense itself;
speech and much else has to condense itself, in such confused man-
ner as it can: these swampy Fen Countries are an emblem to thee of
human History in general! The very meanings of speech, like the
sound of it, do they not swiftly pass away? The hottest controversial
jangling which drives all hearts to madness, this too is a transient
vibration in the lower regions of the atmosphere; this, too, if thou
wait a little, will condense itself and not be. (63)
Carlyle posits the movement of history as turning away from the turbulent
present, where noise and chaos can drive one mad. If history is like a peat
bog, then there may be room for quiet optimism: Although we find our-
selves amidst desolation and decay, we can also extract useful fuel if we
know where and how to dig. Yet a bog is also a dangerous place: swampy,
full of explosive gases, and difficult to navigate. This passage exemplifies
Carlyle’s use of compression, because even aspects of contemporary dis-
course that seem to disappear actually persist. Although political speech
“swiftly pass[es] away,” it “condenses” itself into the bog—that is, it
becomes a potentially explosive fuel. The heat of controversy cannot van-
ish, but must be absorbed into society.
In Sartor Resartus and The French Revolution, Carlyle adapts this image,
using a rotting leaf as a metaphor for the web of force that holds society
together. In Sartor, Teufelsdröckh declares that “nothing hitherto was ever
stranded, cast aside; but all, were it only a withered leaf, works together
with all. . . . The withered leaf is not dead and lost, there are Forces in and
around it, though working in inverse order, else how could it rot?”
(I:11:56, emp. in original). Like the peat bog, this is an image of a system
that recuperates everything; it is also a vision of a system in which every-
thing works—nothing lies outside the exchange of forces constituting the
system. By conceptualizing history in this way, Carlyle binds himself to a
cause-and-effect narrative. Let me show why by turning to a moment of
self-quotation, when Carlyle quotes this exact passage from Sartor to tele-
scope the “plot” of the French revolution.
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In The French Revolution, he theorizes society as interwoven with forces
that need to go somewhere:
How true, that there is nothing dead in this Universe; that what we
call dead is only changed, its forces working in inverse order! “The
leaf that lies rotting in moist winds,” says one, “has still force; else
how could it rot?” Our whole Universe is but an infinite Complex
of Forces; thousandfold, from Gravitation up to Thought and Will;
man’s Freedom environed with Necessity of Nature: in all which
nothing at any moment slumbers, but all is for ever awake and
busy. The thing that lies isolated inactive thou shalt nowhere dis-
cover; seek everywhere, from the granite mountain, slow-
mouldering since Creation, to the passing cloud-vapour, to the liv-
ing man, to the spoken word of man. (II:III:1:407)
Carlyle here proposes a nearly thermodynamic approach to history: Force
is always constant in a system, but it moves around to various locations
and points within it. From this perspective, then, it is wrong to think of
“France” as decaying or weak in the mid-eighteenth century. Instead,
Carlyle proposes that the country’s force has shifted away from the aristoc-
racy (which he identifies with order), and, needing somewhere to go, is
absorbed into the Revolution. Thinking of “force” in this way explains
Carlyle’s ambivalence toward the Revolution. Because it represents the
exercise of force in an otherwise spent society, Carlyle applauds the revo-
lutionaries for destroying the illusions of the aristocracy. However, the
Revolution merely inverts the society it attacks, because its very force
derives from social rot. As a result, from Carlyle’s perspective, revolution
can dismantle society, but cannot build anything new in its place.
Both Carlyle’s preference for stasis over action and his accompanying
skepticism about the ability of narratives to represent fully the meaning of
events result from this thermodynamic approach to causality. Near the
outset of The French Revolution he laments noteworthy acts as inherently
disruptive: “Consider it well, the Event, the thing which can be spoken of
and recorded, is it not, in all cases, some disruption, some solution of con-
tinuity? Were it even a glad Event, it involves change, involves loss (of
active Force); and so far, either in the past or in the present, is an irregu-
larity, a disease. Stillest perseverance were our blessedness; not dislocation
and alteration—could they be avoided” (I:II:1:29). To the extent that an
event changes our lives or identities, according to Carlyle, it also depletes
the energy with which we had constructed those lives. And the effort to
accommodate novelty can strain or dampen our excitement at the change
an event promises. Because the amount of force is always constant, any
shift in the distribution of forces makes society highly volatile.
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The French Revolution thus stages a movement from the exhaustion of
the aristocracy to the exhaustion of the Reign of Terror. According to
Carlyle, in his clearest use of the repressive hypothesis, the aristocracy’s
weakness provokes the ferocity of Revolution. Revolutions, in this view, are
always radically “excessive” or imbalanced and indeed arise from the inabil-
ity of weak governments to contain society’s energies:
[I]t is singular how long the rotten will hold together, provided you
do not handle it roughly. For whole generations it continues stand-
ing, “with a ghastly affectation of life,” after all life and truth has
fled out of it. . . . Hast thou well considered all that Habit does in
this life of ours; how all Knowledge and all Practice hang wondrous
over infinite abysses of the Unknown, Impracticable; and our whole
being is an infinite abyss, overarched by Habit, as by a thin Earth-
rind, laboriously built up together? . . . let but, by ill chance, in such
ever-enduring struggle,—your ‘thin Earth-rind’ be once broken! The
fountains of the great deep boil forth; fire-fountains, enveloping,
engulfing. (I:II:4:40, emp. in original)
Habit and routine canalize the force of society along familiar lines. The
veneer of habit is always precarious, so when the existing order no longer
meets a country’s needs, the explosion will be all the more overwhelming.
Strong—even tyrannical—governments, Carlyle suggests, do not provoke
revolutions: We revolt only when a social order is so effete that it cannot
even contain the limited upheavals that elude habit. This passage tele-
scopes Carlyle’s ambivalence about the Revolution, since he describes the
end of the aristocracy as “rotten,” “ghastly,” devoid of “life and truth,” yet
laments the “ill chance” that it collapsed. And as is so frequently the case
with Carlyle, he is not ambivalent about revolutions only! For if, on the
one hand, “all Knowledge and all Practice” are the cherished, fragile prod-
uct of an enormous labor, it nevertheless is the case that, on the other
hand, “the Unknown, Impracticable” is a source of renewal (this abyss rep-
resents whatever is not caught up in “habit”) as well as a constant threat.
There is, after all, a kind of inconsistency in the metaphor: Carlyle aligns
both “Knowledge” and the abyss with “the rotten” that gingerly remains
upright. I stress this inconsistency not as a weakness, but rather as Carlyle’s
central insight about historical change.
We have seen, then, that Carlyle binds the events of the French Revolution
to a narrative, one of the ebb and flow of power in a society. Were this the
extent of his insight, The French Revolution would be just another cause-and-
effect history, one that could be disputed, for instance, by representing the
French and American Revolutions together as part of a happy shift toward
democracy (as in Tom Paine’s The Rights of Man [1791], which famously
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responds to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France [1790]).
Herman Merivale’s largely critical review of Carlyle’s history in the Edinburgh
Review treats it in exactly this way, identifying The French Revolution as part
of a new wave of writings that explore the earth-shattering forces at work in
the Revolution. Yet Merivale makes an important concession by attributing
Carlyle’s genius to his suggestiveness: Carlyle “is always furnishing hints for
thought; a slight sentence, a passing observation, often seem to open long vis-
tas of reflection; but he rarely thinks out a subject for his reader: he never
weighs, and reasons, and arrives at balanced conclusions” (80). Merivale
implies that Carlyle’s narrative, driven by his version of the repressive hypoth-
esis, is less convincing than the diversions from that account. And in his cel-
ebrated review, John Stuart Mill claims that somehow, it does not matter
whether one agrees or disagrees with Carlyle—and Mill does both in the
course of the review. As we saw with Eliot, Mill shows that Carlyle’s writing
provokes original thought, even or especially when he does not compel
assent. What is important is that The French Revolution produces the very
essence of Revolution itself, as it was “in the concrete” (60, original emphasis).
Carlyle’s “creative imagination” is able to “summon up the Thing” “from a
chaos of scattered hints and confused testimonies” (58). It is not a scrupulous
or scientific history that Carlyle gives us, on this account, but rather a poet-
ic one. Mill thus emphasizes Carlyle’s ability to dramatize the contingency of
events, rather than to integrate all such events into a coherent explanation.
To Mill and especially to Carlyle, the essence of the French Revolution is
a particular kind of explosive chaos, which cannot be aligned with a partic-
ular narrative. Instead, revolution is an experience of perpetual turbulence,
in which every action produces some dreadful reaction, although no one—
especially not the historian—can predict what. Carlyle represents these
moments with such ferocity that they threaten to swamp his narrative in The
French Revolution. Metaphors of fluids and fires allow Carlyle to show us his-
tory at its most unpredictable and contingent, and in so doing to puncture
our faith in conventional accounts of historical process.
IV. “Existence Effervescing and Efflorescing”
Cities, especially Cities in Revolution, are subject to these alterna-
tions; the secret courses of civic business and existence effervescing
and efflorescing. . . . Of which Phenomenon, when secret existence
becoming public effloresces on the street, the philosophical cause
and effect is not so easy to find.
—Carlyle, The French Revolution
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The frequency with which Carlyle resorts to such words as “effervescing,”
“efflorescing,” and “eleutheromaniac” (Carlyle’s coinage to describe a fren-
zy for freedom) in The French Revolution might encourage us to see him as
a chaos theorist avant la lettre.13 Like chaos theorists, Carlyle explores how
extraordinarily complex and unpredictable structures can emerge from the
repetition of simple rules—that is, how order can produce disorder.
Thinking of Carlyle in this way is not simply an exercise in anachronism:
It also allows us to glimpse his understanding of how rapidly events over-
run us, and how even the best intentions, or the clearest actions, can some-
times backfire. From this perspective, Carlyle’s ambivalence about the
Revolution is not a reactionary or phobic refusal of mass action, but
instead reflects his acute sense of the justice of its claims.14 The Revolution
escalates into mass terror, in his account, not despite its legitimacy, but
possibly because of it.
Carlyle’s interest in chaos is partially evident in the relationship between
minute particulars and noteworthy events. Critics such as Merivale decry
this tendency as merely picturesque (84), but we can also see Carlyle’s frag-
mentary approach as underscoring what is most chaotic about all political
demonstrations. For example, Carlyle notes that during the Siege of the
Bastille, at “every street-barricade, there whirls simmering a minor
whirlpool,—strengthening the barricade, since God knows what is com-
ing; and all minor whirlpools play distractedly into that grand Fire-
Mahlstrom which is lashing round the Bastille” (I:V:6:200). The elemen-
tal conjuring of fire and water lashing each other into an ever-greater fren-
zy is a standard combination in The French Revolution.15 What is notable
about this instance is the way purposiveness transforms into chaos as the
scale grows larger. Groups of people swarm at each barricade, making it
stronger, but the cumulative effect of all of these groups is a terrifying loss
of volition. Such a loss cannot be attributed to the bad faith of the partic-
ipants, but is a simple consequence of numbers. This passage exemplifies
how Carlyle tries to make the unpredictable (“simmering . . . whirlpool”)
intelligible. Rather than try to give the history of the overall maelstrom of
revolution, he addresses himself to the smaller eddies that contribute to
it—what Katherine Hayles in a similar context calls the “recursive similar-
ities between scale levels” (13). Not only is a single whirlpool turbulent,
but multiple whirlpools intensify such turbulence beyond any predictive
capacity.
The contrariness found within various experiences of fire—clean,
smoky, chaotic, domesticated, force of nature, tool of man, and so forth—
becomes a considerable historiographical resource in The French
Revolution.16 At various moments in the narrative, fire is a metaphor for
the explosiveness of the revolution, for the movement of history, and for
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the limits of historiography. Carlyle’s fiery imagery allows him to represent
his ambivalence about the Revolution in sophisticated ways. For example,
in Volume I, in which optimism still runs high (at least among the revo-
lutionaries), the Revolution arrives as a shattering, purifying bolt: “How
has the Heaven’s light, oftentimes in this Earth, to clothe itself in thunder
and electric murkiness; and descend as molten lightning, blasting, if puri-
fying! Nay is it not rather the very murkiness and atmospheric suffocation,
that brings the lightning and the light? (I:IV:4:156, emp. in original).
Carlyle here ventriloquizes the revolutionaries’ sense that the Revolution
“blasts” France because the previous regime had forced its hand. Although
the Revolution is terrifying, it nevertheless can abolish the corruption,
exhaustion, and injustice of the preceding state of affairs. Additionally, in
these sentences, Carlyle does not represent fire as chaotic, but rather as the
purifying force which relieves the murky chaos of an exhausted social
order.
In the second half of Carlyle’s history, he repeats the analogy with an
electric storm, which brings no longer purifying fire, but a terrifying,
chaotic, unproductive cloud: “The chaotic thunder-cloud, with its pitchy
black, and its tumult of dazzling jagged fire, in a world all electric: thou
wilt not undertake to show how that comported itself,—what the secrets
of its dark womb were; from what sources, with what specialties, the light-
ning it held did, in confused brightness of terror, strike forth, destructive
and self-destructive, till it ended?” (III:V:1:376–77). Whereas the distinc-
tion between an oppressive atmosphere and lightning’s clarifying force
reflects the early promise of the Revolution, by this point Carlyle imagines
the fire to be part of the chaos and oppression. What this transformation
shows is the difficulty of containing even a purifying blaze. Even if the
lightning bolt were capable of purification, the cloud is now “pitchy,”
tainting everything that passes through it. And though, in Volume I, the
lightning came from heaven, in this second version its “dark womb” and
“sources” are obscure. The point here is not that Carlyle is a hypocrite, or
even that he changes his mind over the course of the text. Instead, Carlyle
suggests, both instances are right: The Revolution is simultaneously a
purifying blast and a nightmare, and it may even be a nightmare because
it is purifying. Whether a fire purifies or destroys is, in other words, entire-
ly contingent.
Carlyle’s suggestive interlacing of contradictory imagery is an impor-
tant technique, because it allows him to highlight the contingency of rev-
olutionary experience. His representation of crowds is exemplary in this
regard, both in relation to the argument of The French Revolution and for
its influence on novelists such as Charles Dickens. Perhaps surprisingly,
given Carlyle’s conventional association with a heroic model of history,
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part of The French Revolution aims to separate volition from historical
events.17 Time and again, Carlyle describes persons and groups overtaken
either by circumstance or by the eruption of chthonic desires over which
they exercise little or no control. In particular, he shows how precarious is
the dividing line between rational behavior and excessive violence, and
even how rationality can produce violence. He comes close to defining the
Revolution as just such an upheaval:
But Social Explosions have in them something dread, and as it were
mad and magical; which indeed Life always secretly has: thus the
dumb Earth (says Fable), if you pull her mandrake-roots, will give a
daemonic mad-making moan. These Explosions and Revolts ripen,
break forth like dumb dread Forces of Nature; and yet they are
Men’s forces; and yet we are part of them: the Daemonic that is in
man’s life has burst out on us, will sweep us too away!—One day
here is like another, and yet it is not like but different. How much
is growing, silently resistless, at all moments! Thoughts are growing,
forms of Speech are growing, and Customs and even Costumes; still
more visibly are actions and transactions growing, and that doomed
Strife of France with herself and with the whole world.
(II:V:9:58–59)
Carlyle’s rhetoric is too frenzied to be described as equipoised, but it is bal-
anced to the point of being self-canceling. The argument marshals very dif-
ferent kinds of energies to demonstrate the ease with which events can
exceed our control. On the one hand, Carlyle always affirms “Life” against
illusions (or what he calls “Shams”) and consistently represents Life as con-
tributing to order by resisting the chaotic source of being. On the other
hand, this passage situates within authentic Life a shard of radical disorder,
and he suggests that we may well yearn to give in to that disorder. The sec-
ond half of the passage is particularly important, as it amplifies Carlyle’s
account of habit, making clear how it can be simultaneously a force for
order and a prop for illusion. The continuity of habit means that we some-
times miss important changes as they occur, and can fail to understand
how actions that once seemed reasonable become self-destructive. Under
certain conditions, the inertia of habit can thus provoke, rather than allay,
a demonic impulse lying at the core of society.
Many of the themes and arguments that I have been discussing coalesce
in Carlyle’s representation of the Paris mob: We learn here about the folly
of continuing to support institutions after they have served their purpose;
the unpredictable way that contradictory forces whip people into a frenzy,
including the way that justice can quickly tip into injustice; and the diffi-
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culty of giving a conventionally causal account of events. Carlyle is both
repelled and fascinated by the mob’s creativity:
[P]erhaps few terrestrial Appearances are better worth considering
than mobs. Your mob is a genuine outburst of Nature; issuing
from, or communicating with, the deepest deep of Nature. When
so much goes grinning and grimacing as a lifeless Formality, and
under the stiff buckram no heart can be felt beating, here once
more, if nowhere else, is a Sincerity and Reality. Shudder at it; or
even shriek over it, if thou must; nevertheless consider it. Such a
Complex of human Forces and Individualities hurled forth, in their
transcendental mood, to act and react, on circumstances and on
one another; to work out what it is in them to work. The thing they
will do is known to no man; least of all to themselves. (I:VII:4:261)
A mob is a threat because of—and not despite—its authentic relationship
with nature. In a world marred by artifice and hypocrisy, a mob has the
virtue of addressing important matters. As I have already shown, Carlyle
sees every event as a threat, and a potential loss of force; we can therefore
see why a mob would be terrifying. As though appropriating the energy of
a population, a mob tears at the balance of social life. The paradox is that
Carlyle sees this destruction as a necessary way to rid society of shams and
illusions. As a result, no matter how much he admires the mob’s
“Sincerity,” Carlyle also carefully shows how easily events surpass every-
one’s judgment and intention.
The key to Carlyle’s representation of the mob—and also of the
Revolution—is its “inflammablest immeasurable Fire-work”
(I:VII:4:261). A mob is obviously a highly combustible mix of people.
Carlyle’s reticence about specifying the cause of fires—his recognition that
they are “immeasurable”—highlights the importance of aspects of conflict
that resist explanation. Raging infernos point up the limits, first demon-
strated by Carlyle in Sartor Resartus and his essays on history, of cause-and-
effect narratives.
As further proof of this limitation, in Part III of The French Revolution,
Carlyle explains, in a chapter usefully entitled “Cause and Effect,” that
some aspects of history are simply inexplicable in conventional terms. He
then lays down a rhetorical challenge to historians. Imagine a ship, he says,
loaded with ammunition, going up in flames:
So soon as History can philosophically delineate the conflagration of
a kindled Fireship, she may try this other task. Here lay the bitumen-
stratum, there the brimstone one; so ran the vein of gunpowder, of
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nitre, terebinth and foul grease: this, were she inquisitive enough,
History might partly know. But how they acted and reacted below
decks, one fire-stratum playing into the other, by its nature and the art
of man, now when all hands ran raging, and the flames lashed high
over shrouds and topmast: this let not History attempt. (III:III:1:245)
Carlyle argues that although history can discover the sources of a fire, it
cannot explain how those particular sources result in the conflagration that
emerges. If the same strata and veins of fuel somehow burned several times,
each iteration might easily be different. And although one can narrate or
describe how such a ship burns, he implies that it is wrong to assume that
this would ever fully explain how the fire came to be.
Carlyle adopts the Fire-Ship as a metaphor for the Revolution in gener-
al, but especially for The French Revolution’s double-edged moral argu-
ment, whereby even admirable purposes can—and likely will—go amiss.
The gathering of likeminded persons in large crowds is, in effect, like pour-
ing accelerant on a flame:
But indeed that similitude of the Fireship; of our poor French
brethren, so fiery themselves, working also in an element of fire, was
not insignificant. Consider it well, there is a shade of the truth in it.
For a man, once committed headlong to republican or any
Transcendentalism, and fighting and fanaticizing amid a Nation of
his like, becomes as it were enveloped in an ambient atmosphere of
Transcendentalism and Delirium: his individual self is lost in some-
thing that is not himself, but foreign though inseparable from him.
Strange to think of, the man’s cloak still seems to hold the same
man: and yet the man is not there, his volition is not there; nor the
source of what he will do and devise; instead of the man and his
volition there is a piece of Fanaticism and Fatalism incarnated in the
shape of him. (III:III:2:246, emp. in original)
Sixty years before Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd (1895), Carlyle offers an
account of how groups can shatter constraints.18 In a crowd, the trait one
has in common with the rest of the participants—in this case,
republicanism—replaces one’s will. In this sense, the decision to oppose
the ancién regime was itself a risky endeavor, and became incendiary as
more and more people made that decision. From Carlyle’s point of view,
while one might not know exactly what sets a political fire, the fact of its
burning is undeniable.
Carlyle’s interests in palimpsests and in fires find common ground here:
Both interests engage our inability to explain events. His painful lesson,
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expounded over and again, is that history is no guide for how to live, pro-
viding no plan for how to act correctly at any particular juncture. To
invoke the language of Past and Present, history offers no Morrison’s Pill
that would resolve our current dilemmas. Instead, by making clear that
conventional sequences of causation do not exhaust the development of
society, history goads us out of complacency. He does not naively pro-
claim, however, the supremacy of human agency; after all, that causation
is often ineffable suggests that we cannot rely on our best intentions.
Because The French Revolution is set in the past, its narrative drive meshes
well with this argument. By contrast, in Past and Present, Carlyle fervidly
proclaims that England is hastening to perdition. How, then, can he sus-
tain the same interest in contingency?
Past and Present is a curiously sibylline jeremiad: On the one hand, it
aims to incite in its readers a revolutionary scorn for Mammonism, but,
on the other hand, its vatic tone resists prescribing specific remedies.
Indeed, he argues that rather than changing the world, we must change
ourselves. The experience of reading Past and Present should transform us,
leaving us less vulnerable to illusion, and capable of real action:
There will no “thing” be done that will cure you. There will a rad-
ical universal alteration of your regimen and way of life take place;
there will a most agonizing divorce between you and your chimeras,
luxuries and falsities, take place; a most toilsome, all but “impossi-
ble” return to Nature, and her veracities, and her integrities, take
place: that so the inner fountains of life may again begin, like eter-
nal Light-fountains, to irradiate and purify your bloated, swollen,
foul existence, drawing nigh, as at present, to nameless death!
(28–29)
In this remarkable passage, Carlyle’s syntax illustrates the gap between
cause and effect that I evoked above. By interposing such a dramatic space
between each clause’s predicate and verb, Carlyle thwarts our expectation
that he can guide us to the purification that he promises. By rendering
agency enigmatic, these sentence’s impersonal arrangement—“there will
. . . take place”—underscores the “universal alteration” that he claims is
possible. Consider, for example, the way the first sentence echoes the
Lord’s Prayer: Carlyle rewrites “Thy will be done” as “There will no ‘thing’
be done,” removing thereby any sense of guidance, agency, or specific pro-
gram. Adopting Carlyle’s perspective should resemble an internal baptism,
one paid for by sacrificing all of one’s comforting illusions.
Though we must sacrifice all of our illusions, Carlyle refuses to prom-
ise any specific outcome; in this respect, his tone recalls that of The French
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Revolution, where we saw forces that transformed society tilting quickly
into ferocious violence. In his history of France, the mob represented an
outburst of nature that exceeded judgment and prediction. Past and Present
comparably invokes an “‘impossible’ return to Nature,” an outpouring of
energy that cannot help but destroy the shams and illusions of the
present—but because it means a “universal alteration,” we cannot be sure
that the destruction will stop there. And the “Light-fountains” that will
purify us echo the lightening bolt from The French Revolution, Volume I.
Just as the originally purifying blast of the revolution quickly became
defiled by pitch, the irradiating blast he describes here may destroy us
along with our illusions. Past and Present thus presents us with a remark-
ably austere choice: Either the illusions of “Dilettantism and Mammon”
(24), or the chance that destroying those illusions will produce something
better.
Some readers found this open-endedness profoundly unsettling.
William Henry Smith, for one, complained that “turn which way you will,
to philosophy, to politics, to religion, you will find Mr. Carlyle objecting,
denouncing, scoffing, rending all to pieces in his bold, reckless, ironical
manner—but teaching nothing” (210, emp. in original). Smith argued that
Carlyle forever preaches action, but never explains exactly what that action
is supposed to be. Such a criticism misses entirely the thrust of Carlyle’s
argument. Carlyle cannot know what the best action should be, because
the entire sphere of actions, persons, and institutions must be transformed.
From within the present system, he of course cannot explain what such a
transformation would entail. What he can do is make clear the conse-
quences of our participation in a system that, he argues, is antithetical to
life.
As Carlyle’s historical writing focuses relentlessly on what eludes causal
explanations, so it makes sense for his political claims, such as they are, to
reject prescription. In The French Revolution and Past and Present, history
always retains a sense of possibility; it is something to which we can aspire,
rather than a force to which we must submit. Carlyle creates a wholly new
kind of history, in which truth is located neither in the events themselves,
nor in the genius of the historian, but in between: His historiography
bypasses merely explaining society, and aims to transform it completely by
provoking readerly self-transformation.
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C H A P T E R T W O
The Ghosts of Causality
Were Charles Dickens’s posthumous reputation to hang on his historical
perspicacity, he might, it has often seemed, readily be forgotten. Replete
with anachronisms, Dickens’s novels both evoke the past and interpret the
present through refracted and elusive memories.1 While Dickens is justly
celebrated for his emotionally resonant depictions of London, for
instance, he conjures them by fusing the half-remembered, half-fantasized
London of his childhood with that (equally fantasized city) of his maturi-
ty. Because his novelistic procedure is so apparently indifferent to histori-
cal realism, critics often dismiss as merely imitative his two novels set dur-
ing historical upheavals of the recent past, Barnaby Rudge (1839–41) and
A Tale of Two Cities (1859). The former, which takes up the Gordon Riots
of 1780, has been read as a failed Scott novel, the latter as derivative of
Thomas Carlyle’s The French Revolution (1837). Rather than characterize
Dickens’s relationship with Carlyle’s and Scott’s works as failed imitations,
I shall argue that Tale and Rudge emphasize an alternative causal model:
both historical fictions override the general function of the historical
novel, which is to show that “the present is a recognizable product of the
past” (McGowan 33). Dickens therefore repudiates two equally untenable
positions: on the one hand, the claim that the present is only a product of
the past; on the other hand, the view that past and present are complete-
ly distinct. Instead, these novels suggest, the past is subject to revision by
the present, with limitations. They also point up the insufficiency of ordi-
nary accounts of causation, stressing instead factors that elude ideological
or material determination, and indeed that remain stubbornly intransitive
or meaningless. Dickens’s putative inability satisfactorily to achieve histor-
ical immediacy—which has been treated as a problem of representation—
instead portrays an asymmetrical relationship between history and indi-
vidual experience.2 At the crucial moments of Rudge and Tale, each novel
abandons mimesis as a strategy, focusing instead on language that resists
easy conversion into political or historical terms. In so doing, Dickens dis-
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rupts attempts to mesh social and subjective realms, suggesting instead that
these realms are at least partially incommensurate.
Rather than seeking to derive the present from the past, Dickens’s his-
torical novels ask what it means to be subject to history—that is, what are
the qualities of a properly historical subject? The conceptual support for
contemporary theory’s widespread punning on “subject” emerges in these
novels: by immersing his characters in history, subjecting them to the
forces of historical change, Dickens paradoxically demonstrates the inabil-
ity of history to guarantee meaning or identity. Instead, his fiction implies
that although history produces subjectivity, it does not determine or con-
struct it. Anticipating by sixty years the speculative arguments now associ-
ated with psychoanalysis, Dickens places doubt, guilt, and the unconscious
at the heart of history. Positing the historical subject as a subject with an
unconscious, Rudge and Tale foreground the origins of a responsible and
sustainable relation to history in the haunted, guilty subject. To make this
case, I will be articulating elements of Rudge and Tale that seem enigmatic
or perverse. In particular, I will be suggesting that Madame Defarge’s
sociopathic certainty must be read against Barnaby Rudge’s paradoxical
moral innocence and social criminality. In these characters, Dickens
undermines the credibility of both certainty about historical meaning and
presentist ignorance of the past. The enigma of history, and the guilt this
enigma elicits from the subject, emerges with particular force in Rudge
through the paradoxical temporality of ghosts. Although we are accus-
tomed to thinking of specters as ghosts of something, Dickens represents
history as a generalized haunting. In so doing, he dramatizes the ways in
which historical forces as well as individual volition fail—both in isolation
and combination—as adequate explanations for historical change and sub-
jective experience.3 He ought therefore to be seen an important precursor
to psychoanalysis, especially insofar as psychoanalysis bears on questions of
historical meaning; grasping the surprising connection between psycho-
analysis’s and Dickens’s view of history should help us to clear both from
the charge of ahistoricism. I begin by juxtaposing Dickens with Sigmund
Freud and Jacques Lacan to highlight the ways in which all three writers
are more centrally concerned with history than is generally acknowledged.
After briefly establishing the shared interests of Dickens and psychoanaly-
sis, I turn to the novels—showing first the dialectic between certainty and
ignorance represented by Madame Defarge and Barnaby. Having estab-
lished how neither option is a credible possibility for Dickens, I then argue
that he uses haunting as a metaphor for history. Finally, I show how con-
temporary theory has taken up this ghostly vision of history, suggesting
that Dickens’s ghostly model helps us understand theoretical arguments
that otherwise seem perverse or needlessly abstract.
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I. Dreams of History, Allegories of Meaning
Much of Barnaby Rudge’s plot revolves around the Maypole Inn, an exem-
plar of the welcoming, entertaining public house so frequent in Dickens.
In particular, the Maypole provides a refuge from home for Gabriel
Varden, a locksmith for whom the novel was originally entitled. After
enjoying the Maypole’s delights one evening early in the novel, Varden
rides, or rather sways, homeward, and Dickens’s narrator comments:
A man may be very sober—or at least firmly set upon his legs on
that neutral ground which lies between the confines of perfect
sobriety and slight tipsiness—and yet feel a strong tendency to
mingle up present circumstances with others which have no man-
ner of connection with them; to confound all consideration of per-
sons, things, times, and places; and to jumble his disjointed
thoughts together in a kind of mental kaleidoscope, producing
combinations as unexpected as they are transitory. (3:70)
The genially drunken Varden resembles nobody so much as Dickens him-
self, or at least Dickens’s narrating persona. To the consternation of literal-
minded readers, Dickens is not overly precise about chronological or 
historical distinctions, and as critics have long noticed, he generally pro-
ceeds by “mingl[ing] up present circumstances with others which have no
manner of connection with them.” And Dickens’s image of a “mental
kaleidoscope” resonates well with his own improvisational genius for con-
juring memorable characters, often in settings and plots drenched with the
most varied affects. He implies, moreover, that these “unexpected” combi-
nations of past and present disclose truths unavailable to conventional
narratives.
If we read the tipsy Varden as a figure for Dickensian narration,
though, we could also say that Varden possesses a kind of historical
knowledge—albeit one in the mode of altered or diminished conscious-
ness. It is a knowledge that requires for its articulation the force of
Dickens’s narratives. The interplay between historical enigma and narra-
tion is not my critical imposition, but is in fact elaborated in a letter from
Dickens to Thomas Stone, a doctor who contributed several articles on
dreams to Household Words in 1850–51. Dickens disputes as both untrue
and unoriginal Stone’s thesis that we dream primarily of present events
and concerns. He claims that such a misunderstanding is the result of “the
usual stories in the books” (Storey 6: 276), and tries to refute Stone’s posi-
tion empirically, by appealing to his own experience:
Chapter Two40
Jones_CH2_3rd.qxp  9/8/2006  2:13 PM  Page 40
My own dreams are usually of twenty years ago. I often blend my
present position with them; but very confusedly; whereas my life of
twenty years ago is very distinctly represented. I have been married
fourteen years, and have nine children, but I do not remember that
I ever, on any occasion, dreamed of myself as being invested with
those responsibilities, or surrounded by those relations. (Storey
6:276)
It does not seem to strike Dickens as troubling or revealing that he never
dreams of his family, though his laconic, impersonal references to his wife
and children as “those responsibilities . . . those relations” may appear to
us to be almost as telling as the claim not to dream of them. Like the
drunken Varden, the dreaming Dickens “confound[s] all consideration of
persons, things, times, and places.” Yet Dickens also places extraordinary
confidence in the accuracy of his dreams of the past, and also stresses the
importance of this accuracy. He does not, for instance, see dreams of the
past as being updated to reflect present circumstances, but insists that such
dreams faithfully and immediately conjure the past as it was, while dreams
of the present are vague and nebulous at best. He does, however, grant that
dreams of the past sometimes bear allegorically upon the present, so that
the fact of his trying to work out a problem will be represented, rebus-like,
in a dream. Dickens locates “the origin of all fable and Allegory—the very
first conception of all such fictions” in this type of dream (Storey 6:277).
This letter raises an explicit parallel between dreaming and fiction, one
focused on the enigmatic relationship between past and present. This par-
allel arguably warrants a connection between Dickens’s private account of
his dreams and his narrative style, for, as I shall argue below, both this let-
ter and his historical fictions aim to show how the past can influence the
present, without reducing this relation to determinism.
Dickens does not seem to recognize that giving an allegorical dimension
to oneiric representation blurs his careful distinction between past and
present. If dreams are sometimes allegorical, then we cannot rely upon
images of the past to refer exclusively to the past, since they might figura-
tively represent present concerns as well. A dream set in the past could, that
is, entirely concern the present. Dickens also cannot maintain with any
credibility that he has never dreamed of the present, or even that he has
done so only by way of past images, since he acknowledges that his dreams
sometimes contain symbolic elements. I am not trying to make a psychobi-
ographical argument about Dickens’s self-contradiction: instead, I am
reading the letter as a fascinating account of the supple relationship
between past and present.
Recognizing that dreams are allegorical also means acknowledging a
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need to interpret them.4 Faced with a confusing dream-element, we elab-
orate meanings for it, in order to dispel our bafflement. Dickens implies
that the past—which is, he claims, the explicit content of his dreams—is
enigmatic, in other words, and that we develop fables and allegories as a
way of resolving that bafflement. But because those allegories are only
interpretative, the meaning they offer is never quite secure. A second
implication is that all fictions are historical fictions.5 My point is not sim-
ply the commonsensical interpretation that Dickens, like many writers,
constantly reworks his memories of childhood people, places, and events
in his fiction. Conversely, I have tried to show that Dickens invokes the
idea of allegory to show how dreams could potentially connect to the pres-
ent. Significantly, Dickens suggests that the connection between the past
and the present is not “really there,” does not inhere in the symbolic
image, but is rather part of the work of interpretation—the dreamer’s
obsession with some problem. Dreams and fictions, according to
Dickens’s letter, represent intractable dimensions about the relationship
between the past and present. Such allegories, in other words, rework
aspects of our past in order to dispel our confusion about the present-day
world.6
Finally, it seems significant that Dickens constantly refers to bad
dreams in his letter to Stone. All of his examples are unhappy ones, and
he spends a full paragraph discussing his “unhealthy and morbid” year of
dreaming about the dead Mary Hogarth, his wife’s sister, whom he loved
intensely (Storey 6:277). Dickens does not seem to notice the contradic-
tion between his earlier claims that he never dreams of his family and this
admission that he dreamed of his wife’s sister for an entire year. Given the
intensity of his grief, it is also contradictory to assert that if “dreams can
be directly traced to any incidents of recent occurrence, it appears to me
that the incidents are usually of the most insignificant character” (Storey
6:277; original emp.). His letter in its contradiction tacitly acknowledges
that dreams may well refer to the present, but that they do so in complex
and unsatisfactory ways. We can therefore understand the fervor of
Dickens’s insistence that dreaming of the past is universal as defensive,
even guilty, rather than as simply representing the truth about dreams.
Dreaming and drunkenness are arguably metaphors for Dickens’s treat-
ment of the past, in which fleeting and surprising combinations have
enormous power. Instead of seeing history as a logical narrative of causes
and effects, Dickens offers an associative representation of history, in
which his characters are driven to actions they often find inexplicable or
unsupported by social or political identifications. In his historical fictions,
material causes never seem to mesh with the stories we tell about our
past—no matter how factually accurate those stories are. 
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One need not be psychoanalytically inclined—although it probably
doesn’t hurt—to connect Dickens’s interest in history, guilt, and states of
altered or diminished consciousness to the very similar interests of
Sigmund Freud, and of psychoanalysis in general. As Freud elaborates his
early theories both of fantasy and of infantile sexuality, he increasingly
becomes interested in questions of history and meaning. How, he con-
stantly asks, do people attach meanings to events, meanings which they
defend exhaustively, even as those meanings cause them suffering?7 Just as
in Dickens’s letter to Dr. Stone, where allegory emerges as a defense against
the enigma of history, Freud and Jacques Lacan argue that subjects are con-
stantly offering up narratives of meaning to ward off those aspects of expe-
rience that seem bewildering.
Freud’s paradoxical approach to historical meaning—and his connec-
tion to Dickens—can briefly be glimpsed in two comments on the etiolo-
gy of hysteria. In Studies on Hysteria (1895), Josef Breuer and Freud
famously write that “Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences” (7, original
emp.). Five years later, in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900 [1899]),
Freud modifies the aphorism: “Hysterical symptoms are not attached to
actual memories, but to phantasies erected on the basis of memories”
(529–30). As the later claim elaborates upon the first, the causal mecha-
nism of hysteria becomes more, rather than less, enigmatic. In the wake of
that enigma, psychoanalysis, properly conceived, comes into existence. In
the original aphorism, the hysteric suffers from a repressed memory of a
traumatic event; that is, an event that is somehow in itself traumatic, and
which transfers its traumatic force to the psyche without distortion. In the
second, fuller version, it is no longer clear whether the event is in itself
traumatic, since Freud shifts the traumatic charge from the event to
unconscious fantasy. Counterintuitively, it is as though neurotics—which,
for Freud, means most of us—are inhabited by some agency that supplies
the analysand with pain in excess of any external or material factors. That
agency, identified neither with the ego nor the unconscious, is the psycho-
analytic subject. Freud’s account of hysteria echoes Dickens’s theory of
dreams, insofar as both the Dickensian dreamer and the hysteric produce
fables to account for their experiences—and, Dickens and Freud equally
make clear, this experience is often fraught with anxiety.
The point of an analysis is not, therefore, to recover forgotten or
“repressed” events from an analysand’s life. It is, rather, to understand the
ways in which the analysand has attached meaning to those events. By
dramatizing the contingency of those meanings, a successful psychoanaly-
sis will allow the analysand to come “unstuck,” as it were, from those
unconscious meanings, and will therefore open the analysand simultane-
ously to the future and to a more capacious—or even just more literal—
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understanding of the past. As Jacques Lacan puts this point in his first
seminar, “the fact that the subject relives, comes to remember, in the intu-
itive sense of the word, the formative events of his existence, is not in itself
so very important. What matters is what he reconstructs of it. . . . when
all is said and done, it is less a matter of remembering than of rewriting
history” (13–14). I shall argue momentarily that Rudge and Tale undertake
a similar project of reopening the question of the past; in the meantime, a
famous example from Tale may clarify what Dickens, Freud, and Lacan are
after. Near the novel’s end, Madame Defarge causes the revolutionary tri-
bunal to become aware of a testament condemning Charles Darnay. The
testimony is particularly damning since it was penned by his father-in-law,
Dr. Manette, during the latter’s long imprisonment. Dr. Manette is aghast,
as he has come to love and admire Darnay; yet this shift in emotion is pre-
cisely what Madame Defarge denies. To borrow Lacan’s distinction,
Madame Defarge insists on remembering history, and on disallowing its
rewriting—that is, any change in its significance for the present.
One of the distinguishing features of Freudian and Lacanian psycho-
analysis is the refusal to admit that some meanings are better or more nor-
mal than others. For Lacan, subjectivity is an effect of speech and
language—that is, of the inability of the signifier and the signified to
cohere. The failure of words to refer adequately to their meanings leaves a
space for the subject to come into being. Because arriving at a final mean-
ing (on the evidence of words alone) is impossible, the subject has to com-
mit itself to one meaning over others, and must suffer and enjoy the con-
sequences of that commitment.8 Viewed from this perspective, the gaps in
an analysand’s history have an importance as gaps—as the possibility of a
space for a different understanding—rather than simply as holes that
would ideally be filled up.
Dickens’s interest in the problematics of history and guilt are also
refracted through a discussion of certainty and ignorance, and, like Freud
and Lacan, his response is enigmatic in two senses—it is difficult to inter-
pret and it offers enigma rather than resolution as history’s meaning. We
see this emerge by placing Charles Dickens’s two most historical actors,
Madame Defarge and Barnaby Rudge, against each other.
II. The Sociopath, the Idiot, and the Historical Subject
As to the condition of the peasant in France generally at that day, I
take it that if anything be certain on earth it is certain that it was
intolerable.
—Charles Dickens to Bulwer Lytton, 5 June 1860
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Throughout Barnaby Rudge and A Tale of Two Cities, characters’ certainty
about the past’s meaning reliably indexes their mistakenness, and even
their evil. Madame Defarge, the figure of murderous memory from Tale,
represents the potentially devastating consequences of such historical cer-
tainty when revolution extrapolates it into the public sphere. Dickens does
not suggest repudiating the past, nor does he side with the ancien régime.
Instead, he is anxious to show that the best way to grapple with the past is
to defer as long as possible assumptions and inferences about the charge of
historical duty. Keeping the question of history’s meaning open in this way,
Dickens suggests, singularly allows for the possibility of historical change.9
I begin with Madame Defarge because she exemplifies what is most para-
doxical about Dickens’s vision. Ordinarily, we understand “revolution” as
historical change. This is especially so of the French Revolution, which
seems to mark a turning point in the history of modernity. For Dickens,
however, the revolutionary impulse fundamentally is not for change, or
even for retribution; rather, I will argue, it is an epistemological vainglory,
a claim that is directed toward knowing the past, and maintaining it as
static, rather than reimagining the future. By contrast, as I shall show
through a reading of Barnaby’s encounter with his father, Dickens implies
that recognizing the fragility and contingency of our legacy from the past
allows for transformation to occur.
Madame Defarge “knows” exactly the meaning of past events (oppres-
sion on the part of the aristocracy; suffering on the part of the people), and
what its implications are for the present (an imperative to kill the people’s
enemies). By undermining her certainty about this meaning, Dickens’s
narrator does not thereby imply that the aristocracy was benevolent: as the
epigraph to this section suggests, Dickens acknowledged the oppressive-
ness of the French aristocracy. Nevertheless, the force of Madame Defarge’s
imperative is terrifying. Her monstrous memory, symbolically knitted like
Lachesis’s tapestry, is unchanging and inflexible. As her husband observes,
the mandate of history will “always be as plain to her as the sun. Confide
in Madame Defarge. It would be easier for the weakest poltroon that lives,
to erase himself from existence, than to erase one letter of his name or
crimes from the knitted register of Madame Defarge” (II:15:179). Elliot
Gilbert notes that Madame Defarge represents “capitulation” to history,
choosing “the past over the present, the historical over the personal, the
moribund written word over the living man” (“To Awake” 260, 261). She
does not simply prefer the past, though; she elevates herself as the sole
arbiter of its unchanging meaning, which authorizes, in her view, a mas-
sive, and partially indiscriminate, slaughter. Put as provocatively as possi-
ble, within Tale Madame Defarge, rather than Dickens’s narrator, strives to
make the present a recognizable product of the past. Refusing to conceive
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of her revolutionary activity as a form of rupture, Madame Defarge clings
passionately to her hatreds so as to keep them, and thus her grief for her
lost sister, alive but also unchanging.
Whereas Madame Defarge stands for certainty about historical mean-
ing, A Tale of Two Cities endorses, by contrast, epistemological modesty as
promoting a more sustainable relationship to history. As Jerry Cruncher
rides back to London after exchanging messages with Jarvis Lorry, the nar-
rator comments:
A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is con-
stituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other. A
solemn consideration, when I enter a great city by night, that every
one of those darkly clustered houses encloses its own secret; that
every room in every one of them encloses its own secret; that every
beating heart in the hundreds of thousands of breasts there, is, in
some of its imaginings, a secret to the heart nearest it! Something
of the awfulness, even of Death itself, is referable to this. . . . My
friend is dead, my neighbour is dead, my love, the darling of my
soul, is dead; it is the inexorable consolidation and perpetuation of
the secret that was always in that individuality, and which I shall
carry in mine to my life’s end. (3:14–15)
The paean to fact in the opening phrase evidently refers to Carlyle, recall-
ing a well-known discussion of secrets in Sartor Resartus (1831–32):
Carlyle writes that the “secret of Man’s being is still like the Sphinx’s secret:
a riddle that he cannot rede, and for ignorance of which he suffers death,
the worst death, a spiritual” (I:8:43; see Timko 186–87). To recognize the
resemblance of these passages, however, is to bring into view their differ-
ence: Carlyle’s “secret” is mystical or metaphysical (everything betrays the
same secret), whereas in Dickens the secret is structural. Not only does
every individual have a secret, but Tale’s narrator more strongly suggests
that individuals simply are that secret, and moreover, it is on the basis of
that constitutive secrecy that relationships are possible. In this passage,
death underscores the fact that we cannot know each other. Carlyle
laments the secret, because ignorance of its truth causes death, implying
that the secret can—and indeed, must—be discovered. Dickens by con-
trast does not imagine that the secrets in every heart can be fully disclosed.
For him, individuals are not transparent to each other.10
Madame Defarge cannot tolerate such an emphasis on occlusion, and the
narrator consistently figures her refusal of doubt in apocalyptic terms.11 In a
chapter entitled “Still Knitting,” the narrator presents an initially telescopic
vision, encompassing all of France, only to zoom in on the Defarges:
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Château and hut, stone face and dangling figure, the red stain on
the stone floor, and the pure water in the village well—thousands of
acres of land—a whole province of France—all France itself—lay
under the night sky, concentrated into a faint hairbreadth line. So
does a whole world, with all its greatnesses and littlenesses, lie in a
twinkling star. And as mere human knowledge can split a ray of
light and analyse the manner of its composition, so, sublimer intel-
ligences may read in the feeble shining of this earth of ours, every
thought and act, every vice and virtue, of every responsible creature
in it.
The Defarges, husband and wife, came lumbering under the
starlight. . . . (II:16:183)
The opening sentence of this passage underscores Dickens’s Carlylean
understanding of the French Revolution. The narrator contrasts the
château of the Marquis Evrémonde, murdered because he carelessly ran
over a peasant’s son, with the huts of the villagers in his town; the gothic
faces of the château, which took on the Marquis’s appearance after his
death, with his murderer, now hanging from a gallows above the town well;
the stain of the Marquis’s blood upon the floor, with the water now being
poisoned by the hung man’s body. The juxtaposition of the Defarges with
the narrator’s spectrascopic metaphor at the end of the passage establishes
an ironic relationship between the “sublimer intelligences” and the “lum-
bering” revolutionary couple. Especially Madame Defarge believes that
one can adjudicate the vice and “responsibility” of every human in France.
As Catherine Gallagher notes, the Revolution mandates transparency
while necessitating a practice of secrecy: the “belief in secrets creates the
need to expose, but the need to expose is reciprocally dependent on the
invention of secret plots. The French Revolution was uncannily like a
Dickens novel in this regard: the invented hidden plot justifies the will to
omniscience” (“A Duplicity” 134). Here, Gallagher conceives of the secret
as having a specific content, which in principle we could discover, or the
narrator could disclose. Dickens, by contrast, introduces the concept of a
structural ignorance that is the condition of novelistic knowledge. The
contrast between “sublimer” and human intelligences already suggests that
Dickens’s novel will not satisfy anything like a “will to omniscience”; like-
wise, his narrator has already made clear that humanity is constituted
through secrecy. In other words, Dickens represents a hole in meaning that
compels us to distinguish between what can be known and what cannot
be. In distinguishing thus between knowledge and omniscience, I am
appropriating one of Joan Copjec’s characterizations of psychoanalysis. For
Dickens, as with psychoanalysis, the argument is “not that we can ulti-
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mately penetrate what had previously seemed the unfathomable secret of
the subject but that there is nothing to fathom; the subject has no secret
knowledge; or, to quote the famous Hegelian quip: the Egyptian secrets
were also secret from the Egyptians themselves” (Copjec 66). Madame
Defarge, representative of the will to omniscience, believes that the
Egyptians knew their secrets; Dickens represents this will toward omnis-
cience as monstrous, and, in the last analysis, false in its relationship to the
past both because it overstates its own certainty and because it disallows in
advance the possibility of change—in other words, it denies that the past
is “past” at all.
The narrator emphasizes the limits of certainty in his representation of
Madame Defarge’s death. Despite all her certainty, Madame Defarge dies
in a most contingent, even slapstick, way. Hunting for Lucie Darnay,
Madame Defarge discovers instead Miss Pross, Lucie’s maid. Neither
woman speaks the other’s language, so they exchange mutually unintelli-
gible insults and threats for several moments before hurling themselves at
each other in what is quite literally a fight for Lucie’s fate. In their fight,
Madame Defarge tries to shoot Miss Pross, but accidentally shoots herself
(in part because Pross is slapping at the gun). Edward Bulwer Lytton
protested that this end is too accidental for the novel’s chief villain; yet
Dickens insists, by way of reply, that only such an ending is adequate to
Madame Defarge’s crimes:
Where the accident is inseparable from the passion and emotion of
the characters, where it is strictly consistent with the whole design,
and arises out of some culminating proceeding on the part of the
character which the whole story has led up to, it seems to me to
become, as it were, an act of divine justice. And when I use Miss
Pross . . . to bring about that catastrophe, I have the positive inten-
tion of making that half-comic intervention a part of the desperate
woman’s failure, and of opposing that mean death—instead of a
desperate one in the streets, which she wouldn’t have minded—to
the dignity of Carton’s. (Paroissien Selected 340–41)
The farce surrounding Madame Defarge’s death arguably stands as a refu-
tation of her certainty during life. Dickens suggests that her obsession
with the meaning of the historical past blinds her to the consequences of
her own actions, and prevents her even from overcoming the comical Miss
Pross. He also explains that what seems accidental is in fact not so:
Madame Defarge’s blind pursuit of her passion causes her death. He there-
fore cannot be accused of eclipsing history altogether; instead, this letter
suggests that ideological explanations cannot wholly account for our
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actions. The realm of the accidental reminds us that the social realm will
not serve as a guarantee of literary meaning.
Barnaby Rudge contains a satiric precedent to Madame Defarge’s cer-
tainty in A Tale of Two Cities, indicating Dickens’s central fascination with
the interplay of certainty and doubt. The focus on Rudge’s political half is
the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots, named after Lord George Gordon and his
Protestant Association. Introducing Lord Gordon, his (fictional) secretary
Gashford, and their Protestant Association, Dickens offers this scathing
praise for their organizational efforts:
To surround anything, however monstrous or ridiculous, with an air
of mystery, is to invest it with a secret charm, and power of attrac-
tion which to the crowd is irresistible. False priests, false prophets,
false doctors, false patriots, false prodigies of every kind, veiling
their proceedings in mystery, have always addressed themselves at an
immense advantage to the popular credulity, and have been, per-
haps, more indebted to that resource in gaining and keeping for a
time the upper hand of Truth and Common Sense, than to any half-
dozen items in the whole catalogue of imposture. Curiosity is, and
has been from the creation of the world, a master-passion. To awak-
en it, to gratify it by slight degrees, and yet leave something always
in suspense, is to establish the surest hold that can be had, in wrong,
on the unthinking portion of mankind. (37:347)
This passage appears to substantiate Gallagher’s reading of Tale, as Dickens
castigates others for creating mystery even as he himself does so.
McGowan, too, observes that “this reproof of Gashford reads like an expla-
nation of Dickens’s own extraordinary success” (43).
This passage, however, is directed against mystification, rather than the
structural kinds of secrecy I discussed earlier. Dickens complains in this
passage about mountebanks who “veil their proceedings in mystery,” wrap-
ping a layer of obfuscation around everyday items, all the better to make
their fraudulent promises enticing. He scorns, in other words, those who
offer up, as reparation for the frustrations of everyday life, banal objects
surfeited with mystery, and who represent themselves as possessing the key
to that mystery. The fictional Protestant Association is a perfect example,
because it offers scapegoating and hatred as answers for social change and
the inequities of life. Dickens reverses this procedure: His historical novels
emphasize elements of historical and generational transmission that are
structurally unknowable, even—or especially—at those moments when
transmission seems the most reliable. He thus reminds us of the ambigui-
ty and conflicting interpretations at the core of what we take to be certain;
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crucially, he does not hold out any promise of resolving the enigma of exis-
tence. To put this point in Freudian terms, Dickens does not believe that
there is a cure for subjectivity.
If Madame Defarge represents murderous historical certainty, Barnaby
Rudge initially embodies the reverse. Barnaby Rudge: A Tale of the Riots of
’80 is by far Dickens’s least-read novel, and so it may be worth sketching
its background and plot. After his early popular successes, Dickens want-
ed to write a historical novel, and the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots of 1780
appealed to him as subject matter for several related reasons. First, these
riots were the clearest local reminder of the threat posed by the mob,
which had been seared into English middle-class consciousness by the
French Revolution. Second, Carlyle’s description of the revolutionary
crowd in The French Revolution (1837) fired Dickens’s imagination. Third,
anti-Catholic prejudice lingered well into the nineteenth century, receiv-
ing a spur in 1829 with the passage of Catholic Emancipation.12 For
instance, an unsigned 1836 essay entitled “The ‘No-Popery’ Cry,” in
Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country, characterized Catholicism as a
“fearful evil,” and recalled Horace Walpole’s admonition that “When the
people of England lose the cry against Popery, they will lose their consti-
tution and their liberty” (511). Moreover, the creation in 1839 of a new
Protestant Association modeled on Gordon’s lent topical relevance to the
1780 riots.13
A central interpretive problem in relation to Rudge has been how to
hold the novel’s two halves together. Despite Dickens’s interest in the
Gordon Riots, the novel is named after the idiot son of a murderer, who
has been raised by his mother to be ignorant of his father’s crime. The
novel’s first half, which details Barnaby’s upbringing with his mother,
explores the world and denizens of the Maypole Inn, and depicts both Inn
and family as haunted by Barnaby’s father, seems to have little to do with
the second half, with its more explicitly historical account of London dur-
ing the Gordon Riots. Barnaby has an acute imagination and a strong
aversion to blood, but is utterly without reason or memory. As a result, he
becomes swept up in the novel’s historical events, and leads the mob’s vio-
lent anti-Catholic protests in 1780. He is arrested, and while in prison, by
a startling coincidence meets his father.
Barnaby’s chance encounter with his father while they both await exe-
cution crystallizes the interplay between certainty and ignorance that I
have been tracing. Here’s how Dickens presents it:
Heaven alone can tell, with what vague thoughts of duty, and affec-
tion; with what strange promptings of nature, intelligible to him as
to a man of radiant mind and most enlarged capacity; with what
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dim memories of children he had played with when a child himself,
who had prattled of their fathers, and of loving them, and being
loved; with how many half-remembered, dreamy associations of his
mother’s grief and tears and widowhood; he watched and tended
this man. But that a vague and shadowy crowd of such ideas came
slowly on him; that they taught him to be sorry when he looked
upon his haggard face, that they overflowed his eyes when he
stooped to kiss him on the cheek, that they kept him waking in a
tearful gladness, shading him from the sun, fanning him with
leaves, soothing him when he started in his sleep—ah! what a trou-
bled sleep it was—and wondering when she would come to join
them and be happy, is the truth. (68:614)
At first glance, this passage seems to idealize fatherhood, even when that
father is a vagabond and murderer. It is as though Barnaby simply needs to
reunite with his father for his problems to be alleviated. Emphasizing the
father, however, misses Dickens’s point: at this moment, Barnaby is flood-
ed with history, even if in the debased form of memories, for nearly the
first time in the novel.14 What is fascinating about this passage is the way
Barnaby refers a variety of recollections to his father. Barnaby’s entire life
has been organized around avoiding his father, both in person and through
reference. His mother, understanding the truth of her husband’s character
all too well, has imagined only one possible outcome of their meeting: that
it would irrevocably sunder Barnaby from reality. It does not go as she
fears, however, in part because Barnaby is finally discovering that knowl-
edge of his father allows him to attribute meaning to a variety of enigmas
in his past. Yet it should also be emphasized that he experiences this mean-
ing as a sort of threat: in a novel obsessed with the violence of the mob, it
is startling that it is a “crowd” of ideas that breaks in on his troubled mind.
Barnaby moves from a refusal of the past to a new, somewhat more open
relationship with it, although it is still “vague,” “dim,” “shadowy,” and
frightening.15
While Barnaby does not improve right away, the encounter with his
father does seem to help him. During the novel’s closing summary of its
characters’ lives, the narrator reports on Barnaby. Perhaps surprisingly, con-
sidering his nervous breakdown after he is spared execution, the news is
good:
Some time elapsed before Barnaby got the better of the shock he
had sustained, or regained his old health and gaiety. But he recov-
ered by degrees: and although he could never separate his condem-
nation and escape from the idea of a terrific dream, he became, in
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other respects, more rational. Dating from the time of his recovery,
he had a better memory and greater steadiness of purpose; but a
dark cloud overhung his whole previous existence, and never
cleared away. (Chapter the Last: 737)
Dickens does not pretend that Barnaby is cured, but he does try to give
Barnaby a relationship to history.16 Barnaby moves from someone utterly at
the whim of anyone’s manipulation, to someone who understands, howev-
er rudimentarily, that one’s past actions bear upon the present—although
always enigmatically. The tension inherent in the last quoted sentence
above is even more interesting, because it indicates Dickens’s awareness of
subjectivity’s costs: Although Barnaby has a “better memory,” a “dark cloud
overhung his whole previous existence.” What is the nature of this cloud?
Is it a moral cloud, representing regret or repugnance for his crimes associ-
ated with his earlier ignorance? Or, as the grammar seems to suggest, is it a
cloud of obscurity, so that Barnaby’s improved memory dates only from his
recovery? The latter option would give Barnaby a sense of the past, but at
the cost of repressing some of the crucial events in his life.
Barnaby’s “dark cloud,” which nevertheless seems to bring clarity, con-
trasts vividly with Madame Defarge’s bloody certainty. Barnaby serves,
astonishingly, as a limited model for historical subjectivity, insofar as he
shows himself capable of adapting to change, and of taking on new mean-
ings. Understanding Barnaby in this way highlights the relationship
between the novel’s halves. In the remainder of the chapter, I try to clari-
fy this hinge by unpacking some of the ghostly images in Barnaby.
Especially in that novel, the ubiquity of ghosts works two ways. First,
those haunted by past events understandably tend to focus on their fear of
the past, to the exclusion of thoughts for the present or future. Second, the
sheer quantity of ghosts eventually disrupts readerly certainty about the
meaning of the past, indicating Dickens’s hope for a different understand-
ing of its import.
III. Ghosts and Guilt in Barnaby Rudge
Haunting is historical, to be sure, but it is not dated, it is never
docilely given a date in the chain of presents, day after day, accord-
ing to the instituted order of a calendar.
—Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (1993)
Many of Dickens’s early novels, such as Nicholas Nickleby (1838–39),
Martin Chuzzlewit (1843), and Dombey and Son (1846–48), focus on a
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central theme, such as hypocrisy or pride, and embody it in memorable
characters such as Pecksniff or Dombey. These novels are set in the
“Dickensian present,” a nebulous timeframe that allows Dickens to draw
interchangeably from contemporary sources and his childhood memories
of London. The central idea of Barnaby Rudge, however, is different, as it
is set explicitly in the past, and ostensibly turns on two analogies rather
than on plots centering on such carefully delineated characters as Pecksniff
and Dombey:17 first, that the historical situation of the 1780s closely
resembles the early 1840s, when Dickens was writing; and second, that
private worries—especially those associated with fatherhood—resemble or
even produce public woe. Both analogies imply a symmetry at the heart of
historical development: in the first analogy, the same conditions in dis-
parate times will produce the same effects; in the second, public and pri-
vate disorders are commensurate and can be translated into each other.18
Yet Dickens disrupts these analogies with metaphors of haunting that fore-
ground the asymmetry of the novel’s cultural periods and arenas. The
novel’s analogies thus function paradoxically, simultaneously promising
and withholding historical knowledge. Indeed, in Barnaby Rudge, Dickens
offers up a historical novel that undermines the kind of historical analogies
on which the genre depends.
Rudge’s critique of the historical novel genre is not in itself surprising,
since Dickens’s express intent was to eclipse the Victorian novelists’ chief
precursor, Walter Scott.19 In the criticism on Rudge there is a Bloomian ten-
dency to see this conflict primarily as a matter of generational and profes-
sional rivalry. As Ian Duncan notes, “for most writers of Dickens’s genera-
tion, writing a historical romance was a professional rite of passage, mas-
tering the dominant (masculine) cultural model and measuring oneself
against its formidable parent” (221). Conceived in this way, a certain filial
rebelliousness is to be expected. Rudge resembles Scott’s The Heart of
Midlothian (1818): both feature riots, an attack on a prison, and promi-
nent mentally deranged characters.20 However, Rudge’s revision of Scott
moves beyond intergenerational conflict, and I would thus characterize
Dickens’s rejection of Scott’s model differently. Dickens’s critique of Scott’s
historicism does not mean that he is unaware of history’s claims. Instead,
as we have seen, Dickens tries to open up a new relationship to history, one
that allows him to conceptualize historical change without subscribing to
determinism. Dickens’s philosophy of history refuses to reduce the past to
a role as the origin of the present. For Dickens, the past is not dead; the
past’s meaning should constantly provoke fresh questions, rather than
obeisance to dead forms.
False, self-serving, and deceptively aestheticized histories circulate freely
throughout Barnaby Rudge.21 In the hands of a lesser novelist, this pattern
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would suggest the inability of fiction to convey historical truth. Instead,
Dickens takes a surprising position: The difficulty with such stories resides
not in their fictiveness but in their stubborn insistence on fact.22 As Juliet
McMaster claims, in Rudge “those visions that move on the edge of
consciousness—dreams, fantasies, chimeras of the imagination—recurrent-
ly leap into the center of the action, and are confirmed as being more real
than the rationality that rejects them” (1). This striking tactic diverges from
conventional “poetic license” by representing historical events as following
the logic and processes of the imagination. The scenes of crowd violence
populating the novel’s second half seem to step out of Barnaby’s fevered
nightmares. This apparent connection between the private horrors of the
Rudge family and the public ones of the riots, however, raises an obvious
question: What can be the link between Barnaby’s half-remembered night-
mares and the convulsive violence of a rebellious populace? Arguing that
Dickens at times seems sympathetic to the rioters, some critics posit a sim-
ple kinship of marginality: mainstream society excludes Barnaby by virtue of
his diminished abilities, just as it excludes the rioters by virtue of their class
position.23 Identifying such a connection inevitably leads these critics to
reproach Dickens for, at the novel’s end, casting his lot with mainstream
society against the rioters and Barnaby.24 More problematically, asserting a
direct connection between the novel’s private half and its public half dimin-
ishes the strangeness of the former, reducing the Rudge plot to an epiphe-
nomenon of the overarching historical events of 1775 and 1780. Finally,
such a reading cannot account adequately for the novel’s ending, in which
Barnaby’s memories of his youth and Geoffrey Haredale’s self-imposed exile
and virtual suicide haunt the unifying gesture of double marriages.
These problems may be resolved by qualifying the connection between
the imaginative figures in the first half of the novel and the political events
in the second. That is, although (as Steven Marcus and McMaster suggest)
the events of the second half unfold like the nightmares and phantoms of
the first half, the relationship between halves is merely one of resemblance,
not identity or even analogy. In Rudge, Dickens underscores the vital dif-
ference between these levels of similitude by repeatedly pointing up the
ways in which the stories we tell about historical events are evocative but
wrong. The plot opens with Solomon Daisy, a denizen of the Maypole,
recounting a murder story from 1753: Reuben Haredale is murdered for
money, apparently by his gardener. Daisy’s story, for example, depends on
the misidentification of Haredale’s unnamed gardener as the steward,
Rudge, “scarcely to be recognised by his clothes and the watch and ring he
wore” (1:58). Rudge’s substitution of his clothes for the gardener’s estab-
lishes a historical record, one that is obsessively retold at the Maypole and
is enough to throw suspicion off the trail for two decades.
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The doubling that emerges in this story, whereby Rudge disguises him-
self as his victim, symbolically killing himself, emphasizes the fascinating
proliferation of haunting images in the novel’s first half.25 Many of these
images are, naturally, associated with Rudge himself, as the returned mur-
derer. He is initially described by the narrator as having a “cadaverous hue”
(1:49). And when he meets Gabriel Varden, this corpse-like description is
dramatically reinforced. Rudge is figured as Death himself, as well as a
dying man and as a corpse: the “ruddy features of the locksmith so set off
and heightened the excessive paleness of the man on horseback, that he
looked like a bloodless ghost, while the moisture, which hard riding had
brought out upon his skin, hung there in dark and heavy drops, like dews
of agony and death” (2:64–65). There is a natural antipathy here between
Varden, the novel’s central point of virtue, and Rudge, the villain of the
novel’s first half. The redundancy of “bloodless ghost,” apparently contra-
dicted by the sweaty “dews of agony and death,” points up the contradic-
tion in Rudge’s character.26 Anyone in Chigwell who discovered his identi-
ty would think that he is in fact a ghost, because they all think him mur-
dered. Figuratively, he haunts not only Chigwell, to which he later declares
that he cannot help returning, but also his wife, Mary, and his son,
Barnaby. Mrs. Rudge declares to Varden, “You do well to say he haunts this
house. . . . His shadow has been upon it and me, in light and darkness, at
noonday and midnight. And now, at last, he has come in the body!”
(6:92). This speech consolidates the contradictory aspects of Rudge, who
seems able to haunt from near and far. Although Mrs. Rudge sees herself
as having endured the worst of all fates for the past twenty-two years, she
also clearly feels that the worst has only now come upon her. Barnaby him-
self glosses the “shadow” in illuminating ways, finding it both precise and
playfully misleading (6:94). As Rudge himself recognizes, he is one that “in
the body [is] a spirit, a ghost upon the earth” (17:185).
In addition to blackmailing his wife, Rudge also haunts the site of his
crime. Returning to Chigwell near the twenty-seventh anniversary of the
murder, he is stricken with a ravaging guilt that seems to unhinge him. The
Haredale family is Catholic, and their home, The Warren, is being
attacked by a mob associated with the Protestant Association. Its defend-
ers sound the alarm—the same bell that rang out the night Rudge killed
Reuben Haredale. As if mesmerized, Rudge re-enacts the murder, stabbing
at phantoms with a knife. The bell’s “ringing summoned phantoms from
their graves. What face was that, in which a friendly smile changed to a
look of half incredulous horror, which stiffened for a moment into one of
pain, then changed again into an imploring glance at Heaven, and so fell
idly down with upturned eyes” (55:504). Like a hypnotic signal, the bell
returns Rudge through twenty-eight years, to the very night of the murder.
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Represented in the novel as a ghost since its opening pages, Rudge is now
afflicted with his own ghosts. He can do nothing but repeat his past con-
stantly, in part because his identity is entirely organized around eluding
responsibility for it.
This patently deterministic model of history holds true for Rudge
because he refuses to acknowledge his complicity with his past. Speaking
to a compatriot, Rudge picks up on the curiously timeless aspect of his
own guilt, reporting that he sees Reuben’s ghost before him constantly,
never changing. Moreover, he “struggled against the impulse [to return to
the scene of the crime]. . . . The day and hour were none of my choice.
Sleeping and waking, I had been among the old haunts for years—had vis-
ited my own grave” (62:561). In emphasizing his struggle to suppress his
guilt, Rudge thus clarifies one of Dickens’s insights about history: The
refusal to engage with the past subjects one to its grip as surely as certain-
ty. Rudge cannot recognize the role that his “choice” has played in his life,
and he cannot, as a result, distance himself from his past. He effectively
sentences himself to his grave—literally, in that the slain steward had been
mistakenly buried under his name, and figuratively, in that his repeated
haunting returns to Chigwell drove him to Newgate. Rudge thus comple-
ments Madame Defarge: At first glance, both characters’ demises seem to
be accidental or externally caused, yet the very contingency of these inci-
dents turns out to be intrinsic to their situation.
On the one hand, Rudge’s ghostliness deploys the language of melodra-
ma and the Newgate novel.27 However, it also strangely perturbs the
novel’s temporality.28 The narrator’s description of Mrs. Rudge’s face
affords an excellent example of this skewed temporality:
One thing about this face was very strange and startling. You could
not look upon it in its most cheerful mood without feeling that it
had some extraordinary capacity of expressing terror. It was not on
the surface. It was in no one feature that it lingered. You could not
take the eyes, or mouth, or lines upon the cheek, and say, if this or
that were otherwise, it would not be so. Yet there it always lurked—
something for ever dimly seen, but ever there, and never absent for
a moment. It was the faintest, palest shadow of some look, to which
an instant of intense and most unutterable horror only could have
given birth; but indistinct and feeble as it was, it did suggest what
that look must have been, and fixed it in the mind as if it had had
existence in a dream. (5:87)
Dickens’s readers are of course to infer that the “instant” which birthed
this capacity for terror was Mrs. Rudge’s discovery of her husband com-
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mitting his crime—a sort of primal scene. However, the characters in the
novel perceive this expression even though they do not yet know that
Rudge is actually the murderer. As a result, her face appears to express an
emotion it will have expressed, but has not yet done so. The future anteri-
ority of her face is caught by Varden when he and Mrs. Rudge encounter
the murderer upon his first return to London: “There, at last, was that
dreadful look—the very one he seemed to know so well and yet had never
seen before—upon her face. There she stood, frozen to the ground, gazing
with starting eyes, and livid cheeks, and every feature fixed and ghastly”
(5:90–91).
Mrs. Rudge’s terrified expression is rich with figurative possibilities, as
is Varden’s reaction to it. Dickens exploits here an ambiguity in the word
“ghastly,” which can of course mean both terrifying and terrified, and can
be associated with ghosts in both senses. Some of Rudge’s spectral capaci-
ty for terror is thus transferred to his wife. Varden feels this keenly, as he
spends part of the next chapter berating Mrs. Rudge for not allowing him
to pursue her husband, who had fled upon seeing the locksmith. Varden
muses to himself, “how came it to be that man; how comes he to have this
influence over her; how came she to favour his getting away from me; and
more than all, how came she not to say it was a sudden fright, and noth-
ing more? It is a sad thing to have, in one minute, reason to mistrust a per-
son I have known so long, and an old sweetheart into the bargain” (6:94).
This is the first we learn that Mrs. Rudge is Gabriel Varden’s old sweet-
heart, and the timing of the revelation is unsettling. Varden does not seem
to believe that Mrs. Rudge’s expressiveness has changed—that is, he does
not register any new capacity for terror—over the years, which unmoors
her face’s capacity for terror from her husband’s murders. (Naturally, it
does not entirely uncouple her expression from the murders, but it does
seem to render enigmatic the connection between the murder and Mrs.
Rudge’s ghastliness.) Varden’s reaction mixes a lover’s jealousy with oblivi-
ousness, since the man he has just encountered is the rival who married his
beloved. Additionally, there is a relationship between the future anteriori-
ty of her expression and the retroactive suspicion that Varden casts over
Mrs. Rudge. In other words, the discovery that Rudge produces out of
Mrs. Rudge a look that Varden has always imagined but never seen under-
scores, for Varden, the oddness of Rudge’s appearance at her door. Varden
does not understand how that man in particular could possibly evoke such
a reaction out of her—just as, in the past, Rudge elicited her love, where-
as Varden could not.
I am unpacking this detail so doggedly because it shows how Dickens
prevents us from entirely assimilating Barnaby’s and his mother’s present
situation to Rudge’s murder. This difficulty of reference is exacerbated by
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Barnaby’s idiocy, because, despite all Mrs. Rudge’s attempts to prevent it,
Barnaby returns to his mother her own ghastly look. After the above
encounter with her husband, Mrs. Rudge goes to Chigwell to renounce
her annual income from Geoffrey Haredale, the surviving brother of
Reuben. As it is the first time that she has returned to Chigwell since the
murder, she has ample time to reflect upon her life with Barnaby:
Two-and-twenty years. Her boy’s whole life and history. . . . How
often since that time had she sat beside him night and day, watch-
ing for the dawn of mind that never came; how had she feared, and
doubted, and yet hoped, long after conviction forced itself upon
her! The little stratagems she had devised to try him, the little
tokens he had given in his childish way—not of dulness but of
something infinitely worse, so ghastly and unchildlike in its
cunning—came back as vividly as if but yesterday had intervened.
The room in which they used to be; the spot in which his cradle
stood; he, old and elfin-like in face, but ever dear to her, gazing at
her with a wild and vacant eye, and crooning some uncouth song
as she sat by and rocked him, every circumstance of his infancy
came thronging back, and the most trivial, perhaps, the most dis-
tinctly. (25:250)
This passage initially seems to say that Rudge’s murders tainted Barnaby’s
mind even while in the womb, a nearly genetic transmission of evil.
Consistent with Dickens’s representational strategy in the novel, this pas-
sage’s associations and resonances exceed such a manifest moral reading.
On the one hand, Mrs. Rudge knows that “the dawn of mind never
came.” The familiar metaphor implies that, for Barnaby, reason never
seized control of his passions. Such a reading corresponds with what little
we know of his affliction: lack of memory, nonexistent attention span,
diminished capacity for distinguishing reality from his imagination, and
so forth. On the other hand, as we have seen, Mrs. Rudge has a ghastly
look of her own, which makes undecidable the question of which parent
is the source of Barnaby’s ghastly expressions. His expressions—in partic-
ular, his “unchildlike . . . cunning”—are hard to fathom in such a dimin-
ished mind. We could even imagine that Mrs. Rudge works to keep
Barnaby ignorant, to ensure he doesn’t turn into his father. (A decision
with devastating consequences, since Barnaby’s flightiness causes him to
fall under Gordon’s spell.) In short, Dickens holds in tension the quasi-
Lamarckian argument that Barnaby inherited his condition from his
father as well as the argument that Barnaby’s ailment is exacerbated by his
childhood situation. Dickens does not quite say that Barnaby’s father’s
Chapter Two58
Jones_CH2_3rd.qxp  9/8/2006  2:13 PM  Page 58
actions determine Barnaby’s ailment—although those actions obviously
produce effects.
The ghostly excess of causation that I have been emphasizing among the
Rudge family is not a private curiosity. Instead, it constitutes the focus of
Dickens’s narratorial commentary throughout Rudge, as virtually every char-
acter and locale receives a spectral label at one point or another during the
novel. The novel rhetorically binds ghosts and guilt, with the paradoxical
effect that it is often the relatively innocent, such as Mrs. Rudge and Geoffrey
Haredale, who are the most haunted, and who thus feel most intensely guilty.
Rather than being merely ahistorical, Barnaby Rudge thus anticipates a ghost-
ly motif in deconstruction. Derrida has recently suggested, for instance, that
the possibility of haunting sustains the work of justice: “Without this non-
contemporaneity with itself of the living present, without that which secretly
unhinges it, without this responsibility and this respect for justice concerning
those who are not there, of those who are no longer or who are not yet present
and living, what sense would there be to ask the question ‘where?’ ‘where
tomorrow?’ ‘whither?’” (xix). Conceiving of history as a haunting rather than
as a cause, Dickens and Derrida acknowledge both the extent to which histo-
ry produces us and the debts we owe the dead.29 An anxious guilt is the cur-
rency in which this debt apparently must be paid.
IV. History’s Cure
If the readability of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univo-
cal, if it did not call for and at the same time defy interpretation, we
would never have anything to inherit from it. We would be affect-
ed by it as by a cause—natural or genetic. One always inherits from
a secret—which says, “read me, will you ever be able to do so?”
—Derrida, Specters of Marx
Derrida’s distinction between legacies and causes is a modern version of
Dickens’s account of history. Madame Defarge treats history as a cause:
Doctor Manette’s letter can have only one possible meaning, which can
never be allowed to change. By contrast, Dickens’s ghostly pattern of
images from Barnaby Rudge allows him to represent the possibility of read-
ing history differently. One of Dickens’s surprising legacies is, I would
argue, psychoanalysis, which similarly tries to battle against certainty in the
name of a more supple, but also more responsible, relationship with the
past. For Freud and Lacan, the conflict with which the analytic “cure”
engages is always a fantasmatic one in the present. And the cure works, as
Slavoj Zizek reminds us, almost in reverse:
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The Lacanian answer to the question: From where does the
repressed return? is therefore, paradoxically: From the future.
Symptoms are meaningless traces, their meaning is not discovered,
excavated from the hidden depth of the past, but constructed
retroactively—the analysis produces the truth; that is, the signify-
ing frame which gives the symptoms their symbolic place and
meaning. As soon as we enter the symbolic order, the past is always
present in the form of historical tradition and the meaning of these
traces is not given; it changes continually with the transformations
of the signifier’s network. Every historical rupture, every advent of
a new master-signifier, changes retroactively the meaning of all tra-
dition, restructures the narration of the past, makes it readable in
another, new way. (Sublime 56)
Psychoanalysis thus advances the startling—but also Dickensian—claim
that one could suffer from fantasies about historical meaning, without
turning the subject into an effect of history. The work of history and the
work of analysis is not only to uncover new facts about past events, but
also thereby to disrupt the familiar, equally self-serving and self-harming
stories we tell ourselves—all in the name of a new story that is perhaps
more capacious, more able to tolerate the demands of the present.
Dickens’s historical fictions paradoxically emphasize the structural limita-
tions to historical knowledge, and the perilous consequences of attribut-
ing stable meaning to past events. In so doing, Dickens dramatizes the
conditions of historical change, both rendering Victorian fables of
progress more precarious and indicating the retroactive influence that con-
temporary reform can have, even on the dead hand of the past.
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C H A P T E R T H R E E
Causation and
Interpretation in Shirley
Great effects may spring from trivial causes.
—Charlotte Brontë, Shirley (1849)
Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley (1849) is clearly a social-problem novel; the dif-
ficulty lies in determining exactly what social problem Brontë set out to
represent. Noting that Brontë wrote this novel of early nineteenth-century
Luddite strife during a period of Chartist agitation, Terry Eagleton affirms
“there can be no doubt that Chartism is the unspoken subject of Shirley”
(45).1 Yet Eugène Forçade insists, in a review Brontë herself endorsed, that
“the novel could have been called Shirley, or the condition of women in the
English middle-class” (143).2 Such disparate readings arise from the novel’s
questionable analogy, comparing the enforced idleness of middle-class
women with that of Yorkshire workers during a severe economic depres-
sion.3 Critics pursuing Shirley’s class and gender themes again join hands at
the novel’s end, arguing that the novel enforces paternalism as a solution
to the myriad problems of English society.4
Yet reading the novel as primarily an allegory of class or gender relations
(or both) defangs Brontë’s most interesting insights, diminishing Shirley’s
achievement relative to Jane Eyre (1847) and especially Villette (1853).5 As
Shirley is fascinated by the problematics of causation, by contested inter-
pretations, and by the limits of historical analogies, it arguably deserves
closer attention, not least because it disrupts allegories of class and gender
as much as it promulgates them. Brontë powerfully suggests that ideolog-
ical explanations cannot exhaust motives in the social realm; she does not,
however, assert that history is therefore void of causality. Shirley is thus a
paradoxical social-problem novel, since it refuses to dramatize amelioration
or reform as plausible, no matter how desirable.
In fact, at every turn, Shirley represents the most disorienting aspects of
causation in early and mid-nineteenth-century society. Robert Moore
debates with his workers over the reasons for the economic downturn, and
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with Hiram Yorke and Mr. Helstone about solutions to the economic and
political challenges of the Napoleonic Wars. Similarly, Shirley Keeldar and
Caroline Helstone contend with men and between themselves about the
rationale for women’s marginalization. Brontë takes special pains to high-
light the gap between personal intention and social effects; as Caroline
muses, “nobody in particular is to blame, that I can see, for the state in
which things are; and I cannot tell, however much I puzzle over it, how
they are to be altered for the better; but I feel there is something wrong
somewhere” (390). Such a gap emerges in the novel whenever issues of
charity, employer-worker relations, and marital relations arise. Yet Brontë
also shows that impersonal social forces do not “work” more reliably to
explain the misery of characters: The workers are not simply disgruntled
about the pace of technological change. As Christopher Lane explains,
hatred works best in this novel, and even that seems to float freely of either
volition or social factors.6
In order to interpret Shirley’s interest in causation, I will examine three
interrelated aspects of the novel: first, its fascination with unintended con-
sequences; second, its ambivalence about reading; and finally, its related
mistrust of historical analogies. In the opening section of the chapter, I
interpret the bafflement Brontë’s characters experience when confronted
by the social order. Shirley, I argue, is drawn to and somewhat repelled by
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” theory of self-interest, because while the
theory decisively uncouples individual volition from the effects of one’s
action, the novel is profoundly skeptical that selfishness can produce any-
thing but more selfishness. As a result, the novel offers a vision of a world
in which neither beneficence nor impersonal forces can plausibly stabilize
the social order. The novel’s investigation of reading bridges its thematic
obsession with causation and its form, especially Brontë’s use of a third-
person narrator. Shirley is the only Brontë novel with such a narrator, and
this formal decision is apparently connected to her decision to set the
novel thirty years in the past. Able to supply historical commentary that
no character in the novel could know, Shirley’s narrator potentially reigns
unchallenged in the text. However, the various scenes of reading under-
mine the narrator as an uncontested certifier of reality. Such internal chal-
lenges to the narrator’s authority thus dispute the official version of histo-
ry in the novel, which ostensibly endorses Robert Moore’s vision of tech-
nological and industrial progress.
A special instance of Shirley’s fascination with interpretation is the use
of historical analogies. The novel’s opening chapters teem with characters
appealing to such analogies in ways that other characters find fraudulent.
The repetition of such examples suggests that Brontë may recognize the
limits of her novel’s chief temporal analogy, comparing the Luddites of
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1811–12 with the Chartists of the late 1840s. In its awareness of how dif-
ficult it is to argue analogically about history, Shirley hints at arguments
Friedrich Nietzsche would develop twenty-five years later in “On the Uses
and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1874). By emphasizing Shirley’s
balky intransitivity to social plots, I argue, we grasp its complexity more
fully than can materialist or historicist emphases on the novel’s ideological
dimensions. More generally, such a reading acknowledges the novel’s most
profound response to the press of modernity: a recognition of the way tra-
ditional conceptions of causality seem irrevocably broken, and thus inade-
quate to contemporary problems.
I. “I See Myself Baffled at Every Turn by Their Untoward Effects”
Charlotte Brontë cannot help herself; she has a morbid tendency to
anatomise every passion, every impulse, every expression. Hence
what may perhaps be regarded as the chief defect of all Currer Bell’s
novels, she must find a motive for every little act, for the twirling of
a thumb, and for every tol-de-rol that a man heedlessly sings: she
has no idea of purposeless behaviour, uncontrollable impulses with-
out meaning, and idle flapping of the sails of the Happy-go-lucky.
—E. S. Dallas, Review of Elizabeth Gaskell’s Life of Charlotte Brontë
(July 1857)
Although E. S. Dallas criticizes Brontë for specifying the cause of all
actions in her novels, the characters of Shirley would likely be grateful to
anyone who could explain why they suffer so intensely. In that novel, we
discover a world that no longer responds to tradition, and where some
forms of behavior appear purposeless. William Farren, Brontë’s most
insightful worker, observes, “I’m getting different to mysel’: I feel I am
changing” (140); as a result, he is willing to hate Robert Moore (though
that man has done him no deliberate wrong), and even to endorse acts that
cannot accomplish any aim beyond destruction.
The economic crisis at the beginning of the novel is itself an exercise in
unintended consequences. Moore, lamenting that he cannot sell any cloth,
observes that, thanks to the Orders in Council, “I cannot get on—I can-
not execute my plans because of them; I see myself baffled at every turn by
their untoward effects” (25). The effect of the Orders was “untoward” in
two senses: the economic isolation is certainly unfavorable for manufactur-
ers like Moore, and they are also unpredictable or unruly—Viscount
Castlereagh, at least, did not expect the United States’s retaliatory closing
of its markets. Factors such as Moore’s brusque manner, his recent arrival
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from France, his limited capital, and his ardent desire to incorporate new
technology into his mill all render his position even more precarious.
Moore tries to attribute both his own hardship and that of his workers
to the impersonal workings of the market. In a heated exchange with
Moses Barraclough, a self-styled leader of the workers, Moore almost wel-
comes his own destruction, because it would hasten the spread of techno-
logical progress:
The utmost you can do—and this you will never dare to do—is to
burn down my mill, destroy its contents, and shoot me. What then?
Suppose that building was a ruin and I was a corpse, what then?—
you lads behind these two scamps, would that stop invention or
exhaust science?—not for the fraction of a second of time! Another
and better gig-mill would rise on the ruins of this, and perhaps a
more enterprising owner come in my place. (136)
Moore defines himself as the friend of science and progress, and his mill
as a politically neutral application of industrial principles. The intensity of
rhetoric is meant to sound like a threat, too: If you loathe me, Moore
seems to say, then I hope you get an even worse employer when I am gone.
Moore completely disavows any responsibility to the common good,
arguing instead that because he has debts, he can think only of himself. In
so arguing, he implicitly takes up Adam Smith’s celebrated defense, from
The Wealth of Nations (1776), of self-interest:
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry,
he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases,
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to
promote it. I have never known much good done by those who
affected to trade for the public good. (484–85)
Moore conceives of his position as replicating Smith’s description. The
best way he can accomplish anything for the community is to upgrade his
technology and pay his debts, and to let the workers fend for themselves.
But rather than taking up either the ethical or the economic implications
of this argument, I want to stress its innovative approach to causation:
Selfishness produces beneficence, almost inadvertently (and, by contrast,
beneficence appears to cause poverty). Over the first third of the novel,
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Moore offers many reasons not to help the workers: they are not his
responsibility, he has no money, and, besides, he hates them for threaten-
ing the mill. His reasoning recalls the proverbial neighbor who, upon
returning a broken kettle, first claims he never borrowed it, then asserts
that it was already broken, and, anyway, he returned it undamaged.7 While
our neighbor’s sense of cause-and-effect has clearly gone awry, Smith’s
metaphor of the invisible hand renders such logic cogent. In fact, we could
even say the invisible hand offers yet another defense of the broken kettle,
claiming that it is now larger and easier to clean.
Shirley recognizes the explanatory power of Smith’s metaphor for eluci-
dating the causality of complex systems, yet refuses it on ethical grounds.
Brontë’s narrator dismisses the possibility that any good can come of self-
interest, declaring that “All men, taken singly, are more or less selfish; and
taken in bodies they are intensely so” (166). Society, she implies, could
never reach a point where the common good would gain traction over self-
interest. Further, self-interest can produce a common good only if the two
factors are equivalently defined. As Smith puts it, anyone who wants to
purchase a good or a service “will be more likely to prevail if he can inter-
est [potential sellers’] self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for
their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever
offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this” (15). From the
perspective of Brontë’s narrator, Smith’s argument holds only if all parties
value profit above all else. The novel condemns Moore for opposing the
Orders in Council on economic grounds, claiming that an England ruled
by merchants “would too often make ignominious submission—not at all
from the motives Christ teaches, but rather from those Mammon instils”
(166–67). The narrator accepts the manufacturer’s analysis of his econom-
ic position, but insists that wealth cannot be the measure of national poli-
cy. Sometimes, in other words, a nation must wage war in order to main-
tain its honor, regardless of cost.
The complexity of Brontë’s approach to causation indicates the limits of
even sophisticated historicist approaches to the novel.8 What’s more, the
novel stages an argument about the legitimacy of materialist explanations.
Joe Scott, Moore’s foreman, proudly declares that after years of looking
after the mill’s machines, “I’ve getten into that way that when I see an
effect, I look straight out for a cause” (59). Moore is incredulous at Scott’s
confusion of different orders of causality:
You need not to think that because you’ve picked up a little knowl-
edge of practical mathematics, and because you have found some
scantling of the elements of chemistry at the bottom of a dyeing vat,
that therefore you’re a neglected man of science; and you need not
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to suppose that because the course of trade does not always run
smooth, and you, and such as you, are sometimes short of work and
of bread, that therefore your class are martyrs, and that the whole
form of government under which you live is wrong. (60)
Moore illustrates here an important difference between causality in the
physical and symbolic realms. If a process stops working in the physical
world, then it can be repaired, but in the realm of culture, matters are
more enigmatic. Historicist interpretations, according to Moore, tend
toward arrogance, because they claim to understand vastly complex situa-
tions. In turning to the novel’s interest in the proliferation of interpreta-
tions, then, I will suggest that characters in the novel offer mutually unin-
telligible readings of events as their only possible response to forces and
emotions that routinely outstrip their grasp.
II. Reading
Shirley represents conflicts about class, nationality, and gender as conflicts
over interpretation. Prominent examples of this strategy include conversa-
tions between Caroline Helstone and Robert Moore, Moore and the work-
ers, Caroline, Shirley Keeldar, and Joe Scott, and Moore and Hiram Yorke.
We might interpret Brontë’s use of a third-person narrator as an attempt to
control this interpretive conflict by providing a meta-perspective capable of
revealing a scene’s underlying truth. Such a perspective would mesh well
with the polemical focus of most social-problem novels, as the narrators of
such novels strive to move readers to action. Yet Brontë’s strategy is differ-
ent: The novel undermines all interpretive stances, including the narrator’s.
Interpretation becomes a vehicle of self-interest in Shirley, rather than a way
of accessing a potentially objective reality. John Plotz has argued recently
that the conflicting interpretations in Shirley crucially recognize the workers
as a legitimate voice in the public sphere. Once all interpretations prove self-
interested, then middle-class Victorian readers cannot dismiss the workers’
claims as readily as they might have hoped.9 Shirley takes a more radical tack,
however: Rather than acknowledging working-class and middle-class inter-
pretations as (at least potentially) equally legitimate, Shirley implies that all
such claims are illegitimate. The novel’s conflicting interpretations echo the
wider breakdown in causal expectations that I have been interpreting.
Because the world is not mutually meaningful to all parties—that is, because
various disputants cannot find a common language or methodology for
resolving interpretive disputes—characters and groups in the novel advocate
their own position regardless of their overall costs.
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Shirley’s suspicion of interpretation differs from Brontë’s other novels,
though Jane Eyre (1847), Villette (1853), and The Professor (1857 [1846])
each feature moments when conflicting interpretations come to the fore.
For instance, Jane Eyre famously opens with Jane’s conflict with the Reed
family, and with her subsequent dispute with Mr. Brocklehurst over the
most virtuous passages in the Bible. In that novel, however, we are nearly
always meant to side with Jane—no reader could pretend that either John
Reed or his mother treats Jane fairly. The vehemence of Jane’s insistence on
her arguments’ validity is itself a sign of the legitimacy of her claims for
affection and respect. Villette echoes this strategy when the perspectives of
Lucy Snowe and Madame Beck clash. At such moments, the existence of
divergent interpretations does not suggest that they are equivalent, but that
one is right and the other wrong, or even evil.10
Theorists of realism argue that it offers a symbolic universe that helps
readers orient themselves in the social world.11 And as Eliot’s narrator asks
in Adam Bede (1859), since Hetty Sorel “had never read a novel . . . [, how]
could she find a shape for her expectations?” (135). Because that symbol-
ic order misfires in Shirley, the novel famously finds itself torn between
realistic and romantic impulses, a rift that the narrator cannot adequately
resolve. In late Romantic and early Victorian accounts of the novel, espe-
cially those influenced by Scott, an interest in probability and consistency
drives the shift from romance to realism. Brontë’s narrator urges the read-
er to “calm your expectations” for “sentiment, and poetry, and reverie[,] . . .
passion, and stimulus, and melodrama” (5). And when Robert seems to
reject Caroline, the narrator cruelly emphasizes the distinction between
romance and realism: “You expected bread, and you have got a stone; break
your teeth on it, and don’t shriek because the nerves are martyrized. . . .
You held out your hand for an egg, and fate put into it a scorpion. Show
no consternation: close your fingers firmly upon the gift; let it sting
through your palm” (105). The narrator’s distinction between sentiment
and reality follows Scott’s distinction between romance and realism; fur-
ther, it adheres to the implied promise of social-problem novels—to show
the reader the world as it is, rather than as we like to imagine it. The nar-
rator touts the reality of Shirley’s account of society, and indeed goes so far
as to claim that this novel is superior to all rival social-problem novels:
[T]hough I describe imperfect characters (every character in this
book will be found to be more or less imperfect, my pen refusing to
draw anything in the model line), I have not undertaken to handle
degraded or utterly infamous ones. Child-torturers, slave masters
and drivers, I consign to the hands of jailers; the novelist may be
excused from sullying his page with the record of their deeds. (61)
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Brontë scornfully disdained the melodramatic accounts of industry found
in novels such as Frances Trollope’s Michael Armstrong, the Factory Boy
(1839).12 And her narrator here ventriloquizes that disdain, thus offering
to disclose reality more adroitly than had her predecessors. Likewise, the
ostensible refusal to idealize characters anticipates George Eliot’s similar
proclamations in Adam Bede (1859). Yet there is something enigmatic
about this passage, because the point of the social-problem genre as such
is that certain kinds of abominations were going unpunished—
abominations the narrator professes here to ignore. The narrator’s power
to “consign [wrongdoers] to the hands of jailers” is the power of poetic jus-
tice, a characteristic more strongly associated with romance than realism.
Shirley in fact revels in this tension between realism and romance,
which finds the narrator clamorously affirming the priority of realism yet
also smuggling in forms of romance. After all, the denouement of the mar-
riage plots, as Caroline and Shirley marry the brothers Moore, is scarcely
credible, given the novel’s extended, passionate denunciations of the mar-
riage market. Likewise, the novel’s ending is silent about ongoing class
conflict, as the narrator sees “the manufacturer’s day-dreams embodied in
substantial stone and brick and ashes” (645). The narrator does skeptical-
ly qualify Moore’s triumph, noting with an apparent sigh that “I suppose
Robert Moore’s prophecies were, partially, at least, fulfilled,” and calling
his new mill’s chimney “ambitious as the tower of Babel” (645). With this
closing Biblical reference, the narrator implicitly acknowledges the futili-
ty of both Moore’s and the novel’s unifying projects. What these com-
ments show us is a shift to fantasy and prophecy from the sedate realism
that the narrator promises at the novel’s opening.
This shift, I argue, is tactical rather than merely symptomatic, inas-
much as it qualifies in advance elements of the novel’s ending. Rather than
seeing Shirley as concluding, as does Jane Eyre, with a satisfactory marriage
to a domesticated, formerly domineering, man, we might recognize it as
closer to Villette, where Lucy Snowe allows the most stubbornly idealistic
reader a tenuous faith that Paul Emanuel did not drown near the end. It
is as if, having promised reality to the reader, Shirley’s narrator recognizes
that only fables are possible—or, rather, that the only ending that could
unify the novel’s disparate interests is a fantasy. Indeed, the narrator slyly
hints at this at the very start: “It is not positively affirmed that you shall
not have a taste of the exciting, perhaps towards the middle and close of
the meal” (5). Because the narrator associates “a taste of the exciting” with
melodrama and romance, we can construe this sentence as promising an
abandonment of realism. Such an understanding is consistent with
Shirley’s skepticism about the efficacy of intentions. Finally, there is a
metacritical reason to infer that the novel seems aware of the inadequacy
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of its closing gestures: If we hold the novel to be a panicked response to
Chartist activism in the late 1840s, then this implies an awareness that the
impersonal economic and technological forces on which Moore relies can-
not guarantee social harmony. While Brontë privately characterized the
Chartists as an “ill-advised movement” (Wise Lives II:203), Shirley suggests
that expecting beneficence from the social order is “ill-advised.”
Reading the ending skeptically does not imply that we must naively
endorse the beginning of the novel. Despite the narrator’s mocking irony
on the novel’s first page, Brontë herself is not averse to passion and senti-
ment, properly conceived. In January 1848, she and George Henry Lewes
exchanged letters about realism and the novel, using Jane Austen’s fiction
as a chief example. Brontë chides Lewes for “lectur[ing]” her to “familiar-
ize my mind with the fact that ‘Miss Austen is not a poetess,’ . . . and then
you add, I must ‘learn to acknowledge her as one of the greatest artists, of the
greatest painters of human character’” (Lives II:180, emp. in original). She
then asks a withering rhetorical question: “Can there be a great artist with-
out poetry?” (Wise Lives II:180). Of course, when Shirley’s narrator dis-
avows “sentiment, and poetry, and reverie,” it means to dismiss conven-
tional frippery and melodrama, not the kind of poetry to which Brontë
refers. Nevertheless, her riposte to Lewes is relevant to my reading of
Shirley, since it reminds us that what animates this “real, cool, and solid”
narrative are concerns that block a secure picture of society.
Shirley’s fascination with reading and interpretation far surpasses its nar-
rator’s metafictional commentaries. The novel features several key scenes of
reading, which direct our attention to the biases of interpretation. The
most prominent of these depict Caroline’s reading of Coriolanus with
Robert and her argument with Joe Scott about the book of Timothy. In
these moments, Caroline’s methodology contradicts itself: in the first, she
invokes Shakespeare as a timeless conveyer of universal truths, while in the
second she reveals herself to be a good historicist. The narrator does not
invite us to see this shift as progress, or even as something of which
Caroline is aware. Instead, interpretation becomes entirely contingent on
factors that elude social determination. Aesthetic and historicist readings
alike are only ways of making people act in accordance with one’s own
desires, rather than revealing something true about the world.
Nancy Armstrong has argued that Shirley’s representation of reading is
the novel’s most salient historical argument. The key to the novel, she
writes, is “the role it attributes to literature in effecting certain historical
changes” (214). Her key example is the famous “Coriolanus” chapter, a
“scene of reading that both initiates the historical transformations charac-
terizing Victorian literature and represents a model of the communication
situation in which such transformations occur” (214). Armstrong argues
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that the nineteenth-century novel is a training ground for middle-class
subjects to learn how to take up their classed and sexed identities. When
Caroline entices Robert into a joint reading of Coriolanus, then, they are
readying themselves for marriage. Such a project, Armstrong claims, strips
Shakespeare of his historical context, turning him into a purveyor of uni-
versal truths about subjectivity.
I want to suggest, by contrast, that Shirley shows us the futility of ask-
ing literature to effect political or subjective reform. Instead, it exposes lit-
erature as a permanently contested site of variant interpretations. In turn-
ing now to Caroline and Robert’s reading of Coriolanus, I want to suspend
momentarily the (entirely legitimate) question of how Shakespeare’s play
comments upon Brontë’s characters. Although Caroline clearly aspires to
reform Robert’s manner with his workers, she picks a strange text as her
exemplum. Their reading arguably reinforces, rather than transforms,
Robert’s character. Coriolanus is, according to Caroline, “an old English
book . . . that you like; and I will choose a part of it that is toned quite in
harmony with something in you” (89). As she rhapsodically claims that
Moore must “take some of [Shakespeare’s] soul” into his own, he sardon-
ically asks whether this reading is “with a view to making me better; is it
to operate like a sermon?” (89). No, she replies, it should “stir you; to give
you new sensations. It is to make you feel your life strongly, not only your
virtues, but your vicious, perverse points” (89). Caroline here unwittingly
acknowledges that there can be no guarantee that Robert will accept her
reading of the play. While she clearly means that he will now recognize his
“perverse points” as faults, we could as easily say that he will experience
them more strongly. After all, Coriolanus is a play that Robert already likes,
and it is in “harmony” with aspects of his personality, so it is difficult to
understand why Caroline thinks their reading will do any good.
The narrator echoes Caroline’s optimism, but does so ambivalently.
While listening to Caroline read, Robert finds himself “stepping out of the
narrow line of private prejudices, beg[inning] to revel in the large picture
of human nature, to feel the reality stamped upon the characters who were
speaking from that page before him” (91). Although such a claim seems to
support Caroline’s view, “human nature” is consistently represented in
Shirley as selfishness.13 For example, the narrator calls all men selfish (166),
and William Farren states that “Human natur’, taking it i’ th’ lump, is
naught but selfishness” (326). Shakespeare’s play becomes the vehicle for
reinforcing selfishness, rather than tempering Robert’s brusqueness.
The scene ends without any agreement as to its meaning. Caroline tells
Robert that “you must not be proud to your workpeople; you must not
neglect chances of soothing them, and you must not be of an inflexible
nature, uttering a request as austerely as if it were a command” (93). He
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dismisses her reading, claiming, “That is the moral you tack to the play”
(93).14 By the logic of the scene, Robert is strictly correct here. Caroline
begins by claiming that the play would move Robert’s emotions, but ends
by treating it as a sermon. Meanwhile, the play authorizes a kind of self-
ishness, rather than the vague appeasement she recommends here.
Unpacking William Hazlitt’s reading of Coriolanus, Lane shows how “our
experience of art is so intoxicating . . . that we seek ways of replicating that
excitement in public life” (211). For Moore, Lane explains, reading
Shakespeare’s play is far likelier to incite his misanthropy than to encour-
age his self-improvement.
Appeals to human nature are not Caroline’s only strategy. Later in the
novel, she threatens to embark on a rigorously historicist reading of the
Bible. While arguing with Caroline and Shirley whether women can be
credited with independent thought, Joe Scott, Moore’s foreman, appeals to
the authority of St. Paul’s 1 Timothy. In that epistle, Paul explains that
women should submit to their husband’s authority on spiritual matters.
Caroline refuses to accept such an uncongenial decree:
Hem! I—I account for [Paul’s arguments] in this way: he wrote that
chapter for a particular congregation of Christians, under peculiar
circumstances; and besides, I dare say, if I could read the original
Greek, I should find that many of the words have been wrongly
translated, perhaps misapprehended altogether. It would be possi-
ble, I doubt not, with a little ingenuity, to give the passage quite a
contrary turn. (329–30)
Caroline here wittily adopts the methods of the higher criticism in order
to tweak Joe’s pretense at superiority. Although when reading Shakespeare,
according to Caroline, we must allow his language to play upon our
nature, we can read the Bible as aggressively and contingently as possible
in pursuit of our own truth. Her adoption of such a posture implicitly con-
firms Robert’s earlier complaint, that she had simply “tacked a moral” to
Coriolanus. Although she accuses Joe of being “dogmatic” (330), Caroline
herself adroitly conceives of reading as a way to persuade others, rather
than to transform herself. The sententious Joe deserves his comeuppance
in this scene, and I am not endorsing his reactionary interpretation of 
1 Timothy. My point is simply that Shirley represents its characters as
adrift in a world without secure meanings, in which they have to fight for
their interpretations in order to make sense of the world. These interpreta-
tions, however, do not disclose the world so much as provoke or incite it,
in the hopes that a change will happen.
Psychoanalysts know well the folly of expecting interpretations to pro-
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duce a desired effect in analysands. In fact, Lacan is even driven to declare
that “An interpretation whose effects are understood is not a psychoana-
lytic interpretation” (“Responses” 114/“Réponses” 211). The wholly desir-
able enigma of interpretation marks the ethical distinction between psy-
choanalysis and therapy. In Seminar XX: Encore, Lacan wryly jokes that
“People do History precisely in order to make us believe that it has some
sort of meaning. On the contrary, the first thing we must do is begin from
the following: we are confronted with a saying, the saying of another per-
son who recounts his stupidities, embarrassments, inhibitions, and emo-
tions. What is it that we must read therein? Nothing but the effects of
those instances of saying. We see in what sense these effects agitate, stir
things up, and bother speaking beings” (45). History is an incitement, one
only tangentially related to the facts of the past. The narratives and inter-
pretations we give to that past do not disclose to us the meaning of our
lives; rather, they bind us to or authorize us to relinquish actions in the
present. In the next section, I show how Brontë examines a particularly
insidious mode of interpretation, that of constructing analogies with the
past in order to guide conduct in the present.
III. Coriolanus and the Deceptiveness of Analogies
Monumental history deceives by analogies.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History
for Life” (1874)
“On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” registers Nietzsche’s
rejection of a century of historicism in German thought.15 According to his
taxonomy, monumental history is historiography attuned to great deeds; it
can inspire further greatness, but, as the epigraph suggests, it can greatly
mislead. We might imagine our own historical situation to recall exactly an
earlier epoch, and act accordingly. We also tend to imagine ourselves as com-
paring only to the most favorable historical figures. Because it concerns only
the splendid outcomes of heroic acts, monumental history “as far as possi-
ble avoids causes, . . . which, fully understood, would only demonstrate that
the dice-game of chance and the future could never again produce anything
exactly similar to what it produced in the past” (70). Historical icons blind
us to the exigencies of the present, duping us into viewing our conditions
through the prism of other times. Not surprisingly, then, Nietzsche’s theory
of history is not a mode of hero-worship. Instead, he proposes a critical his-
toriography, in which the active members of a given society rewrite their his-
tory in order to sustain their creative activities.
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Shirley prefigures Nietzsche’s critique of monumental history. Its open-
ing chapters mercilessly expose the ways in which characters use historical
analogies to legitimize their own desires. If for Nietzsche the historical
analogy blinds us to causation, Brontë shows us the causal forces we con-
ventionally eclipse in the process: personal animosity, self-interest, self-
love. Although the novel’s characters believe analogical reasoning will guide
them toward the best solution to the economic crisis, Shirley demonstrates
that such reasoning will more likely inflame conflicts between persons and
groups. A crucial analogy in the novel is that between Robert Moore and
Coriolanus, an analogy which the narrator’s fascination with the Duke of
Wellington reproduces. The paradoxical effect of this double analogy is to
cast doubt on all such reasoning: Rather than reinforce each other, the
reduplicative analogies seem to disperse each other into sheer arbitrariness. 
One of the most striking features of Shirley’s representation of the
Yorkshire workers is that they seem knowledgeable about the past and
about socioeconomic forces. To representatives of the middle and manu-
facturing classes, this knowledge makes the workers all the more terrifying.
If, as William Farren acknowledges, the workers know that smashing
Robert Moore’s mill is counterproductive, then their persistent desire for
violence seems irrational.16 Reverend Helstone introduces this striking
thirst for vengeance in the novel’s first chapter, as he describes Mike
Hartley, an Antinomian weaver:
When he is very drunk, his mind is always running on regicide.
Mike is not unacquainted with history, and it is rich to hear him
going over the list of tyrants of whom, as he says, “the revenger of
blood has obtained satisfaction.” The fellow exults strangely in mur-
der done on crowned heads, or on any head for political reasons. I
have already heard it hinted that he seems to have a queer hanker-
ing after Moore. (15–16)
This is one of the most telling descriptions in Shirley, as the novel’s critique
of historical analogies and its fascination with unintended consequences
coalesce. Hartley’s familiarity with history grants him a noble alibi for his
desire to kill Robert Moore. Moore’s refusal to employ weavers makes him
a tyrant, and therefore worthy of destruction. Hartley can attribute his
“queer hankering” for Moore’s death as a sign of his own love of justice,
rather than as a delight in murder. While Hartley’s use of history as an alibi
is suggestive of Brontë’s disdain for analogical reasoning, his allusion to the
book of Numbers is the key to this passage. Chapter 35 of Numbers
expounds the laws of revenge: When can the family of a slain person
revenge themselves upon the killer? The first answer is that if the killer
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acted deliberately, his or her life is forfeit, and the victim’s family can take
revenge themselves: “The revenger of blood himself shall slay the murder-
er: when he meeteth him, he shall slay him” (Numbers 35:19). Hartley
takes this answer as authorizing Moore’s execution: From the weaver’s
point of view, Moore is deliberately starving his workers, and can justly be
killed.
But Numbers exacts two further conditions before sanctioning
vengeance. First, the “revenger of blood” must renounce any affect toward
the killer, and even an explicit plan to claim the revenge that is due: “If he
[the revenger] thrust him of hatred, or hurl at him by laying of wait, that
he die; Or in enmity smite him with his hand, that he die: he that smote
him shall surely be put to death; for he is a murderer” (Numbers
35:20–21). Hartley’s “queer hankering” after Moore means that the rules
legitimating revenge no longer apply, and the desire to kill Moore is essen-
tially a desire for mutual destruction. The second criterion addresses the
relationship between volition and causation. If the killer could not have
known that the victim would die, or if the victim died through an unin-
tended consequence of the killer’s action, then the family cannot take
revenge. In such a circumstance, “the congregation shall judge between the
slayer and the revenger of blood” (Numbers 35:24). As Moore cannot be
held personally responsible for the economic consequences of his
actions—especially since, as we have seen, another manufacturer would
replace him if he died—Hartley can gain no comfort from the book of
Numbers.
As such critics as Patrick Brantlinger and John Plotz have argued,
Shirley is not a novel that treats the workers as stupid, and the novel does
not simply dismiss Hartley as a buffoon (Brantlinger Reading 114; Plotz
171). Instead, he is caught up in a horrible problem: Confronted with
economic and symbolic universes that have made causation enigmatic,
how is he to make sense of the world? The complexity of the situation is
what makes the analogical reasoning of monumental history so appealing.
Analogies provide answers, but to problems that no longer exist in quite
the same way.
Shirley does not disparage the analogical reasoning of its workers only.
Indeed, Helstone soon finds himself caught up in an argument with
Moore about such analogies, as part of their overall dispute about the
legitimacy of the Napoleonic War. Moore sees Napoleon as an “omnipo-
tent master-spirit,” while Helstone is confident that “Wellington is the
right champion of a good cause” (38), and because his cause is right, he
must ultimately prevail. Moore replies that “God often defends the pow-
erful,” which provokes Helstone to launch an extended analogy between
England’s war with France and the Israelites’ flight from Egypt. Just as
Chapter Three74
Jones_CH3_2nd.qxp  9/8/2006  2:13 PM  Page 74
God allowed the Israelites to escape the tyrannical Egyptians, Helstone
insists, so too will he allow Wellington to triumph. Moore’s response antic-
ipates Caroline’s reversal of Joe Scott: “You are all right, only you forget the
true parallel. France is Israel, and Napoleon is Moses. Europe, with her old
over-gorged empires and rotten dynasties, is corrupt Egypt; gallant France
is the Twelve Tribes, and her fresh and vigorous Usurper the Shepherd of
Horeb” (39). This answer shows why analogical reasoning fails as an ade-
quate historical explanation. We cannot know with any certainty whether
the correspondences that we find between another historical period and
our own are accurate or warranted. The quarrel between Helstone and
Moore has an even more disturbing implication: Reversing Helstone’s
analogy makes the distinction between good and evil problematic. We can-
not ascertain whether Napoleon is “truly” Israel or Egypt until he has
either won or been defeated. So not only does analogical reasoning break
down, but when it does so it also threatens what remains of the symbolic
universe.
The Duke of Wellington plays a key role in Shirley, one paradoxically
tied to the Coriolanus lesson. Brontë’s narrator repeatedly extols
Wellington’s military might and, as we have seen, condemns the manufac-
turing class for refusing to support the war. However, the novel is at a loss
to explain—indeed, cannot even bring itself to mention—Wellington’s
disastrous opposition to parliamentary reform. The novel’s silence on this
score, I will argue, invites us to read Wellington, in addition to Moore, as
a stand-in for Coriolanus. Wellington’s political failure thus looms omi-
nously over Moore’s own personal transformation. If Wellington himself
could not handle reform adequately, the narrator seems to suggest, then
how can a mere mortal like Robert Moore? Shirley’s representation of
Wellington as a foil for Moore foregrounds Brontë’s skepticism about his-
torical analogies.17
As Christopher Lane suggests, Moore has a misanthropic “propensity to
copy Coriolanus,” which Brontë “improbably convert[s] . . . into a hazy
notion of sociability” (210). The mechanism of this conversion is his and
Caroline’s belief that his fault is chiefly one of manner—in other words, a
superficial defect rather than a fundamental flaw. Caroline’s advice to
Moore, cited above (be more soothing, and less proud and brusque),
reflects this belief. But as Lane demonstrates, the connection between
Moore and Coriolanus is far more extensive, registering a Hazlittian affin-
ity for the seductiveness of power, especially of abusing power. Shirley
arguably exposes the difference between style and superficiality: Through
the figure of Wellington, Brontë’s narrator acknowledges there are
moments when one’s manner echoes structural components of one’s iden-
tity, instead of only surface polish. This commonplace emphasizes the
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improbability of domesticating Moore, and thus of reconciling the indus-
trial conflicts that disrupt England.
At the end of the novel, as I have suggested, Shirley shifts into the realm
of fable, in which Robert can become a suitable husband and employer.
Were Brontë’s narrator to acknowledge explicitly the self-indulgent nature
of this fable, it would of course fall to pieces. Instead, she does so by prais-
ing the Duke of Wellington, a sleight-of-hand that allows the novel to
endorse its fantasy of social harmony, even as it recognizes that fantasy’s
limits.18 The narrator sums up Wellington’s deeds at the end of 1812 in
this way:
In this year, Lord Wellington assumed the reins in Spain: they made
him Generalissimo, for their own salvation’s sake. In this year, he
took Badajos, he fought the field of Vittoria, he captured
Pampeluna, he stormed St. Sebastian; in this year, he won
Salamanca.
Men of Manchester! I beg your pardon for this slight résumé of
warlike facts: but it is of no consequence. Lord Wellington is, for
you, only a decayed old gentleman now: I rather think some of you
have called him a “dotard”—you have taunted him with his age,
and the loss of his physical vigour. What fine heroes you are your-
selves! Men like you have a right to trample on what is mortal in a
demi-god. Scoff at your ease—your scorn can never break his grand
old heart. (637)
The narrator’s address to the men of Manchester is puzzling. If the listing
of Wellington’s victories is “of no consequence,” then why proceed? The
narrator’s apostrophe here eclipses the Duke’s troubled reign as Prime
Minister (1828–30), which saw him undergo much criticism for endors-
ing Catholic Emancipation, and even more brutal attacks for refusing par-
liamentary reform. What is striking here is less the narrator’s implicit com-
parison between Moore and Wellington than the narrator’s abrupt trans-
formation into Moore. Brontë’s narrator here echoes explicitly Moore’s
passionate denunciations of his workers—an echo most explicit, perhaps,
in the off-handed aggression of a phrase like “it is of no consequence.” Yet
Shirley’s readers’ knowledge of Wellington’s political collapse must color
the way we read the novel’s fables of closure.
Wellington’s response to the demand for parliamentary reform illus-
trates why style is not only superficial. After the election of 1830, the ten-
sion over reform was dramatic. Earl Grey’s first speech in the post-election
Parliamentary session acknowledged that the people must have reform.
Shockingly, “by an almost inconceivable error of judgment, Wellington
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chose to reply,” saying that “not only was reform inappropriate, and that
he had no intention of proposing it, but that the existing constitution was
so perfect that he could not imagine any possible alternative that would be
an improvement” (E. A. Smith 23). The government fell within weeks, and
a new cabinet was formed around Grey. James Grant, a parliamentary
reporter, noted Wellington’s declaration “was not only the most foolish
that he ever made,” but “was decidedly the most imprudent that ever pro-
ceeded from the lips of a Minister of the Crown. It could not fail to prove,
in the then existing circumstances of the country, the destruction of the
government” (qtd. in Smith 5–6). Charles Greville, Clerk to the Privy
Council, recorded in his journal:
Never was there an act of more egregious folly [than the Duke’s dec-
laration], or one so universally condemned by friends and foes. . . .
The effect produced by this declaration exceeds anything I ever saw,
and it has at once destroyed what little popularity the Duke had left,
and lowered him in public estimation so much that when he does
go out of office, as most assuredly he must, he will leave it without
any of the dignity and credit which might have accompanied his
retirement. (qtd. in Smith 26)
Wellington was hissed at and accosted by crowds whenever he appeared in
public, there was a run on the Bank of London, and plans were drawn up
for the possible quashing of a revolution. What these nineteenth-century
observers register is how political observers in and out of Parliament expe-
rienced Wellington’s callous, even insolent, reply as expressing an astonish-
ing preference for his own power rather than a willingness to acknowledge
political necessity.
The narrator’s passionate endorsement of Wellington, then, ironically
emerges as a qualified skepticism toward Moore’s plans, and about the pos-
sibility of his genuine transformation. As Lane explains, Brontë cannot tol-
erate too ardent a love of power in Moore, so she emplots him in a narra-
tive of domestication. However, she is able, through the comparable figure
of the Duke of Wellington, to acknowledge that such a pleasure in power
could easily override social harmony. By folding literary history onto “real”
history, Brontë suggests that appeals to either are false and self-serving, and
the fantasy of reform at the novel’s end must remain only that. Admittedly
bleak, such a perspective nevertheless offers a more interesting take on the
contemporary Chartist uprising than does the dream of reconciliation that
Moore and Caroline’s marriage seemingly exemplifies.
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C H A P T E R F O U R
George Eliot’s Crises of
Consequence
I. The Picture and the Diagram
A key moral and aesthetic question for George Eliot was whether history
progresses teleologically. If it does, then art’s purpose is to disclose that
truth; if it does not, or if one cannot know whether history has an aim,
then art has no such foundation. The best it can do, as she frequently
insists, is to tell the truth as precisely and concretely as possible. By exam-
ining Eliot’s correspondence with Frederic Harrison, I will argue in this
chapter that Eliot replaces a teleological model of history with one based
on guilt and self-doubt, allowing her model to move backwards and for-
wards through time. Subsequently, through readings of her essays and of
Felix Holt, the Radical (1866) and Middlemarch (1871–72), I interpret
Eliot’s fascination with our desire to attribute meaning to historical events
and figures. The past always threatens to disrupt the present, in her view,
so that we can never be sure that we have achieved progress. Teleological
approaches to history reconcile past suffering by referring it to a glorious
future. For Eliot, however, such a reconciliation can be accomplished only
by betraying our past; she suggests that such a betrayal can never achieve
its promise.
Harrison’s combination of wide-ranging interests and polemical devo-
tion to positivism made him a valuable correspondent for Eliot. As a
lawyer, he could provide her with advice on the inheritance plots of Felix
Holt and Daniel Deronda (1876); as someone who gave public lectures on
history after 1862, he shared her abiding sense that communal identity is
possible only when grounded in reverence for the past; and as a commit-
ted adherent to Comtean philosophy, he gave her a private opportunity to
demarcate her own distance from it.1
Harrison’s disagreements with Eliot did not end with her death in
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1880. In an uncredited role, he helped John Cross with the proofs for his
Life and Letters of George Eliot (1884).2 He subsequently reviewed the book
for the Fortnightly Review, praising Cross’s innovative weaving of Eliot’s
journals and letters, and his abstemious withholding of overt commentary.
Reviewing the biography of a recently deceased artist offers a natural
opportunity to reflect on the artist’s career, and Harrison did not miss his
chance. Praising Eliot as one of the most important minds of the century,
he nevertheless judged that her novels after Silas Marner (1861) bear the
burden of her intellect too heavily, and consequently prevent her from
being a first-rate novelist. The terms of his dismissal resonate with Eliot’s
preferred metaphors for novelistic creation: “The canvas of laborious cul-
ture is too often visible through the colouring of the picture. We find so
much to think about that we crave a little rest for simple enjoyment”
(“Cross’s Life” 315). On its own merits, this is a defensible, even common,
reaction to Eliot’s post-Romola fiction: Many readers have found Eliot’s
later novels too aggressively learned. Given Harrison’s involvement with
Cross’s proofs, however, it is difficult not to read this as a cheap shot:
Harrison silently reverses an analogy Eliot had used against him in a letter
twenty years earlier—a letter not printed in the Cross text but since made
available in Gordon Haight’s publication of Eliot’s Letters.
Harrison’s request that Eliot write a novel dramatizing Comtean princi-
ples forms the crux of their 1866 exchange. The correspondence thus
explicitly addresses the relationship of theory to practice and implicitly
comments on the validity of the theory. Eliot declined in an expression
that has since become famous, claiming that if aesthetic teaching “lapses
anywhere from the picture to the diagram[,] it becomes the most offensive
of all teaching” (IV:300).3 She further reveals that she expends an “agoniz-
ing labour . . . [of her] English-fed imagination to make art a sufficiently
real back-ground, for the desired picture, to get breathing, individual
forms, and group them in the needful relations, so that the presentation
will lay hold on the emotions as human experience” (IV:301). Harrison’s
1885 review essentially claims that Eliot’s labor went for naught—indeed,
that her novels would be relieved by a little of the diagram, in order to give
her readers a reprieve from the intensity of Eliotic representation. Even
after her death, Harrison misses Eliot’s point: Her letter implies that her
novels are at least as interested in failures of symbolization as in anything
resembling representational transparency.4 She acknowledges having “a
consciousness tending more and more to consist in memories of error and
imperfection rather than in a strengthening sense of achievement”
(IV:300–301).
Harrison and Eliot disagree about the importance of pain in history and
in art. Indeed, Eliot’s emphasis on pain causes her to withhold assent from
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Harrison’s proposal, though this represents Harrison’s chief complaint
about her fiction. For example, he found Harold Transome’s rebuke of his
mother, in Felix Holt, “too intensely painful” (IV:265). Harrison’s resistance
to pain stems partly from his Comtean interest in historical progress. In
“The Use of History” (1862; collected in The Meaning of History, 1894), he
argued repeatedly that the scoundrels and mistakes of the past are best for-
gotten, the better to concentrate on the triumphant story of civilization’s
development. Harrison bitterly condemns both the historian’s and the
reading public’s interest in vice and tragedy: “And they call this history.
This serving up in spiced dishes of the clean and the unclean, the whole-
some and the noxious; this plunging down into the charnel-house of the
great graveyard of the past, and stirring up the decaying carcases [sic] of the
outcasts and malefactors of the race” (9). From Harrison’s point of view,
most of the past resembles Frankenstein’s creature, an abortive project that
can only titillate and degrade our understanding of culture, rather than
enhance it. By contrast, true history for him “teaches us something of the
advance of human progress” (10). As I shall show momentarily, while Eliot
acknowledges progress, she refuses Harrison’s view that progress is the
whole or even most interesting story to be learned from history.
When Eliot warns of lapsing from the picture to the diagram, she is not
dismissing the “diagram”—in this exchange, Comtean theory—as too ide-
alized. Such a neat distinction would oversimplify the complex workings
of pictorial metaphor in realist fiction. As Eliot acknowledges in the
exchange with Harrison, in Romola (1862–63) she turned towards histor-
ical fiction in order to achieve the “necessary idealization” (IV:301). She
seems to imply instead that Harrison’s theory misunderstands the process
of history and composition. Her letter is full of suffering: the “agonizing
labour” of composition, the “unspeakable pains” of researching Romola,
and her preference for “pain and terror” over “admiration and delights”
(IV:301–2).5 Eliot associates the difficulty of her writing with her own
“mind morbidly desponding.” How could such a mind, her letter asks,
produce a work committed to a theory of progress? Although the pangs of
composition are not exactly those of morbid despond, the letter suggests
that they end up in the same place, as her tragic novels achieve their effects
by dramatizing pain in order to win her readers’ sympathy.
My interest in Eliot’s understanding of suffering is not psychobiograph-
ical speculation. Instead, I find productive in her account the link between
pain and symbolization’s failure. Historical narratives cannot, in her view,
be only narratives of progress; they also literally hurt, as they remind us of
opportunities missed and wrongs committed. Conceiving of Eliot’s argu-
ment with Harrison in this way does not merely help us grasp her refusal
of Comte’s system (an ultimately biographical question), but also clarifies
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Eliot’s interest in the intractable dimensions of fiction and history as well
as her hint that any identification that ignores this intractability must fail.6
In subsequent sections I return to this complex relationship between iden-
tification and history.
In this sense, Eliot’s powerful faith in the past’s haunting relevance affili-
ates her more closely with such thinkers as Wordsworth and Burke than with
Comte. Edmund Burke’s idea of culture as an “entailed inheritance” serves
as an important backdrop to Eliot’s thought, because it clarifies the value of
thinking about history, even if such thought cannot offer unequivocal guid-
ance to present problems. We can draw an analogy here between Eliot’s view
of history and her “consciousness tending more and more to consist in mem-
ories of error and imperfection rather than a strengthening sense of achieve-
ment” (IV:300). While Harrison sees history as marching triumphantly
towards the future, Eliot’s conception of memory arrests her in the past, dis-
rupting her self-presence. From Eliot’s perspective, a teleological history
would be plagued by a forgetting of our predecessor’s, or even our own, suf-
fering. The point of history, she suggests, surpasses accomplishing something
new; we also must atone for what we have become. In her earlier essay on
“The Antigone and Its Moral” (1856), Eliot argued that the key to tragedy is
“two principles, both having their validity, [but that] are at war with each”
(263). For Eliot, history is tragic in this sense, because progressive and con-
servative impulses battle within it, and neither is ever wholly dominant. So
from this perspective, it is impossible to distinguish between specifying how
society has developed over time and plundering Harrison’s “charnel-house of
the great graveyard of the past.” Eliot understands the past and present as
structurally inseparable yet incommensurate, mourning the tendency for
accounts of progress to dispense cheerfully with the past, and marking the
past’s ability to overthrow even the most triumphant present event. History
is thus ontologically paradoxical for Eliot: an impossible ground that simul-
taneously underwrites and overturns identity.
II. The Defense of Historical Consequences
The master key to [divine] revelation, is the recognition of the pres-
ence of undeviating law in the material and moral world—of that
invariability of sequence which is acknowledged to be the basis of
physical science, but which is still perversely ignored in our social
organization, our ethics and our religion. It is this invariability of
sequence which can alone give value to experience and render edu-
cation in the true sense possible.
—Eliot, “The Progress of the Intellect” (1851)
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In her biography of George Eliot, Rosemary Ashton argues that this state-
ment about causation, from Eliot’s first published book review, represents
a “philosophical standpoint from which [Eliot] would never deviate” (76).
Beyond this “philosophical” perspective lies the bulk of progressive
nineteenth-century historiography and science, and it is easy to find evi-
dence supporting Ashton’s claim in Eliot’s oeuvre.7 Eliot’s adamant insis-
tence on this perspective often obscures other approaches to causation and
history. However, as we have seen, Eliot has a paradoxical experience with
the “invariability of sequence”: while she believes in it as a principle, her
consciousness is always trying to go backwards and forwards.
However, there is another Eliotic perspective on history and causation,
emerging obliquely in her early reviews, apparently against their explicit
aim. This other perspective is, in the early essays, too nebulous to warrant
its own label, but it works mainly to disrupt Eliot’s advocacy of organicist
approaches to social theory.8 Two of Eliot’s most prominent assertions of
organicist principles, “The Progress of the Intellect” (1851) and “The
Natural History of German Life” (1856), demonstrate the argument I am
advancing.
In the first of these two reviews, Eliot glowingly assesses Robert
Mackay’s The Progress of the Intellect, as Exemplified in the Religious
Development of the Greeks and Hebrews (1850), in part because it express-
es historiographic ideas she finds congenial. Her review opens by defend-
ing the study of history against followers of Comte who urge a practical
focus on the present. Predating Marx’s famous contemporary complaint
that the “tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on
the brain of the living” (595), Eliot declares that modern society is
oppressed by the “petrifactions” of the past, obsolescent ideas and mores
that no longer respond to present needs (28). As a result, the study of his-
tory is the most valuable mode of learning, because it alone can give us any
perspective on cultural change. She claims that people will be better pre-
pared for progressive sentiments if “by a survey of the past, it can be shown
how each age and each race has had a faith and a symbolism suited to its
need and its stage of development, and that for succeeding ages to dream
of retaining the spirit along with the forms of the past, is as futile as the
embalming of the dead body in the hope that it may one day be resumed
by the living soul” (29). Although the meaning of this vivid analogy is
clear, it is also disquieting. After all, the implicit metaphor of society’s
“stage of development,” which figures society as a growing organism in
which the relation between stages is transformative, clashes with the image
of a corpse, which represents historical change as death. Neither figure sits
easily with “petrifaction,” which implies calcification.
More than an oddly macabre image is at stake here: To associate histo-
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ry with death disrupts the essay’s otherwise prevalent argument that socie-
ty is improving teleologically, as well as Eliot’s affection for historical ties.
Were Eliot interested only in organicism, we could conclude simply that
no creed can outlive its time. However, there is a more interesting conclu-
sion to draw from her argument: namely, the purpose of historical study is
to help us relinquish our identification with the past and, potentially, with
the present. She suggests that modernity is an epoch that breaks with the
conditions of the past, but during which people continue to believe in the
relevance of the past’s mores. If we think of historical change as a mode of
dying, we might see that our own identity is more contingent than we per-
haps are comfortable believing. I’ll soon show that both Felix Holt and
Middlemarch make this complex relationship between fantasy and identity
a central topic of investigation.
History for Eliot here represents a speculative habit of thought, not sim-
ply a set of facts, stories, or morals drawn from the past. It becomes a mode
of hygienic self-forgetting:
It may be doubted, whether a mind which has no susceptibility to
the pleasure of changing its point of view, of mastering a remote
form of thought, of perceiving identity of nature under variety of
manifestation—a perception which resembles an expansion of one’s
own being, a pre-existence in the past—can possess the flexibility,
the ready sympathy, or the tolerance, which characterizes a truly
philosophic culture. (“Progress” 29)
Rather than valuing historical knowledge for its own sake, Eliot implies
that the study of history disrupts our self-image.9 History is, according to
Eliot’s narrator in the later novel Middlemarch, a path leading out of our
“small hungry shivering selves” (II:XXIX:277); it is one of the ways to tran-
scend the “moral stupidity” into which we are all born (II:XXI:208).
Although history offers such transcendence, Middlemarch suggests (as I
shall show soon) that it also offers our egoism an alibi. Likewise, “The
Progress of the Intellect” simultaneously evokes and repudiates complacent
teleological views of history.
“The Natural History of German Life,” another earlier review, also
prominently features a clash between the organicist principles that Eliot
enunciates and the images through which she illustrates them. Her review
of Wilhelm Heinrich von Riehl’s Die burgerliche Gesellschaft (1851) and
Land und Leute (1853) yokes statements of both aesthetic and historio-
graphic principles, viewing both as directly related: she asserts that art
needs concretely to represent the way people actually live. This scrupulous
realism will, in turn, allow us to understand better their proper gover-
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nance. Eliot famously describes this type of realism as reproducing the
“incarnate history” of a populace, in her mind the concretization of millen-
nia of development (287, emp. in original; see Graver “Incarnate”):
What has grown up historically can only die out historically, by the
gradual operation of necessary laws. The external conditions which
society has inherited from the past are but the manifestation of
inherited conditions in the human beings who compose it; the
internal conditions and the external are related to each other as the
organism and its medium, and development can take place only by
the gradual consentaneous development of both. (287)
Although this is one of the clearest published statements of Eliot’s organi-
cism, it contains again a strange mingling of development and death. On
the one hand, the phrase “die out” implies an evolutionary perspective, in
which maladapted social structures are, like unfit species, supplanted by
more efficient ones; on the other hand, Eliot represents society itself as
possessing some capacity for agency.
While Eliot tries to affirm an organic view of development, then, her
key comparison—society’s historical development is akin to that of lan-
guage (287)—does not support an argument about progressive develop-
ment. Although our own perspective here is post-Saussurean, Eliot also
views language as defeating any ideal correspondence between inside and
outside, and between signifier and signified. As she writes,
one word stands for many things, and many words for one thing;
the subtle shades of meaning, and still subtler echoes of association,
make language an instrument which scarcely anything short of
genius can wield with definiteness and certainty. Suppose, then,
that the effort which has been again and again made to construct a
universal language on a rational basis has at length succeeded, and
that you have a language which has no uncertainty, no whims of
idiom, no cumbrous forms, no fitful shimmer of many-hued signif-
icance, no hoary archaisms ‘familiar with forgotten years’—a patent
de-odorized and non resonant language, which effects the purpose
of communication as perfectly and rapidly as algebraic signs. Your
language may be a perfect medium of expression to science, but will
never express life, which is a great deal more than science. (287–88,
emp. in original)
Eliot’s description of language emphasizes those elements, such as emotion
and tropes, that interfere with its representational mission, implying that
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language intransitively registers “life” through its inability to communicate
clearly. The overall argument of “The Natural History of German Life” is
that historical progress is at work in Europe, but it must emerge slowly,
even organically. However, Eliot’s treatment of language complicates this
overall argument by showing that progress itself is neither ideal nor guar-
anteed. After all, the description’s rhetorical power lies in demonstrating
that while language changes over time, it does not evolve toward commu-
nicative transparency—for if it could, Eliot would want nothing to do
with it. The rhetorical form of these sentences embodies the kind of
intractability that their content extols—we note, for instance, the synes-
thetic image of a “deodorized language,” along with the prominent use of
such figures as ellipsis (verging on parataxis) and alliteration.10 At first, this
meshing of form and content appears to endorse Eliot’s organicist argu-
ment, and these sentences would accordingly have the function of a rhetor-
ical set-piece whereby Eliot demonstrates her obvious mastery. Indeed,
taken as an argument about the impossibility of artificially imposing polit-
ical changes from above, the analogy with language is locally persuasive.
But the surplus rhetoric trumps her argument about organicism, because
she recognizes that language cannot communicate transparently, even
within a single society. So although Eliot declares that language “must be
left to grow in precision, completeness, and unity, as minds grow in clear-
ness, comprehensiveness, and sympathy” (288), her argument has just
made clear why this growth cannot happen, and is in fact profoundly
undesirable. Her familiar allusion to Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814)
demonstrates this point, since language’s appeal emerges through
archaisms redolent with memories and emotions linked with the past.11
Eliot’s fondness for linguistic relics is most famously displayed in her pre-
Romola fiction, perhaps especially in this well-known passage from The
Mill on the Floss (1860):
These familiar flowers, these well-remembered bird-notes, this sky
with its fitful brightness, these furrowed and grassy fields, each with
a sort of personality given to it by the capricious hedgerows—such
things as these are the mother tongue of our imagination, the lan-
guage that is laden with all the subtle inextricable associations the
fleeting hours of our childhood left behind them. (I:5:34)
We see, then, inevitable linguistic anachronisms in Eliot’s writing, because
language cannot correspond fully to the contemporary moment. This tem-
poral delay enforces the tension I described among Eliot’s variety of images
for the organic society’s development, because it suggests that time, as lan-
guage registers it, is irrevocably out of joint. She attempts to resolve this
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tension by claiming that historical development is like a seed: “The nature
of European men has its roots intertwined with the past, and can only be
developed by allowing those roots to remain undisturbed while the process
of development is going on, until that perfect ripeness of the seed which
carries with it a life independent of the root” (288). However, her interest
in language’s anachronistic qualities suggests both the impossibility and
the undesirability of such a “life independent of the root.”
Felix Holt and Middlemarch extrapolate these anachronistic qualities of
language into a general view of history in order to dramatize our inability
to apprehend causation at work. These novels register this conceptual
blindness through the gaps between the plots and characters of these nov-
els and the organic metaphors that narrators use to comment upon them.
The word register here is carefully chosen: While, on the one hand, I am
not convinced that Eliot seeks self-consciously to undermine her self-
confessed faith in organic views of history, on the other hand a careful
reading suggests that her novels obstinately reenact certain problems in the
representation of organicism; the effect, on the whole, is to qualify signif-
icantly our ability to share her view. Eliot’s tepid representation of
admirable nineteenth-century developments provides another striking
instance of this ambivalence. In her notebook entry on “Historic
Imagination,” she argued that historical narratives are valuable because
they enhance our understanding of what is possible: Without them we
lapse “into ridiculously inconsistent estimates of actual movements, con-
demning in the present what we belaud in the past, and pronouncing
impossible processes that have been repeated again and again in the his-
torical preparation of the very system under which we live” (447). In this
fragment, historical narrative counters overly pessimistic conservatism.12
Perhaps because of this progressive strand of her thinking, many critics
have reproached Eliot with self-contradiction.13 And we can concede that
her later novels seem politically pessimistic. Consider Middlemarch: Eliot
believed that the two most significant developments of her lifetime were
reform and improved understanding of disease, representing both in the
novel.14 Yet, the characters associated with these developments all end
rather lamely—Will, the most articulate spokesperson for reform in the
novel, has no world-making career; reform notoriously does nothing for
Dorothea’s prospects; and Lydgate is wrecked, not only by his “spots of
commonness,” but also by the aversion with which Middlemarch greets
his work. Of course one can object that, for instance, Lydgate fails because
he can’t adequately see the true scientific advances of his time, but this
verges on question-begging: Why can’t Lydgate see this? These pessimistic
tendencies often lead politically radical critics, especially those represent-
ing feminism or Marxism, to deprecate Eliot’s apparent incapacity to rep-
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resent the possibility of collective action, or new ways of imagining gender
or social relations, or even the progress that was in fact made in the nine-
teenth century.15 However, equating a particular character’s ability to thrive
with political representation reproduces high Victorian providentialism, in
which the good prosper and the evil die—a perspective Eliot’s fiction
resists, despite her interest in the invariability of causation.16 While she
does portray resistance to reform, such a view does not amount to politi-
cal defeatism.
In turning now to Felix Holt, I want to focus on a narrative comment
that is repeated there and in Middlemarch. In Felix Holt, the narrator
famously claims: “there is no private life which has not been determined
by a wider public life” (I:3:50). Likewise, in the “Finale” of Middlemarch,
the narrator remarks: “For there is no creature whose inward being is so
strong that it is not greatly determined by what lies outside it”
(VIII:Finale:821). Yet the novels do not show us external constraint over-
riding psychic considerations. Instead, the novels anatomize the relation-
ship between history and fantasy, arguing simultaneously for attention to
history, on the one hand and, on the other, skepticism about the legitima-
cy of appeals to history. Eliot suggests that we are prone to finding histor-
ical justifications for our desires and actions, which she sees as illegitimate.
However, she can only foreground that illegitimacy through historical nar-
ratives and their failure.
III. Stories of Origin in Felix Holt
Was there a motive at work under this strange reluctance of Arthur’s
which had a sort of backstairs influence, not admitted to himself?
Our mental business is carried on much in the same way as the busi-
ness of the State: a great deal of hard work is done by agents who
are not acknowledged.
—Eliot, Adam Bede (1859)
Felix Holt, the Radical suggests that what is true for Arthur Donnithorne
holds also for the public sphere: unconscious motivations do not disappear
from public business, but drape themselves instead in respectable clothing.
The novel tries to explain why the First Reform Bill could not guarantee
the beneficence of the Second; it tries, that is, to disrupt complacency
about the inevitability of political progress. Eliot’s narrator implies that we
blame history for our desires and anxieties, so that even the most apparent-
ly altruistic public motives, or highest ideals, cannot exhaust our motiva-
tions. The novel dramatizes these concerns in two ways: first, by its 
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explanation of eventual reform at Treby Magna, and second, by its prob-
lematic hero.
Because its plot hangs on an election, Felix Holt allows Eliot to explore
the nebulous motives underpinning action in the public sphere. The
novel’s account of election-day riots, poster-switching, workers surrepti-
tiously selling their political affiliation for beer, and the transparent
Machiavellianism of Harold Transome and Matthew Jermyn gives reform
a thoroughly unsavory appearance. Yet as we have seen, Eliot correctly
believed that the extension of the franchise was one of the most important
achievements of the nineteenth century. To understand why she might
want to make reformers seem so unappealing, let us consider a passage
from Felix Holt in which Eliot’s narrator explicitly comments on their
tactics:
At that time, when faith in the efficacy of political change was at
fever-heat in ardent Reformers, many measures which men are still
talking about with little confidence on either side, were then talked
about and disposed of like property in near reversion. Crying abus-
es—“bloated paupers,” “bloated pluralists,” and other corruptions
hindering men from being wise and happy—had to be fought
against and slain. Such a time is a time of hope. Afterwards, when
the corpses of those monsters have been held up to the public won-
der and abhorrence, and yet wisdom and happiness do not follow,
but rather a more abundant breeding of the foolish and the unhap-
py, comes a time of doubt and despondency. (I:16:179)
In The Spirit of Reform (1977), Patrick Brantlinger influentially interprets
this passage as an emblem of “the transformation of the idea of reform into
progress and progressive evolution” characteristic of the 1860s (8). This
development represents, according to Brantlinger, an abdication of poli-
tics. Calling a political change a “reform,” he explains, means accepting
that activism and political argument are necessary. But when change
becomes “progressive evolution,” such strategies disrupt the natural
progress of history. He goes on to assert that the “primary causal factor”
behind this transformation was “the increasing economic and political
power of middle-class industrialism” (8–9). Granting Brantlinger’s overall
argument about the middle class’s losing enthusiasm for reform, more
than quietism is at stake in Eliot’s novel. Instead, this passage emphasizes
the difficulty of ascribing motive in the public sphere. Who could be
against abuses? As Harold Transome makes clear upon his return to Treby
Magna, however, the charge of “abuses” is often an alibi for a relatively
uncomplicated will-to-power. Eliot hardly seems to substitute a theory of
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evolution for one of reform; instead, she documents the eagerness with
which everyone seeks noble-sounding justifications for personal gain.
The symmetry of accusations—“bloated paupers” and “bloated plural-
ists”—highlights the tit-for-tat nature of the discourse where “abuses” are
the watchword of the day.17 Eliot implies that the transformation of abus-
es into monsters is the main obstacle to reform. Her pointed irony allows
us to see that the rhetoric of “abuses” cannot counter future abuses because
it is always incendiary—instead, the “corpses of those monsters” may well
produce a “more abundant breeding.” Rather than inveighing against
reform in general, in other words, Eliot dramatizes the seductive appeal of
the reformer, and the blindness inherent in such seduction. Eliot’s position
may be summed up thus: ask for less, and you may get more (but don’t
count on it!).
Felix Holt’s third chapter explicates the private definitions that the char-
acters of Treby Magna attribute to “reform.” After a fantastically idyllic epi-
graph, the chapter shows how the citizens of the town construe historical
events along traditional lines arising from earlier social hierarchies and
their resultant interpersonal animosity. According to the epigraph, Treby
Magna was “town, yet country too,” the kind of place where one could
hear from one’s window the “tiny bleat of new-yeaned lambs, or see / The
children bend beside the hedgerow banks / To pluck the primroses”
(I:III:45). Evidently, the narrator admires the town’s landscape and archi-
tecture as fine instances of English village life. But in ways similar to Eliot’s
next novel, Middlemarch, the town notices modernity in the arrival of a
canal, coal mines two miles away, and the discovery of a salt-water spring;
from these new developments, the townspeople learn several new vocabu-
laries for discontent. For example: the “Catholic Emancipation Bill opened
the eyes of neighbours, and made them aware how very injurious they were
to each other and to the welfare of mankind generally” (I:III:48); and
although “Tory, Whig, and Radical did not perhaps become clearer in their
definition of each other[,] . . . the names seemed to acquire so strong a
stamp of honour or infamy, that definitions would only have weakened the
impression” (I:III:49). Such an environment lends itself to the interpene-
tration of public and private opprobrium; for instance, a Reform-minded
grocer caught using weighted scales metaphorically represents to his cus-
tomers the crookedness of Reform itself. At such moments, the narrator
encourages us to see how motives coalesce.
Eliot also shows how, in another unintended consequence of reform,
the machinery of the law gives unacknowledged delights to the citizenry.
The novel’s election is of course the first of its kind in Treby Magna—the
first, that is, under the new terms of the Reform Bill. When the Revising
Barrister comes to Treby to validate the list of qualified voters (those with
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fifty-pound households), he must decide the appeals of marginally qual-
ified voters and query others about the extent of their holdings. As the
news of the Barrister’s decisions drifts back to Mr. Pink’s shop (the sad-
dler happened to be at the center of male Treby gossip), Pink is proud to
learn
whose votes had been called in question before His Honour, how
Lawyer Jermyn had been too much for Lawyer Labron about Todd’s
cottages, and how, in the opinion of some townsmen, this looking
into the value of people’s property, and swearing it down below a
certain sum, was a nasty, inquisitorial kind of thing; while others
observed that being nice to a few pounds was all nonsense—they
should put the figure high enough, and then never mind if a voter’s
qualification was thereabouts. (II:28:267)
Pink’s “satisfaction” (II:28:266) at this peculiarly incisive news speaks to
the exquisite piquancy of unmasking a neighbor—especially a heartless or
exploitative one.18 Too, the court makes the property of others a legitimate
topic of conversation, and especially the possibility of a gap between what
the person professes to own and what the court determines he does in fact
possess. Finally, the townspeople’s response to the court is instructive. The
auctioneer, Mr. Sims, laments that the Reform Bill’s requirements are
“done for the sake of the lawyers. Mr. Pink suggested impartially that
lawyers must live, but Mr. Sims, having a ready auctioneering wit, did not
see that so many of them need live, or that babies were born lawyers”
(II:28:267). Without rising to the defense of the legal profession—and
while conceding that the lawyer joke has been a staple of comedy at least
since Shakespeare—it is striking how adroitly Sims turns Pink’s observa-
tion about lawyers needing work to sustain themselves into a wish for their
inexistence.
Felix Holt therefore emphasizes a clear-eyed understanding of what
reform can and cannot accomplish. While the novel suggests that giving
increased representation to the manufacturing towns and eliminating rot-
ten boroughs are worthwhile goals, Eliot’s narrator dramatizes how
progress is never just progress: reforms always have unpredictable conse-
quences, as people adapt their emotions to the new state of affairs.
Historical developments offer new vocabularies for old grievances, allow-
ing them to persist, though townspeople disavow them under the guise of
modernity. Rather than focusing her novel on the debates around the
Second Reform Bill, Eliot’s narrator appeals to the political act ostensibly
legitimating that Bill—the First Reform Bill, which of course only became
“first” after the passing of the 1867 Bill. Instead of being the apocalyptic
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act that many contemporary observers feared it to be, advocates of extend-
ing the franchise in 1866 saw the 1832 bill as an originary moment of
modern democratic politics. Hence it is all the more valuable for my argu-
ment about determinism and false organicism that Eliot pays consistent
attention to the limits of self-knowledge—especially the difficulty of
knowing the causes of one’s actions or predicting the consequences there-
of, and of the meaning of those limits for political representation. These
limits take on additional weight because Felix Holt and Middlemarch
appear to reconstruct an important historical moment.
This uncertainty rebounds upon Felix Holt, Eliot’s least appreciated pro-
tagonist. Contemporary reviewers such as R. H. Hutton and Henry James
argued that he was too underdeveloped to sustain the novel’s focus, and
modern critics have argued that he stands for anything from middle-class
bad faith about the merits of reform to a kind of hectoring misogynist who
is not a credible match for the novel’s heroine, Esther Lyon.19 Critics fre-
quently argue that Felix may be taken as a spokesperson for Eliot—an argu-
ment that Eliot’s “Address to Working Men, by Felix Holt” (1868) unwit-
tingly reinforces. Rather than alleging even a putative congruence between
Felix and Eliot, I am emphasizing Eliot’s fascination with nebulous motives
to reinforce her prior ambivalence about whether historical narratives can
sustain identity. Although Felix’s speech often seems violently defensive or
compensatory, this arguably attests to Eliot’s uncertainty about whether the
ideals Felix proposes are plausible as a strategy. In other words, Felix does not
so much embody a set of propositional truths as give voice, no matter how
unselfconsciously, to the difficulty of embracing those ideals.
Grasping Eliot’s interest in the difficulty of making ideals and desires
coincide helps us understand the most common Victorian criticism of
Felix Holt: that it hides its protagonist’s development. Hutton put this
claim most vividly: “the great struggle in [Felix’s] mind between political
and moral radicalism which gives the thread of unity to the story is almost
past away before it opens; and though it has left behind it a sort of torso
enthusiasm which flings itself nobly but half wildly into the social life
around, there is no sufficient development in the character, or doubt about
its decisions” (258). Likewise, James lamented that the “dramatic
antecedents” of the plot find no answering conflict in the novel (274). For
both Hutton and James, Felix Holt seems disconcertingly to begin before
its beginning: the narrative develops a curious mode of deferral, whereby
the lag between a cause and its effects indicates both the complexity of cau-
sation and the tenacity of her characters’ ongoing faith in it.20
By representing Felix’s conversion as taking place before the novel begins,
the narrator introduces a note of doubt about his intentions, and even allows
him to betray self-doubt. This maneuver has significant repercussions: Eliot’s
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strategy guarantees that readers will find her protagonist unsatisfactory, since
there is a gap between his ideals and his enunciation of them. This gap man-
ifests itself virtually every time he speaks, though he seems only intermit-
tently aware of this. For instance, when he first meets Reverend Lyon and
his daughter, Esther, Felix winningly describes himself as a “roughly-written
page,” “a little too fond of banging and smashing” (I:V:60, 67). And the nar-
rator claims that, though his “speech verged on rudeness, . . . it was deliv-
ered with a brusque openness that implied the absence of any personal
intention” (I:V:68). Despite this absence of malice, though, we could not
deny that Felix is quite rude to Esther, and several times during their con-
versation her father nearly takes offense. He claims that he is merely candid
and blunt: “Those are your roundabout euphuisms that dress up swindling
till it looks as well as honesty, and shoot with boiled pease instead of bullets”
(I:V:70). Felix’s fantasy of the conversation as a mode of gunplay here fur-
ther highlights his aggression. 
As Hao Li has claimed, however, Felix’s “assertions lend his speech an
authority more argumentative than moral. . . . Holt’s appealing tone
sometimes vacillates between self-apology, self-righteousness and patron-
ization” (114). Li focuses on Felix’s speeches to the working men in the
novel, yet these characteristics are in fact omnipresent in his discourse. His
mother finds him “masterful” (I:IV:56), and his first conversation with
Esther is a constellation of quasi-malicious repartee. Eliot emphasizes how
Felix’s self-righteous passions color even his sense perceptions. Because he
is repulsed by Esther’s ladylike mannerisms, he avoids looking at Esther
until he discovers her reading Byron: “Felix . . . was led at last to look
straight at Esther, but it was with a strong denunciatory and pedagogic
intention. Of course he saw more clearly than ever that she was a fine lady”
(I:V:69). Eliot’s artful phrasing both confirms Felix’s supposition that
Esther aspires to gentility and grasps how his delight in verbal battle
shapes his perception of her. Because he wants to sneer at Byron, he is
especially prepared to find her a “squirrel-headed thing, with small airs
and small notions” (I:V:71). Saying this aloud steps somewhat past
rudeness—we could even connect his declaration that Esther is “squirrel-
headed” with his earlier preference for shooting with bullets. His speech
arguably betrays an erotic violence lurking behind his love of argument.
By having Felix “converted by six weeks’ debauchery” in the novel’s pre-
history (I:V:62), Eliot conspicuously highlights the ways that his convictions
about the meaning of his past contribute to his violent speech. Although he
refuses his father’s legacy—a “pharmacy” promoting quackery—he accuses
his father of the greater refusal: “My father was a weaver first of all. It would
have been better for him if he had remained a weaver. . . . I mean to stick to
the class I belong to” (I:V:64). Felix’s simple-minded equation of class ambi-
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tion with fraud contributes to his violent denunciations of Esther’s conscious-
ness of status. Similarly, Felix’s own debauchery, in which he found himself
“making a hog of myself” (I:V:62), tellingly repulses him. He subsequently
reserves his strongest denunciations for indulgence. Byron is a “misanthropic
debauchee” (I:V:69)—an epithet that may sound envious, considering how
Felix recoils from his own dissipation. Workers who sell their opinions for
beer also disgust him, as do preachers who purchase “a fine coat and a glut-
ton’s dinner” with their parishioners’ money (I:V:64). Felix’s opinions, how-
ever, link up with the novel’s overall mistrust of the rhetoric of “abuses” and
corruption. If in the political sphere, the cry of abuses acts as catalyst, inflam-
ing partisan passions, then so too does Felix’s attempt at leading the workers.
In other words, one should read the violence of his rhetoric partly as compen-
satory, as geared toward repudiating in others what he fears to rediscover in
himself; he denounces others so vigorously partly because they tempt him to
relapse, not merely because they threaten the social fabric. Like a newly quit
smoker who tries feverishly and self-righteously to make everyone else quit,
Felix cannot accept that others might continue to enjoy what he has forsaken.
The result of this reading is a novel less patronizing to workers than
Brantlinger implies, and more enigmatic than Hutton and James acknowl-
edge. Although Eliot’s narrator sometimes seems to echo Felix’s program of
moral reform, the protagonist voices them in such a way as to undermine
their credibility. We could say that the novel invokes an ideal of moral
progress, in order to show that it is no more secure than any other
approach to reform. In this way, Felix Holt shows how appeals to history
can provide a cover for other, less acceptable motives. The townspeople of
Treby Magna use Catholic Emancipation and parliamentary reform as
opportunities to vent against each other, and Felix converts his shame over
his father’s fraud into an exaggerated estimation of the virtues of the work-
ing class. If Felix Holt shows how easy it is for us to use our fantasies of his-
torical meaning against each other, then Eliot’s other reform novel goes far-
ther still: Middlemarch demonstrates how our desire for a historically
grounded identity is potentially an instrument of our undoing.
IV. Middlemarch and History
Men can do nothing without the make-believe of a beginning.
—Eliot, Daniel Deronda (1876)
Although it derives from a different novel,21 this epigraph helpfully frames
the debate between Jerome Beaty and Michael Mason over the status of
history in Middlemarch. The former’s classic essay, “History by
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Indirection,” closes with these words: “few readers realize they are reading
a novel full of documented, accurate historical information; none feels his-
tory obtrudes inorganically upon the fiction” (706). After Mason quotes
these lines, he comments, “this is meant to be a compliment to
Middlemarch, but it is a strange one. We may take the point about ‘inor-
ganically,’ but the first part of the judgment seems to make a virtue of the
irrelevance of what is admitted to be a carefully studied element in the
novel—history” (419). Mason here performs a bit of a sleight of hand,
substituting “irrelevance” for Beaty’s emphasis on the ubiquity of
Middlemarch’s historical information. Moreover, Mason asserts that seeing
the period of the novel “as a time of origins gives Middlemarch a dynamic
aspect, a dimension forward in time” (419). This formulation gives Mason
some trouble, as he must awkwardly explain that Eliot’s view of progress
is not purely optimistic, and that there are many ways of representing
progress in the novel (426–30). And as Eliot’s Carlylean epigraph suggests,
she is skeptical that appealing to origins can fully ground narratives.
If the novel is not about origins, then we can understand why Lydgate
does not prefigure later improvements in medicine, and of course why
Dorothea does not go beyond rendering “wifely help” to Will
(VIII:Finale:819). This argument may be surprising, given Eliot’s com-
ment in “Historical Imagination,” cited above, that the aim of historiog-
raphy is the “working out in detail of the various steps by which a politi-
cal or social change is reached” (446). However, showing that change is
possible and precarious is very different from endorsing triumphalist
accounts of change. Additionally, Eliot is careful not to guarantee that past
events will result in present or future beneficence. Rather than represent-
ing the Reform Bill as an origin, Middlemarch investigates the stakes of
fantasmatically attributing causal authority to any historical moment.22
Eliot focuses our attention on historical interpretation from the novel’s
beginning, during a hilarious conversation among Mr. Brooke, Sir James
Chettam, Casaubon, and Dorothea over agricultural reforms. Sententious
Mr. Brooke recalls taking “in all the new ideas at one time—human per-
fectibility, now. But some say, history moves in circles; and that may be
very well argued; I have argued it myself. The fact is, human reason may
carry you a little too far—over the hedge, in fact. It carried me a good way
at one time; but I saw it would not do. I pulled up; I pulled up in time”
(I:II:17). Mr. Brooke’s account of the appeals and dangers of speculative
theory is a sort of perpetual non sequitur, moving from political economy,
to theology, to philosophy of history without any sense of how the con-
cepts relate, or whether they are equally speculative.  Eliot’s parody here
points up the necessity of historical consciousness—without it, one has no
guidance, only contingency.
Chapter Four94
Jones_CH4_2nd.qxp  9/8/2006  2:14 PM  Page 94
But while Brooke’s mind is clearly absurd, Casaubon’s is ominous in its
obsession with the past. He disdains the putatively speculative literary
offerings of Brooke, insisting instead on his affinity for history: “I feed too
much on the inward sources; I live too much with the dead. My mind is
something like the ghost of an ancient, wandering about the world and
trying mentally to construct it as it used to be, in spite of ruin and confus-
ing changes” (I:II:17). Casaubon’s description of himself as a revenant is,
in part, an Eliotic in-joke: The last sentence also served as the description
of the spirit in the “Proem” of Romola. However, the joke has its limits:
Eliot seems less interested in “constructing [the past] as it used to be,” than
in understanding the past relative to some present conflict.
If Brooke is absurd and Casaubon ghoulish, then we might expect
Dorothea to triangulate between the two.23 Unfortunately for her own hap-
piness, however, Dorothea is captivated by the desiccated scholar.
Watching this exchange between Brooke and the “neat” Casaubon, she
thinks that “Mr. Casaubon was the most interesting man she had ever seen.
. . . To reconstruct a past world, doubtless with a view to the highest pur-
poses of truth—what a work to be in any way present at, to assist in,
though only as a lamp-holder!” (I:II:17–18). As in Felix Holt, Eliot’s nar-
rator wryly lets us glimpse how easily an intellectual rationale provides an
alibi for libidinal responses, as Dorothea shifts from this early appreciation
of Casaubon’s “neat” person (especially in comparison with the “scrappy”
and “slovenl[y]” Brooke) to an admiration for his goal. Dorothea even sug-
gests that he is “remarkably like the portrait of Locke” (I:II:20). Eliot’s nar-
rator rallies subsequently to Dorothea’s defense, observing for instance that
“life could never have gone on at any period but for this liberal allowance
of conclusions, which has facilitated marriage under the difficulties of civ-
ilization” (I:II:22), and noting Dorothea’s disadvantage in being raised by
her uncle. However, Eliot has also already shown us Dorothea’s propensity
for using historical identifications as an alibi for her own naïve and ideal-
istic desires.
Reading Middlemarch in this light gives us a new perspective on what
we might call Dorothea’s “historical education,” which begins before she is
even introduced. It is commonplace to claim that the novel contrasts
Reform-era England with the Spain of Saint Theresa, idealizing the latter
as a historical moment during which one’s inner yearnings coalesce with
the opportunities and impulses of the social order. For example, in
Narrating Reality, Harry Shaw offers an exemplary analysis of
Middlemarch, in which he documents the extent to which even Dorothea’s
most fragmentary impulses arise from the press of historicity (229–36). Yet
he sees the novel as offering up exactly this contrast between St. Theresa
and Dorothea: “Even the vagueness of [Dorothea’s] feelings results from
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history. If Dorothea were in St. Theresa’s age and place, her feelings
wouldn’t seem, they would be: they’d find clear expression” (235). This is
a superb analysis of the prelude, one that silently points up its patronizing
quality. I am not suggesting that Eliot’s narrator is patronizing; instead, I
believe the “Prelude” voices Dorothea’s projection of Theresa, and so the
patronization belongs to Dorothea. The idea that feelings used to “find
clear expression,” but no longer do, is a quintessential modern fantasy,
because it represents the present as more psychologically complex (even if
more alienated) than the past. Middlemarch exposes this fantasy as a dan-
gerous will-o’-the-wisp, to which Dorothea initially clings but eventually
must abandon. In effect, the novel argues that not only are there no “good
old days,” but the very fantasy that there must be causes us to misrecog-
nize our motivations and desires in the present as the result of fate, des-
tiny, or history. Because we imagine that desires and external circum-
stances once meshed, we risk forcing our own to do so.
Eliot’s novel famously begins with a rhetorical question: “Who that
cares much to know the history of man, and how that mysterious mixture
behaves under the varying experiments of Time, has not dwelt, at least
briefly, on the life of Saint Theresa?” (3). By opening the novel with a
question, no matter how rhetorical, Eliot holds out the possibility of read-
ing this passage as partially ironic: after all, not many Victorians would
have thought about St. Theresa at all. More to the point, Eliot carefully
shows that our fantasy of the past’s harmony plays a crucial role in our
demand for harmony in the present. Theresa’s heart is “already beating to
a national ideal,” and she found “some illimitable satisfaction, some object
. . . which would reconcile self-despair with the rapturous consciousness
of life beyond self ” (3). Eliot’s description makes clear the libidinal under-
pinnings—“hearts . . . beating,” “illimitable satisfaction,” “rapturous con-
sciousness,” plus the combination of “passionate, ideal nature” (3)—of
Theresa’s sense of purpose. Juxtaposing with the famous description of
Dorothea’s “theoretic” mind, which “yearned after some lofty conception
of the world” and which was “enamoured of intensity and greatness, and
rash in embracing whatever seemed to her to have those aspects” (I:I:8), it
is difficult not to view Eliot as having some fun with our fantasies of
saints, and with our idea that history calls us, like them, to a particular
destiny. In the “Prelude,” we are given Theresa as Dorothea might have
imagined her, a Theresa who complements most perfectly Dorothea’s
excesses.24 The “Prelude,” in other words, implies that the importance of
history comes not from the correspondence of great forces to internal
desires, but from our belief in this correspondence.
Dorothea’s suffering in Rome confirms Eliot’s interest in the fragility of
historical identifications, and how they can create as many problems as
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they solve. Jim Reilly claims that it is impossible to tell whether Eliot’s nar-
rator believes that unity exists in the world or is invented in the course of
describing it. Moreover, Dorothea’s experience in Rome, he argues, is
symptomatic of Victorian dismay at the overwhelming copiousness of
modernity, which Eliot shares with Matthew Arnold (48–51). What I
would emphasize about this passage, by contrast, is the way that Rome’s
past attacks Dorothea, indicating her inability to conceive of history as
teleological, even if she were able to see the “suppressed transitions which
unite all contrasts” (II:XX:190).
Middlemarch’s report of Dorothea’s despair in Rome is famously aggres-
sive: she finds a “stupendous fragmentariness,” an “oppressive masquerade
of the ages” with “gigantic broken revelations . . . thrust abruptly” upon
her; Dorothea has “no defence” against the “unintelligible weight” of the
city’s past; the coexistence of classical ruins with a “sordid present” alarms
her, and the city reveals simply the “monotonous light of an alien world:
all this vast wreck of ambitious ideals, sensuous and spiritual, mixed con-
fusedly with the signs of breathing forgetfulness and degradation”
(II:XX:190–91). The impact of this confusion is painful: the ancient stat-
ues, relics, and paintings “jarred her as with an electric shock, and then
urged themselves on her with that ache belonging to a glut of confused
ideas which check the flow of emotion” (II:XX:191). The crosscurrent of
ideas and emotion is the crux of Eliot’s analysis here: Because the private
misery of her disappointing marriage distracts Dorothea, she is susceptible
to a despair that the city’s riotous confusion intensifies. Just as she quickly
converted her desire to do noble works into desire for Casaubon, so here
she equates her private suffering with Rome’s historical legacy. Indeed, she
is so “quick” and “ardent” that she “turn[s] all knowledge into principles”
(II:XX:191); consequently, she finds in the city a mirror of her own expe-
rience, converting the city’s “masquerade of the ages,” via a variant of the
pathetic fallacy, into a personal “masque with enigmatic costumes”
(II:XX:190). Eliot dramatizes, through Dorothea, the complex interplay of
causation between “inward being” and “public life”: The outside does not
simply determine the inside, as the narrators of Middlemarch and Felix Holt
assert, even as they indicate otherwise; rather, the expectation of determi-
nation (or even simply correspondence) blinds us to the contingent inter-
play of desire with the external world. Through Middlemarch’s first two
volumes, Dorothea’s automatic tendency to connect her outer circum-
stances with her inward desires and worries consistently leads her astray.
Rather than lamenting the absence of modern-day Theresas in the
“Prelude,” then, Eliot is arguably warning us against the expectation that
our desires will ever fully correspond with the outside world. If Eliot’s nov-
els have a moral teaching, this is it—that integrating desire and perception
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is the key to right conduct. What makes these novels compelling, howev-
er, is her sense that we can only ever achieve this integration
asymptotically.
By the time we reach the “Finale,” Dorothea has changed radically and,
I would suggest, the narrator provides a different vision of Theresa. The
narrator first claims that “there is no creature whose inward being is so
strong that it is not greatly determined by what lies outside it”
(VIII:Finale:821). In the next sentence, though, Eliot’s narrator recapitu-
lates the argument in Eliot’s essay on “The Antigone,” admitting that “the
medium in which [Theresa’s and Antigone’s] ardent deeds took shape is
forever gone” (VII:Finale:822). Though the medium has changed, great
deeds are still possible, and the challenge is to see them correctly.
According to this reading, it is a mistake to try to reconcile one’s “inward
being” with one’s fantasies about noble deeds. Indeed, Eliot dramatically
reverses herself here. The “Prelude” closes thus: “Here and there is born a
Saint Theresa, foundress of nothing, whose loving heart-beats and sobs
after an unattained goodness tremble off and are dispersed among hin-
drances, instead of centering in some long-recognizable deed” (4, my
emphasis). In the finale, dispersal is no longer an issue: “the effect of
[Dorothea’s] being was incalculably diffusive” (822, my emphasis). In
these sentences, “dispersed” and “diffusive” function nearly as antonyms,
despite their close denotative meaning. Here, the former indicates an
impotent, fruitless exercise of power, while the latter denotes an ever-
expanding circle of influence. Eliot’s feminist point from the “Prelude”
still holds, insofar as it is tragic that women like Dorothea so frequently
become mere helpmeets for their husbands. But grasping that the novel
refuses the comparison with St. Theresa makes Middlemarch more, rather
than less, historically specific, because it diminishes our tendency to treat
Dorothea as a saint. In other words, it diminishes her aura of uniqueness,
and highlights how historical forces constrain her options as her fantasies
about identification exacerbate those constraints.
Although Eliot’s reform fiction expresses skepticism about the
prospects of reform, it is, I have argued, not simply quietist or defeatist.
Instead, Felix Holt and Middlemarch dramatize how our fantasies about
historical meaning sustain dubious desires, and especially the ways that
history can serve as an alibi for individuals and communities. Eliot quali-
fies narratives about the past that simply legitimate the conscious inten-
tions of the present. Her novels continually represent the failure of con-
scious intentions and of consequences to coincide, showing us why some
of her characters’ appeals to the past take on a defensive, justificatory air.
In setting Felix Holt and Middlemarch around 1832, Eliot tries to suggest
the limitations of thinking of the Reform Bill of 1867 as the “Second
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Reform Bill.” She thus undermines the kinds of high Victorian complacen-
cy with which she is sometimes identified. She unsparingly exposes, that
is, two complementary fantasies: the idea that our social context thorough-
ly determines us, and the idea that we escape determination absolutely.
What is most difficult to confront in her fiction is how easily these uncon-
scious attitudes commingle with even our noblest aims.
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E P I L O G U E
Psychoanalysis in the
Nineteenth and 
Twenty-First Centuries
The Future History of the Victorian Novel
What I have tried to suggest throughout this book is that we seem to
believe in Victorian historicism more than key Victorians did themselves,
or at any rate, we seem to believe that the Victorians believed in histori-
cism. However, Victorian writers’ historical consciousness could frequent-
ly be interestingly fraught with ambivalence and internal contradiction, in
ways that are arguably closer to their own experience of historical change.
In other words, whatever they professed to believe, Carlyle, Dickens,
Brontë, and Eliot (all of whom of course believe different things) produce
texts that seem closer to historical experience than the self-conscious argu-
ments made on their behalf. In short, while these writers may have
believed they were arguing historically, our own belief that they were striv-
ing toward historicism, combined with our own wish to do justice to mar-
ginalized voices, has blinded us to these writers’ real interest, which lies in
capturing the baffling temporality of self-conscious historical change. If
we suspend briefly the relentless imperative to historicize, I have tried to
argue, we can find in Victorian literature powerful tools, not only for
understanding historical change, but also for grasping how limited our
understanding of such change must be in our own time. 
This book’s original title was Lost Causes: Psychoanalysis and Victorian
Literature, which was a bit misleading inasmuch as the book doesn’t spend
that much time on psychoanalysis. But that subtitle did offer both a spe-
cific conceptual promise and a bit of gallows humor, which are worth
sketching briefly. As I have argued throughout the book, in both Victorian
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literature and psychoanalysis we find an innovative, and still poorly under-
stood, representation of causality, one which is arguably more interesting
than the historicist methods currently used to interpret the literature. On
this account, true causes are primally lost, never to be satisfactorily linked
up with the effects that they determine; while this loss can be unsettling
and even pathogenic, it is also what allows for change, whether in persons,
discourses, or even cultures. This version of causality offers an internal
resistance to historicism, a supplement to historical argumentation with-
out which historicism risks sterile aridity.
The joke is less abstract: Defending the psychoanalytic account of any-
thing, much less a nonsexual topic such as history or causality, seems a bit
of a lost cause these days, especially outside of English or cultural studies
departments. Outside the academy, the clinical efficacy of psychoanalysis
is either openly ridiculed or simply bypassed by pharmacological interven-
tions. Inside the academy, the influence of historicist theories, as well as
theories rooted in identity politics and the self-inflicted wounds of reduc-
tive psychobiographical approaches, have lessened Freud’s influence signif-
icantly. In 1978, Richard Altick could survey the field of Victorian criti-
cism and note that “Apart from the continuing work of a few experts, the
psychoanalytic approach seems to have passed the zenith of its promise”
(19). While it is a striking coincidence that 1978 also saw the first United
States publication of Jacques Lacan’s Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, it would be hard to deny the essential truth of
Altick’s claim: For while the “return to Freud” has reinvigorated psychoan-
alytic studies of literature and culture over the past twenty-five years,
Victorian studies has largely found Lacan’s “gnomic propositions” rather
more baffling than illuminating.1 While psychoanalytic approaches—and
often quite brilliant ones—to Victorian fiction continue to be published
and to be well reviewed, one could hardly make the case that there has
been a great upsurge in psychoanalytic criticism.2 I want to suggest that
psychoanalysis’s future depends on recognizing that the historically popu-
lar elements of psychoanalytic criticism—sex, sexuality, and the perver-
sions; symbolism; the stages of development—distract us from more inter-
esting and useful arguments about the relationship between time, causa-
tion, and being. This distraction, perversely enough, turns out to repeat
the structure of repression itself; a structure that we find schematized in
many contemporary works, ranging from glossy pulp like The Matrix
Reloaded (2003) to such neo-Victorian fictions as William Gibson and
Bruce Sterling’s The Difference Engine (1991), Tom Stoppard’s The Coast of
Utopia (2002), and Michel Faber’s The Crimson Petal and the White
(2002).
In The Matrix Reloaded, the nonhuman information trafficker known
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as the Merovingian makes a long speech about “the only real truth; causal-
ity. Action, reaction. Cause and effect” (69). Overriding Morpheus’s
human insistence on choice, the Merovingian arranges a demonstration,
in which a piece of cake that he has written forces a young woman into an
intense burst of erotic feeling. He describes the way “each line of the pro-
gram creat[es] an effect, like poetry” (69). Lost on the Merovingian—who
is, after all, a program—is the key difference between code and poetry:
code’s effects are, even in massively complex computer programs, relative-
ly straightforward. When a program calls a function or a subroutine, there
is no confusion about what happens. For literary language such as poetry,
however, this straightforward relationship between cause and effect no
longer obtains, nor does the relationship between the author’s intention
and the experience of the poem’s audience. The Merovingian only grasps
poetry, code, and causality at the level of meaning. He insists, “Our only
hope, our only peace is to understand it, to understand the why. Why is
what separates us from them” (70). The conviction that causes can be
referred to meanings is the root of the Merovingian’s strength—it facili-
tates his trafficking in information—but it is also what prevents him from
being able to stop Neo’s revolutionary attempts to end the war between
humans and machines.
While it perhaps seems absurd to move from the sober realities of
Victorian social-problem texts—and especially the moral seriousness of
writers like Carlyle and Eliot—to an ephemeral movie (and a disappoint-
ing sequel at that!), this scene foregrounds the way sex, causality, and
understanding are repeatedly yoked together. In The Difference Engine,
Gibson and Sterling contrast revolutionary, manifesto-driven claims for
historical narrative with more fluid, emergent crystallizations borrowed
from chaos theory. In so doing, they unwittingly borrow from Carlyle. In
Stoppard’s Voyage (the opening play in The Coast of Utopia), the sisters
Liubov and Varenka discuss the mechanics of sex, while the object of
Liubov’s desire discusses Kant’s discussion of causality (17–18). What all
of these texts point to, time and again, is the way that sexuality and causal-
ity are metaphorically entangled—what they have in common is a recog-
nition of enigma, and the limits of our ability to find meaning in our lives.
In Victorian fiction and in psychoanalysis, this enigma is a resource for
psychic and political change, a guarantor that the symptoms, social or oth-
erwise, afflicting us today are alterable, possibly even for the better.
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N O T E S
Notes to Introduction
1. It is not hard to find testimonies, from the nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, vouching for the importance of historical consciousness for the nineteenth
century, and I discuss some later in the introduction. Michel Foucault famously
called the period “the Age of History” (Order 217), and Jerome Buckley’s The
Triumph of Time documents how far-reaching such consciousness could be.
2. Suzy Anger’s excellent introduction to her recent anthology, Knowing the
Past, begins by connecting Strachey’s witticism with recent debates on epistemol-
ogy (1).
3. The clearest articulation of this lament in Arnold is the “Preface” to Poems
(1853).
4. Here I adapt slightly a point Charles Shepherdson makes in Vital Signs:
Nature, Culture, Psychoanalysis: He points out that the fact that we understand sex-
uality discursively opens sexuality toward history, rather than toward nature, with-
out reducing sex to an effect of discourse (6–7).
5. Psychoanalysis has a cognate set of fantasies that I discuss in the opening sec-
tions of “The Time of Interpretation.”
6. Reading private and public experience as “incommensurate” bears a clear
debt to Christopher Lane’s discussion of “Victorian asymmetry” (Burdens 1–43).
Stephen Jay Gould also invokes asymmetry to explain the failure of biologically
inspired Victorian historiography: “Not only as an anomaly of human history, but
also as a signature of nature, pasts can’t imply futures because a pattern inherent in
the structure of nature’s materials and laws—‘the great asymmetry’ in my
terminology—too often disrupts an otherwise predictable unfolding of historical
sequences” (211).
7. See Copjec 68.
8. In “Revisiting ‘Mr. Bennett,’” I argue that this obstinate instinct fleshes out
Bennett’s interest in the mutual foundering of subjective and social experience.
9. Arguing from a hermeneutic point of view, Anger takes a similar point of
view. See especially 7–14.
10. Fredric Jameson explains that after 1848 the historical novel “takes the exter-
nal world as a mere dead decorative spectacle. . . . and yet which at the same time
paradoxically uses that decorative background as the pretext for a host of projec-
tions of contemporary psychological states (i.e., ennui, anxiety, neurosis), but also
contemporary philosophical issues and concerns, into a past in which they have no
place” (“Introduction” 3).
11. Armstrong argues that the early nineteenth-century novel attempts to subjec-
tivize its readers, rather than engage in political reform. Brantlinger (Spirit), Jameson,
and Lukács all claim that the Victorian novel withdraws from political engagement
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beginning in 1848. Catherine Gallagher (Industrial) argues that novelists after the
1850s begin to emphasize moral, rather than political, representation.
12. A task performed admirably by Jann and Dale, as well as the various con-
tributors to Anger’s Knowing.
13. Jim Reilly comments that “Nietzsche’s fearsome rhetoric would hardly be
exaggerated if, as Foucault suggests, the nineteenth century has impaled itself on
the paradox whereby history is seen both as the very ‘mode of being of empirici-
ty’ and as ‘no longer compatible with representation’” (20).
14. Reilly discusses Nietzsche’s belief that the nineteenth century has been
“ruined by history” on 18–19.
15. As Hayden White explains, in “place of a sequence of cause-effect relation-
ships as the model for viewing the evolution of any given biological or social phe-
nomenon, Nietzsche substituted the notion of a set of retroactive confiscations”
(Metahistory 363).
16. White explains that “Foucault rejects the authority of both logic and conven-
tional narrative. His discourses often suggest a story, but they are never about the
same ‘characters,’ and the events that comprise them are not linked by laws that
would permit us to understand some as causes and others as effects” (Content 108).
17. Bruce Robbins has recently suggested that more attention should be paid to
continuity rather than discontinuity, and provocatively argues that there is a “hid-
den antiprogressive continuity that helps explain the relatively smooth transition
from an Arnoldian to a Foucaultian regime in Victorian studies and that might
also raise some suspicions about the new dispensation” (174–75). In part, the con-
fusion about continuity and discontinuity is encouraged by Foucault. In an inter-
view cited by Robbins, Foucault goes on to claim that “History has no ‘meaning,’
though this is not to say that it is absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intel-
ligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail—but this
in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics” (“Truth
and Power” 114). Discontinuity is introduced, not necessarily in the past itself,
but by conceptualizing interpretation as struggle.
18. In developing this emphasis on fantasy, I have been significantly influenced
by Joan Scott’s recent essay, “Fantasy Echo.” Scott argues that fantasy echo names
“a set of psychic operations by which certain categories of identity are made to
elide historical differences and create apparent continuities. . . . It does not pre-
sume to know the substance of identity, the resonance of its appeal, or the trans-
formations it has undergone. It presumes only that where there is evidence of what
seems enduring and unchanging identity, there is a history that needs to be
explored” (304).
19. As Hardy had already written in “Hap” (1866): “Crass Casualty obstructs
the sun and rain, / And dicing Time for gladness casts a moan” (11–12).
20. For an important discussion of Foucault’s model of causation, see Copjec
5–14, and below.
21. For this notion of the “extradiscursive” see Lane “Poverty” 453, and on this
term’s difference from ideological appeals to some prediscursive arena of existence,
see Tim Dean’s Beyond Sexuality, especially his insistence that Lacan terms this
“resistance or negation within language” the real (18). Finally, for the orthodox
Lacanian explanations about why this is not just deconstruction, see Miller “A and
a in Clinical Structures” and Zizek Sublime 153–58.
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22. Copjec mounts her argument against “Foucault”; it’s clear from her descrip-
tion of his argument that she’s discussing mainly Discipline and Punish and The
History of Sexuality, volume 1.
23. Copjec almost acknowledges this (6–7), arguing that Foucault’s work in the
mid-1970s prevents his overall project from succeeding. Christopher Lane’s
Burdens and “The Experience of the Outside” are indispensable works for anyone
considering the relationship among Foucault, Lacan, and Victorian studies.
24. Within literary criticism, the loosely defined movement known as “new his-
toricism” owes a significant debt to Foucault and has profitably urged literary
scholars, particularly in Renaissance and Victorian studies, to reconsider the rela-
tionship between text and context. Yet practitioners of new historicism have been
famously reluctant to explain their theoretical aims, or exactly how new histori-
cism differs from old. Even in a recent articulation, Practicing New Historicism
(2000), Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt claim the mantle of Johann
Gottfried Herder’s cultural analysis:
Poetry [for Herder] is not the path to a transhistorical truth . . . but
the key to particular historically embedded social and psychological
formations. . . . Herder’s brilliant vision of the mutual embeddedness
of art and history underlies our fascination with the possibility of
treating all of the written and visual traces of a particular culture as a
mutually intelligible network of signs. (7)
Greenblatt and Gallagher here acknowledge how the new historicism leans upon the
old, and in such a way that explains how both Foucault and Herder could be among
their chief influences: For new historicism, the crucial interpretive gesture is the insis-
tence on reading culture as a “mutually intelligible network of signs,” as a glorious
chain of “mutual embeddedness.” Greenblatt and Gallagher actually go farther than
conventional Foucauldian analyses in asserting this embeddedness, dismissing critics
who argue that art might not be governed entirely by “semantic necessity” (11). This
confidence in the efficacy of reference—words are required to refer to a meaningful
context—is perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of new historicism.
25. The idea of deferred action is notoriously difficult. The most useful intro-
duction is Jean Laplanche’s “Notes on Afterwardsness,” which makes the connec-
tion between time and language explicit: deferred action “is inconceivable without
a model of translation: that is, it presupposes that something is proposed by other,
and which is then afterwards retranslated and reinterpreted. . . . It’s impossible
therefore just to hold a hermeneutic position on this—that is to say, that everyone
interprets their past according to their present—because their past already has
something deposited in it that needs to be deciphered” (222).
26. See “Direction” Fink 252 (“La direction” 627). 
27. Versions of this argument may be found in “The Natural History of German
Life,” in the famous Chapter Seventeen of Adam Bede (1859), and in the Prologue
to Felix Holt.
28. For Shaw, although mimesis is obviously crucial to realism, it is not an end
in itself. Instead, he argues, the “narrative apparatus of realism involves us in emo-
tional and cognitive activities that allow us to experience what it would be like to
come to grips with the way history moves” (35).
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29. In his introduction to Gulliver’s Travels, Scott explains that “a marked dif-
ference between real and fictitious narrative [is] that the latter includes only such
incidents as the author conceives will interest the reader, whereas the former is
uniformly invested with many petty particulars, which can only be interesting to
the narrator himself. Another distinction is, that, in the course of a real story, cir-
cumstances occur which lead neither to consequences nor to explanations;
whereas the novelist is, generally speaking, cautious to introduce no incident or
character which has not some effect in forwarding his plot” (“Jonathan Swift”
157).
30. Alluding to Adam Bede, Rosemary Jann helpfully links history and
nineteenth-century realism: “The proliferation of quotidian detail authenticated
this [shared historical] consciousness as it made the past habitable by imagination.
In its ‘faithful representing of commonplace things,’ the Victorian narrative histo-
ry aimed at asserting the authority of the ordinary in the same way as did many
novels of the period” (210).
31. For related critiques of Lukács, see Fleishman 11, and especially Shaw Forms
41–46.
32. The expectation that social-problem novels yearn for transparency is of
course most influentially articulated in Patrick Brantlinger’s The Spirit of Reform:
British Literature and Politics, 1832–1867 (1977). Brantlinger shows that what
animates Victorian fiction is the idea that “literature is or can be an instrument of
social amelioration, at the same time that it is shaped by social events” (27).
33. In The Industrial Reformation of English Fiction: Social Discourse and Narrative
Form, 1832–1867, Catherine Gallagher emphasizes this dilemma: social-problem
novelists “take no sly satisfaction in formal reflexiveness because their polemical pur-
poses, the same purposes that lead them to question the novel’s form, also lead them
to make excessively naïve mimetic claims for it. Even as they probe the contested
assumptions of their medium, they try to insist that their fictions are unmediated pre-
sentations of social reality” (xii). Gallagher’s formulation leaves unexamined the pos-
sibility that there might be a reason to claim mimetic representation as an aesthetic
aim, especially when that representation proves impossible to sustain.
34. In this respect, my project owes a large debt to Bodenheimer’s The Politics
of Story, which conceptualizes the social-problem genre as principally about social
fantasy, rather than about social reality as such. Bodenheimer argues that the genre
“points to a middle-class crisis of self-definition: insofar as the social-problem nov-
els can be treated as a group, they display conflict about the nature and diversity
of a newly empowered and newly fragmented middle class as they attempt to
reimagine the roles that it should play in the maintenance of social order” (5).
35. Walter Scott takes this position in a variety of places, including his com-
mentary on Jonathan Swift.
Notes to Chapter 1
1. For instance, in his essay on “Biography” (1832), Carlyle urges contempla-
tion of “how impressive the smallest historical fact may become, as contrasted with
the grandest fictitious event” (54, emp. in original).
2. In The French Revolution (1837), Carlyle lists “Nature, Universe, Destiny,
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and Existence” as equally useful names for the “grand unnamable Fact in the midst
of which we live and struggle” (13).
3. Mill makes a similar point about The French Revolution, arguing that Carlyle
makes his readers “acquainted with persons, things, and events, before he suggests
to us what to think of them. . . . This done, his logical propositions concerning the
thing may be true, or may be false; the thing is there, and any reader may find a
totally different set of propositions in it if he can; as he might in the reality, if that
had been before him” (“Review” 61, emp. in original).
4. The best sustained discussion of Carlyle’s inventive power is Dale, who pro-
vides a helpful overview of the relationship between Carlyle’s historiography and
German romanticism (Victorian Critic 15–88). Bigelow anatomizes Carlyle’s con-
cept of the unconscious, which he borrows from German romanticism. Recently,
Vida provides a sustained recent discussion of Carlyle’s early work in light of
German thought; the classic reference is Harrold.
5. In recent years, theorists have articulated as a general problem of narrative
Macaulay’s difficulty in establishing a secure difference between fictional and his-
torical narrative. For example, White famously explains that “narrative is not mere-
ly a neutral discursive form that may or may not be used to represent real events
in their aspect as developmental processes, but rather entails ontological and epis-
temic choices with distinct ideological and even specifically political implications”
(Content ix; Metahistory’s argument about the “emplotment” of history is also rel-
evant). From White’s perspective, we cannot overlook as simply ornamental the
latter half of the phrase “historical narrative”; instead, we must recognize the struc-
turing demands that narrative places on the historical field.
6. As White explains, Carlyle “made of the historical field and the historical
process a panorama of happening in which the stress is on the novel and emergent,
rather than on the achieved and inherited, aspects of cultural life” (Metahistory
149).
7. As Lacan puts it in Seminar II: “the object of the human quest is never an
object of rediscovery in the sense of reminiscence. The subject doesn’t rediscover
the preformed tracks of his natural relation to the external world. The human
object always constitutes itself through the intermediary of a first loss. Nothing
fruitful takes place in man save through the intermediary of a loss of an object”
(Seminar II 136/Le séminaire II 165). Two things are worth emphasizing here: The
first is that the subject does not so much remember the past as recreate it, in part
because what the subject remembers is the wrong thing: “In man, it is the wrong
form which prevails” (Seminar II 86/Le séminaire II 109). The second point is that
conceptualizing analysis as the restoration of the past is wrongheaded. If the
restoration of the original object were even possible, it would spell the death of
desire. As Lacan will argue in the seminar on anxiety, “the subject must fail, nec-
essarily, so that its desire is not suffocated” (Harari 99). Every object is a re-found
object, but happily, not the original one.
8. For recent overviews of the Macaulay-Carlyle debates, see Isaacson and
Sorenson. Isaacson explains that “Macaulay’s expansive, ambitious program for the
writing of history provided Carlyle with a convenient foil against which to express
his own evolving historiography” (29). Sorenson attributes their differences to
rivalry as much as philosophical contention (although he concedes that it is a fac-
tor, too), but emphasizes that both “wanted to open up the past to an audience
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that had turned away from the privileged discourse of gentlemanly chroniclers to
the more visceral language of journalism” (42). For Sorenson, “in The French
Revolution and [Macaulay’s] the History of England the press of ‘marginalized’ life
is felt in the style, description, documentation, and interpretation” (42). George
Levine’s The Boundaries of Fiction offers a useful assessment of Carlyle’s and
Macaulay’s achievements in Sartor and History; he explicitly considers the two in
relation to each other on 16–18 and 79–85.
9. G. P. Gooch’s History and the Historians in the Nineteenth Century narrates
the emergence of the Whig version of history, which properly begins with Henry
Hallam’s Constitutional History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the
Death of George II (1827). See Gooch 282–307, especially 292–95. Also see Parker
9–13. For a conservative polemic against the Whig version, see Butterfield.
10. “On History Again” explains that the benefit of historical portraiture is a
kind of “inspiration” rather than mimetic representation, and that such portraits
“urge [the reader’s] mind to complete the picture, and evolve the meaning there-
of for itself ” (57).  And in Past and Present, Carlyle argues that it is the “enigmat-
ic” feature that a portrait discloses, rather than certainty (45).
11. Michel Foucault coins the phrase “repressive hypothesis” in his The History
of Sexuality, Volume I, to describe the hydraulic conceptions of sexuality he attrib-
utes to Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse. In History, see 10–12. The most
important discussion of the “repressive hypothesis” is the opening of Christopher
Lane’s The Burdens of Intimacy, especially 3–7. In “Loving Civilization’s
Discontents,” I also address the limits of Foucault’s account (172–75).
12. Historical Sketches is a posthumous collection of Carlyle’s notes that his
brother, Alexander Carlyle, published. It comprises the notes and sketches that
Thomas Carlyle wrote while researching his biography of Cromwell, which
appeared in 1845.
13. In “Signs of the Times” (1829), Carlyle explains that “there is a science of
Dynamics in man’s fortunes and nature, as well as of Mechanics. There is a science
which treats of, and practically addresses, the primary, unmodified forces and
energies of man, the mysterious springs of Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of
Enthusiasm, Poetry, Religion, all which have a truly vital and infinite character”
(68).
14. In a brilliant and scrupulous reading of Carlyle’s Chartism (1839), Plotz
argues that Carlyle willfully misreads the rational, coordinated mass actions of the
Chartists as an outburst of a primal mob mentality. In so doing, Carlyle deprives
the Chartists of political agency, substituting in its place an unhistorical aesthetic
or psychological “truth” about the need for order (136–48). However, in The
French Revolution at least, Carlyle stages not only the inarticulateness of the mob,
but also how even the most well-thought-out and just political action can misfire,
even as it partially accomplishes its aim. And in Past and Present, he claims that
the Chartists were in fact the most articulate voice in England. 
15. The standard, and still invaluable, analysis of Carlyle’s rhetorical patterns is
Holloway; of most interest in this context is 61–75.
16. Bidney devotes his analysis of archetypal fire imagery to Carlyle’s Heroes,
Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History (1841).
17. Culviner offers the most helpful discussion of heroism in The French
Revolution; he suggests that the heroic approach may not be the most successful
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way to approach this earlier text.
18. Plotz connects Le Bon and Carlyle through the latter’s Chartism (1839), a
work that represents crowds in ways similar to The French Revolution (4–5).
Notes to Chapter 2
1. On Dickens’s anachronism as an organizing principle rather than a slip, see
Tillotson Novels 109–15. Peter Ackroyd remarks that “the London of [Dickens’s]
novels always remains the London of his youth” (100).
2. In writing of an “asymmetrical” relationship between history and experience,
I draw on Christopher Lane’s “Victorian Asymmetry” (Burdens 1–43).
3. Patrick Brantlinger has recently characterized Dickens’s ghostly philosophy
of history as a “grotesque populism” (61), that is, as a deeply ambivalent populism
which manifests its ambivalence by representing the popular as grotesque.
Brantlinger’s powerful reading does illuminate Dickens’s politics more than the
familiar claim that the novelist is a sentimental radical. However, I want to argue
that Brantlinger overlooks the extent to which, for Dickens, the ghostly and the
uncertain are what make history itself possible.
4. Although allegory traditionally implies a one-to-one correspondence
between registers of meaning, the proliferation of examples that all mean the same
thing indicates that such a model does not apply here. The pressure Paul de Man
brings to the concept of allegory is relevant, however. See particularly “Reading
and History” (66–67), where de Man also argues that a “dialectic of understand-
ing, as a complex interplay of knowing and not-knowing, is built into the very
process of literary history” (58). Although de Man writes of “literary history” in
this passage, at other moments in this well-known essay he connects literary-
historical practice with history as such.
5. Ackroyd writes that “Dickens suggests that the strongest dreams are those
which create a kind of allegory of the world, that dreams are, in that sense, at the
root of all fiction” (378–79). While I agree with this claim, it is important to
acknowledge that Dickens does not represent these “allegorical” dreams as the
“strongest” dreams, but simply as those in which he is willing to concede some
relationship between the past and the present.
6. My language here alludes to the Freudian/Lacanian principle of
Nachträglichkeit, or “deferred action.” As Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand
Pontalis explain, “It is not lived experience in general that undergoes a deferred
revision, but, specifically, whatever it has been impossible in the first instance to
incorporate into a meaningful context. The traumatic experience is the epitome of
such unassimilated experience” (112). I discuss deferred action at greater length in
my Introduction.
7. At least since Steven Marcus’s classic essay, “Freud and Dora: Story, History, Case
History,” critics have been attentive to the interplay between historiography and psy-
choanalysis. Marcus’s powerful reading of the Dora case as a historical narrative should
not obscure psychoanalysis’s more fundamental opposition to narrative meanings—or,
perhaps more precisely, psychoanalysis’s interest in the kinds of failures that thwart nar-
rative, although we often defend those narratives to the cost of our well-being.
8. Alenka Zupancic explains this point through the figure of Oedipus, suggest-
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ing that the particulars of Oedipus’s answer to the Sphinx’s riddle are less impor-
tant than his willingness to risk an answer. The Lacanian inference is that “the sub-
ject actually gives something—he must give or offer his words; thus he can be
taken at his word” (203, original emp.). 
9. Indeed, this openness to history, rather than the more sober injunction to
duty, constitutes his real inheritance from Carlyle; I take up Carlyle’s version of
history in Chapter 1. Elliot Gilbert provides an excellent discussion of Carlyle’s
“passionate anachronistic vision,” which denies “the view that human history con-
sists of a series of events linked by a superficial causality and that the way to pre-
serve and communicate that history is to present those events as far as possible in
the order in which they actually occurred and to look with disdain upon all but
logical explanations of the connections therein” (253).
10. For a different reading of secrecy in Dickens, see Miller, especially 192–220.
My account is more compatible with Christopher Lane’s recent critique of secre-
cy in contemporary queer theory (224–45, esp. 239–42).
11. Slavoj Zizek’s For They Know Not What They Do (1991) explains the “cata-
strophic consequences” of revealing “what should remain unspoken if the existing
intersubjective network is to retain its consistency” (11, 12).
12. Standard treatments of anti-Catholic prejudice in Victorian England
include Norman; Arnstein; Klaus; and Paz. Monod has a fascinating discussion of
Dickens’s personal hostility to Catholicism (192). For discussions of the Gordon
Riots, see Babington; De Castro; Hibbert; Rudé Crowd and Hanoverian.
13. Butt and Tillotson explain that “the events of 1836–1841 make the novel
almost journalistically apt. The Poor Law riots, the Chartist risings at Devizes,
Birmingham, and Sheffeld, the mass meetings on Kersal Moor and Kennington
Common, and most pointed of all, the Newport rising of 1839 with its attempt
to release Chartist prisoners—all these . . . gave special point in 1841 to ‘a tale of
the Riots of ’80’” (82). For additional discussion of the contemporary political sig-
nificance of Barnaby, see Rice “Politics.”
14. In “The Time of Interpretation: Psychoanalysis and the Past,” I discuss the
way psychoanalysis handles the distinction between memory and history proper.
15. Psychoanalytic critics have not failed to emphasize Barnaby’s discovery of his
father. Lacanian-oriented critics such as Michasiw and Sadoff have tended to read
Barnaby as psychotic. While their elucidations of the paternal role, or, more prop-
erly, its foreclosure, in paranoia have been useful to me, I am not sure that the
Lacanian father—that is, the signifier of maternal desire—is absent from Barnaby.
Mrs. Rudge is clearly marked by desire: The desire that Barnaby and his father not
meet. That this desire should depend on Barnaby’s ignorance of his father does not
necessarily mean that the father has been absent.
16. Natalie McKnight, as part of her argument that “Barnaby’s history recapit-
ulates the history of the treatment of the insane, as Foucault presents it in Madness
and Civilization” (90), reads this paragraph as a kind of silencing and punishing
of Barnaby.  It is, she finds, an attempt to normalize him that is more restrictive
than incarceration itself, because it implants within him the values of productivi-
ty and hard work. The extent to which Barnaby’s story recapitulates Foucault’s
argument is open to question—Dickens does not, after all, try to turn Barnaby
into a bourgeois, or even into a farmer, reporting instead that “his love of freedom
and interest in all that moved or grew, or had its being in the elements, remained
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to him unimpaired” (Chapter the Last: 634).
17. The most unequivocally evil characters in Barnaby, Sir John Chester and
Gashford, are ancillary figures in the novel; moreover, Chester is such a transpar-
ent caricature of Lord Chesterfield that Dickens cannot draw upon him in the
same way as he does the other main characters. For a full expression of this view,
see Saintsbury (qtd. in Hawses’ Barnaby 675–76). By contrast, Magnet argues that,
by attacking Lord Chesterfield so vehemently, Dickens is trying to prop up the cul-
tural role of the superego (84–99).
18. For a useful discussion of the function of these analogies in Scott’s historical
fiction, see Duncan (222), although he attributes Dickens’s revision of Scott to a
misreading on the former’s part (for a similar argument, see Newman 172). Also
see Marcus’s seminal account of Barnaby’s father-son pairs for a useful discussion
of analogy, as well as, more generally, Daleksi’s account of analogy in Dickens.
19. For the standard discussion of Dickens’s ambitions on this score, see Butt
and Tillotson.
20. Alison Case explains that Dickens “rejects . . . precisely the qualities which
define Scott as a historical novelist: namely, his ability to construct plots and char-
acters as representations of historical process and consciousness” (129). Yet she
goes on to assert that “it is the sense of being in the grip of the past, whether his-
torical, personal, or literary, that Dickens most wants to escape in Barnaby Rudge,”
and that “Dickens’s treatment of the subject seems to leave no room for any con-
sciousness of the past which is not ‘retrogressive’” (141, 42).
21. For example, the novel starts with two histories that are untrue—John
Willett’s account of Elizabeth staying at the Maypole and cuffing a story, and
Solomon Daisy’s misleadingly gripping account of the Haredale murder. Likewise,
Sim Tappertit, Varden’s apprentice, plots a vengeance justified by a bizarre belief in
the ancient privileges of apprentices, and the Protestant Association elicits violence
through misguided appeals to history.
22. For some critics this instantly disqualifies Barnaby as a historical novel: see
Lindsay; Butt and Tillotson.
23. McKnight exemplifies such claims, arguing that “Barnaby, Gordon, Hugh,
and the mob they lead are all striving to find a voice by lashing out at the surfaces
and conventions that have kept them mute and marginalized” (88). This formula-
tion obscures the radically different relationships of Barnaby, Gordon, and Hugh
to their mob—including the extent to which they are even aware that they are part
of a mob. In addition to McKnight, Lindsay and Hollington also read the novel in
these terms. Lindsay claims that “Barnaby and Tappertit . . . make up together
what Dickens feels the motive force of the revolt: that which is limited to particu-
lar circumstance and the sense of personal wrong, and is treated humorously, satir-
ically, and that which holds the pure human aspiration and is treated poetically,
sympathetically” (103). Such readings as Lindsay’s and McKnight’s miss the “actu-
al formation of an alliance between the two extremist factions, the militant
Chartists and the anti-Catholic Ultra-Tories,” which is the novel’s key political
insight into the 1840s (Rice “Politics” 60).
24. This criticism is explicitly formulated by Hollington, who argues that Rudge
“seeks conservatively to reinstate authority rather than undermine it. . . . It seems
Dickens is unwilling or incapable of imagining any freedom from psychic repres-
sion” (14). By contrast, John Kucich astutely observes that Dickens is uninterest-
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ed in psychic repression in his early fiction, including Rudge—though he is clearly
interested in the ways political repression can produce mob violence (213–14).
25. For a discussion of Rudge’s ghosts that emphasizes Dickens’s view of the
imagination rather than historical process, see McMaster 12–13.
26. Near the novel’s end, Barnaby comes to resemble his spectral father: “Passive
and timid, scared, pale, and wondering, and gazing at the throng as if he were
newly risen from the dead, and felt himself a ghost among the living, Barnaby—
not Barnaby in the spirit, but in flesh and blood, with pulses, sinews, nerves, and
beating heart, and strong affections” (79:711). It is striking that Dickens’s vibrant
proliferation of bodily tissues, apparently intending to confirm Barnaby’s liveli-
ness, contradict the list of adjectives at the sentence’s beginning. Read temporally,
this organization could suggest that Barnaby recovers his physical prowess as he
and Gabriel make their way to the latter’s house. The tension between the two
parts of the sentence also corresponds structurally to the status of the other living
ghosts in the novel—his father was pale, ghastly, and terrifyingly alive, for
instance. The sentence registers Barnaby’s return, but paradoxically his return
from life.
27. Duncan notes that Ainsworth and Bulwer-Lytton “undertook what might
be called a re-gothicization of the historical romance. . . . suggest[ing] that ‘histo-
ry’—the public affairs of great folks—is a glossy but empty pageantry, and the
fiery currents of life flow underground, in populous warrens and secret labyrinths”
(213–14). Dickens can be included in this re-gothicization as well, although his
ghosts work to very different effect from Ainsworth’s.
28. To understand the force of Dickens’s vision, it may be helpful to compare it
with W. H. Ainsworth’s Guy Fawkes (1841), an exactly contemporary historical
novel also promulgating tolerance for Catholics. In Ainsworth’s novel, Guy
Fawkes is plagued with supernatural visions—including the ghost of a saint—
warning him of certain disaster if he proceeds with his plot. Ainsworth deploys the
ghostly to indicate that Fawkes mistakenly acted out of ambition. For a further
discussion of the distinctive appeals to the supernatural in Dickens and
Ainsworth, see Schroeder 31.
29. For a useful overview of how Derrida’s recent turn to “hauntology” can help
us read the Victorians, see Julian Wolfreys’s Victorian Hauntings (and especially, on
Dickens, see chapters one and four of this work).
Notes to Chapter 3
1. For criticism of Shirley that emphasizes industrial conflict, see Plotz 154–93,
and Webb 121–61. E. P. Thompson discusses Shirley in his chapter on the
Luddites in The Making of the English Working Class (472–602).
2. Writing to William Smith Williams, Brontë enthuses that, were she to meet
Forçade, her “impulse would be to say, ‘Monsieur, you know me, I shall deem it an
honour to know you. . . . the subtle-thoughted, keen-eyed, quick-feeling Frenchman,
knows the true nature of the ingredients which went to the composition of the cre-
ation he analyses—he knows the true nature of things, and he gives them their right
name” (Wise Lives III:41). And she confides to Ellen Nussey that Forçade “follows
Currer Bell through every winding, discerns every point, discriminates every shade—
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proves himself master of the subject and lord of the aim” (Lives III:42).
3. Sally Shuttleworth concisely describes this analogy: “Both the labour and
marriage markets are overstocked. Middle-class women and mill workers are alike
made redundant, transformed from valued producers into worthless commodities
by the operation of economic factors over which they have no control” (Charlotte
Brontë 184). John Plotz argues that the relationship between women and workers
is not analogous, but that the novel shows how middle-class women’s flight
towards privacy is produced by the threat of the mob.
4. For accounts emphasizing Shirley’s paternalism, see Bodenheimer; Webb.
5. Wendy Parkins has recently noted the tendency to read Shirley as though it
were a “transparent allegory” (27), a phrase she borrows from Roland Barthes. Paul
Kenny makes a similar argument.
6. See Lane “Charlotte Brontë.” My argument in general owes a clear debt to
Lane’s reading; I shall return to his argument at specific moments below.
7. Sigmund Freud was fond of this story, which he called “kettle logic,” using
it in both The Interpretation of Dreams (1900[1899]) and Jokes in Their Relation to
the Unconscious (1905). For a related discussion of Moore’s apparently inex-
haustible list of reasons not to help the workers, see Lane 206–7.
8. For instance, Patrick Brantlinger has recently argued that, because Shirley
represents the working classes as intelligent, the novel is caught in a double bind:
“it is not clear why, assuming that Luddism was not in their interest, the workers
should fall prey to the outside agitators. On the other hand, if Luddism was in
their interest, and the workers knew this, they wouldn’t have needed outsiders to
rise them to action” (Reading 114). I am trying to suggest that Shirley’s theory of
causation cannot be equated with responsiveness to ideology.
9. Plotz argues that “the real strength of Shirley” is “the way it is striving to con-
tain within the confines of the novel a potentially disruptive rival. That rival is the
claims for representation that working-class crowds forcefully asserted throughout
the 1840s” (171).
10. The Professor and Villette, in particular, also showcase a different kind of con-
flicting interpretation, one that tends to mediate between secrecy and the intensi-
fication of desire—and even to use repression as a mode of this intensification.
This is a fascinating dynamic, but one that proceeds quite afar from this chapter’s
focus. For a full discussion of this idea, see Kucich 34–113.
11. I discuss this theory of realism, and its evolution from Walter Scott’s writ-
ings on the novel, in my introduction.
12. In a letter to Williams, Brontë proclaims that “Details, situations which I do
not understand and cannot personally inspect, I would not for the world meddle
with, lest I should make even a more ridiculous mess of the matter than Mrs.
Trollope did in her ‘Factory Boy’” (Wise Lives II:184).
13. For a superb discussion of Coriolanus and antisocial aspects of human
nature, see Lane 210–11. Other relevant discussions of the relationship between
the play and the novel include Arnold and Patterson.
14. At a crucial moment in her argument, Armstrong misattributes this line to
Caroline, and further insists that “Brontë was not being the least bit ironic in hav-
ing her heroine say this” (217). Had Caroline said this, the scene would indeed
take on a disciplinary valence of the sort Armstrong describes.
15. I discuss “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” at greater
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length in my introduction.
16. Lane is especially interesting on the surplus violence that the workers voice;
see 207–8.
17. Patterson argues that Shirley is “a fable of industrial relations that is triply
layered in historical retrospect and proceeds by historical analogy, a method to
which the frontal presentation of Coriolanus is at once the key and the profession-
al statement of intent” (149). 
18. Brontë herself had always admired the Duke of Wellington. For a telling
recollection from Brontë’s childhood, see Gordon 28.
Notes to Chapter 4
1. Eliot’s relationship with positivism is famously complex. For helpful discus-
sions, see Vogeler; Semmel 8–11; and Graver 4–10.
2. Martha Vogeler’s excellent biography of Harrison, Frederic Harrison:
Vocations of a Positivist, details his involvement with the biography (293–94).
3. For a full consideration of Eliot’s painterly metaphors, see Witemeyer, espe-
cially 33–44.
4. Harry Shaw explains that realist novels have never been as interested in so-
called representational transparency as its various critics and defenders have
alleged. See particularly Narrating 38–89.
5. Eliot and Harrison’s exchange is motivated by his reading of Felix Holt, sug-
gesting that Eliot’s reference to “pity and terror” is a self-quotation: Many people,
she writes, experience “some tragic mark of kinship in the one brief life to the far-
stretching life that went before, and to the life that is to come after, such as has
raised the pity and terror of men ever since they began to discern between will and
destiny” (Introduction: 10).
6. In his most recent novel, Thinks . . . (2001), David Lodge revisits the terms
of Harrison and Eliot’s debate. In Thinks . . . , a cognitive scientist dismissively
refers to grief, with its concomitant “excessive” outbursts of affect, as a sign that
the “virtual machine” of consciousness is broken. His conversational foil, a novel-
ist whose husband has recently died, refuses to believe that grief is a breakdown at
all. In their conversation, the scientist and novelist explicitly raise the distinction
between pictures and diagrams, as well (68–69). Connecting Lodge’s novel with
the Harrison/Eliot debate suggests that fiction may be motivated by nonrecuper-
able aspects of experience. In other words, in both cases the novelist’s interest in
painful thoughts is not to integrate them into an otherwise uplifting narrative, but
to explore how the persistence of those thoughts deforms and even shatters our
complacent everyday sense of identity and self-transparency.
7. Ashton sees this passage emerging from Eliot’s reading of Lyell’s Principles of
Geology (1830–1833) and “the optimistic materialism of [Charles] Bray and
[Charles] Hennell” (75). For an extended unfolding of this passage in its relation
to Eliot’s career, see Bonaparte Will. Dale (In Pursuit) and Shuttleworth (George
Eliot) establish the broad context of the nineteenth-century birth of scientific
empiricism, or “positivism” in that term’s widest sense. Beer’s excellent Darwin’s
Plots scrutinizes Eliot’s relationship with evolutionary biology. McCaw similarly
locates the passage in relation to nineteenth-century British historiography, and in
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“Determinism” Levine establishes Eliot’s intimate familiarity with the relevant
philosophical arguments, especially those of Mill.
8. Li puts this argument most generously, arguing that while Eliot accepted the
organic metaphor, she saw no need to elevate it into an all-encompassing theory
(194). Williams gives the argument a particularly caustic form: Eliot’s position is
“that of a Carlyle without the energy, of an Arnold without the quick practical
sense, of an anxiously balancing Mill without the intellectual persistence” (108).
9. Amanda Anderson’s recent The Powers of Distance (2001) usefully explains
that “for Eliot acts of distancing produce a more primary effect, which is psycho-
logical: the underdevelopment of the moral faculties, particularly the faculty of
sympathy” (11).
10. Eliot recycles this synesthetic image to similar effect in Adam Bede (1859),
where her narrator says that the “secret of our emotions never lies in the bare object
but in its subtle relations to our own past: no wonder the secret escapes the unsym-
pathising observer, who might as well put on his spectacles to discern odours”
(200).
11. For an extended discussion of Eliot’s complex invocation of Wordsworth and
“the peasant,” see Roazen; also see Pinney “Authority” for a helpful discussion of
this passage as evidence of Eliot’s skepticism about progress.
12. For particularly explicit versions of this tendency, see Andres; Rosenberg
“George Eliot”; Rosenberg “Historicizing.”
13. Kate Millett makes this point with characteristic pungency: “George Eliot
lived the revolution . . . perhaps, but she did not write of it” (139). And it is worth
acknowledging that nothing is less like the world of a George Eliot novel than
Mary Ann Evans’s escape from being the daughter of a Tory land-agent and her
transformation into a great novelist. Her father, Robert Evans, was “suspicious of
all forms of ‘enthusiasm,’ took both his politics and his religion from Arbury Hall
[estate of the Newdigate family, for whom he served as land-agent], never trou-
bling his head with questions of doctrine” (Haight 8; Ashton 11–16). In this chap-
ter, I am trying to suggest that there are conceptual reasons for Eliot’s approach
that cannot be reduced to bad faith or “a little Toryism by the sly” (Eliot “Sad
Fortunes” 3–4).
14. Writing of the increasing sense of interconnectedness in the nineteenth cen-
tury, Eliot states: “Within lives still vigorous there have been changes such as the
First Reform Bill & the Repeal of the Corn Laws, which have given a keen exper-
imental sense that public action is also a private affair. And there is the better
understanding of disease which makes obedience to general sanitary measures a
double education in the ideas of continuity & solidarity” (Pinney “More Leaves”
372). Eliot implicitly concedes here that we cannot know whether public events
determine private ones, but can only “sense” that they may be related. She defends
this position vigorously, though, exclaiming, “As if the question whether personal
identity can be proved were more weighty than my experience that what my past
self felt & did is affecting my present self!” (Pinney “More Leaves” 370). For Eliot,
everything will hinge on this “experience,” and whether or not her characters are
capable of taking up a different position with respect to it.
15. Examples of such political criticisms are almost too numerous to mention.
For Felix Holt, a useful overview of the overwhelmingly negative Marxist and
materialist critical response to the text is provided in Perkin 125–38. Well-known
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instances of critics lamenting George Eliot’s conservatism in Felix Holt include
Bamber; Brantlinger Spirit 230–35 (where Eliot’s organicism is assimilated to
Spencer’s); and Williams Culture 102–9. For influential feminist perspectives on
Eliot, see Showalter Literature, esp. 125–32; Millet 139, 155; Gilbert and Gubar
443–535; Booth 204–35. Booth puts this particularly bluntly: “Eliot . . . openly
begs her social questions: Which misogynist is Esther Lyon to marry? Which fate
is better for the workers in the short run: brute subjection or brute rebellion?”
(205). Staten provides a useful abridgement of and rebuttal to similar criticisms of
Middlemarch.
16. Oscar Wilde skewers such providentialism in The Importance of Being
Earnest (1895), as Miss Prism defines fiction for her pupil, Cecily Cardew: “The
good ended happily, and the bad unhappily. That is what Fiction means” (II: 341).
17. For a discussion of this passage’s origin in George Eliot’s astonishment at the
inflated rhetoric of the 1830s, see Graver George Eliot 289.
18. As Eliot’s narrator puts it in Middlemarch, “Mortals are easily tempted to
pinch the life out of their neighbour’s buzzing glory, and think that such killing is
no murder” (II: xxi: 205).
19. The key modern critics of Felix as a match include Bamber; Brantlinger
Spirit; and Gallagher Industrial.
20. While Victorian critics denounced Eliot’s deferred narrative, modern critics
have praised the same tendency. In a formulation I have found immensely help-
ful, Rosemarie Bodenheimer explains that in Felix Holt, “stories . . . reproduce the
view of action as anticlimax, revealing a perpetual frustration of anticipated rela-
tionships between thought, action, and consequence” (211). Similarly, Robert
Caserio finds “an arbitrary relationship between what is done and narrative rea-
sonings about what is done that always threatens to return action to the form of
accident. And this constant threat to the significance of action, which in its turn
threatens to return meaning itself to the form of accident or mere nomination, is
also offered by Eliot as most plausibly representative of ‘the real’” (211).
21. There isn’t space enough for a proper consideration of Daniel Deronda,
which is of course Eliot’s most well-developed account of progressive organicism
in history. But Deronda can be such a novel because it is aspirational, whereas Holt
and Middlemarch are so self-consciously novels of England’s past, and thus
attempt more seriously to explain the present.
22. Gillian Beer brilliantly connects Eliot’s refusal to specify originary moments
to the novel’s complex array of web imagery (153–65). J. Hillis Miller’s influen-
tial essay, “Narrative and History,” also argues that the narrative is not organized
around beginnings or endings.
23. I am not seriously suggesting that Brooke or Casaubon represents tenden-
cies in organicist thinking, of course—only that they are clear, and when played
against one another, comic demonstrations of error in historical thinking.
24. It is interesting to note here that in Eliot’s manuscript, the “Prelude” is con-
tained within Volume I, “Miss Brooke.” Such a bibliographic detail can only be
suggestive, rather than definitive, but it may buttress my point that the narrator
of the “Prelude” is voicing Dorothea’s fantasies, rather than her own. For a discus-
sion of the manuscript, see Beaty Middlemarch.
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Notes to Epilogue
1. For “gnomic propositions,” and Lacan’s self-conscious manipulation of
aphorism, see Seminar VII (129).
2. Nor has time disproved Jameson’s witticism that “the only people still seri-
ously interested in [Freudian criticism] are the Freudians themselves” (Political 65).
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